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ABSTRACT

This study describes a comprehensive theoretical framework for

Open Education based upon the epistemological, psychological, and

philosophical premises of John Dewey and Jean Piaget.

It assumes

that Open Education requires for itself a more rigorous understanding of the psychological notions and their philosophical implications

than currently seem to inform Open pedagogy.

It also assumes that

Open Education, like the Progressive Movement in education before it,
faces as its major task that of getting beyond the phase of self-

advocacy through polemical rhetoric and sentimental theorizing,
so as to evolve a consistent and workable body of pedagogical prescrip-

tions for elementary teachers.

Following an Introduction, the second chapter describes this
initial phase, and its tendency to couch arguments for educational

reform in ideological terms.

It contends that while an educational

reform movement may be carried along initially by the efforts of
persuasive critics writing in times of social ferment, and by the

examples of a few conspicuously successful experiments in progressive
schooling, it must ultimately define itself through its manifest

ability to sponsor total development in individual children, and
in particular,

the development of an active and resourceful intelli-

gence.

which
Chapter three sketches out a theoretical position from
inferred.
prescriptions for Open classroom practice may be logically

from the developmental
The theory described here is derived largely
lesser extent, Lawrence
ideas of John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and to a

vi

Kohlberg and other developmental psychologists.

It focuses on

Dewey and Piaget's notions of the development
of logical thinking,
3nd the dynamics of this development.

Chapter four establishes criteria for the classroom
"environ-

ment

that are implied by the dynamics of development.

Strategies

for provisioning and organizing the Open classroom are discussed

with respect to responsive environmental conditions, and the need
for opportunities to act and reflect, and to experience cognitive

conflict situations.

These strategies are informed by the teacher's

assessment of environmental possibilities, and of the student's
capacity for logical thinking.

Chapter five follows with a discussion of curriculum implications.

The dynamics of cognitive development suggest that curriculum

essentially be thought of as problem-solving activity.

This activity

varies according to how the problem is identified, and to the kind
of outcome that represents an adequate encounter with the problem.

Curriculum that sponsors problem-solving, inquiry behavior requires
subject matter that is cognitively challenging, and capable of

engaging the learner's interests over a substantial period of time.

Chapter six examines theoretical implications for the teacherpupil relationship.

It concludes that the "humanistic" trend in

current educational reform, emphasizing the importance of the "helping relationship" for classroom learning and teaching, needs to

epistemology.
involve an understanding of developmental psychology and
and study
The final chapter points to the need for further research
theory, and on
in the areas of ego psychology and developmental

vii

teacher training that reflects an awareness of the
implications of

developmental theory.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

If there is an open education movement, it is surely
a loosely defined one.
There is no detailed theory of
child development or of pedagogy or of social systems
which creates consensus among all those who are now
involved in open education.
Instead, any movement
which exists has grown more from the day-to-day activities of teachers in English infant schools than from the
thinking of educational theorists. The definition of
informal education exists most fully in the perceptions
of teachers who know a good classroom when they see one,
but who would be hard put to explain precisely what is
.

.

.

good about it.
(Bane,

1972, p.

273)

Open education will defy definition as a discrete
concept.
It will remain a multi-dimensional ideology
Educators in the United
like progressive education.
States have collected under the label of open education
a number of "best existing practices" and imbued them
with the aura of an ideology.
(Myers and Duke,

1972, p.

14)

Some of this characteristic vagueness about definition
the movement is young (in spirit, if
can be explained:
British practitioners seem reluctant
not historically).
for fear of being misinterpreted
writing
to put much in
or 'copied' too precisely or too superficially; the
essence of this environment is its flexibility, and many
of its practices are therefore difficult to define.
Practice, in this particular educational movement, has
precluded theory, and, as yet, the theorists have not
But all these reasons notwithstand"caught up."
come for more exact specification
surely
has
time
the
ing,
objectives, both psychoeducational
education's
of open
.

.

•

emotional and intellectual.
(Rathbone,

1972, p.

539)
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Open Education, as

a body of

teaching practices and theoretical

assumptions about learning, teaching, and the role of schooling

in

society, has not yet articulated for itself a coherent rationale--a

philosophy consistent with

a

psychology.

At present, theoretical

foundations for Open, "integrated day" practice in the United States

seem rather eclectic.

Psychological theory comprises a disjointed

and sometimes contradictory mix of cognit ive-deve lopmentalism, "per-

ceptual" theory, and therapeutic technique.

There

is a

resemblance

here to the rather fluid theoretical foundations of the Progressive

Movement in education.

Unfortunately, Open Education has so far

shown a conspicuous disregard for historical precedents that might

offer some valuable lessons on the subject of educational change.
If Open Education is to avoid the waywardness and lack of

intellectual integrity that characterized the evolution of the

Progressive Education Movement, then it requires of and for itself
a more rigorous understanding of the psychological principles and

their philosophical implications that seem at present to guide the

best examples of Open practice.

Open Education needs prescriptive

as well as descriptive theory, drawn from research and inferred from

practice.

It requires theory to consolidate and direct present

conducive
practice, insure intelligent and informed extension, and be
to the effective preparation of new teachers.

Such theory also needs

in a non-doctrinaire
to be sufficiently comprehensible, and persuasive

appraise its real
way, as to enable parents to fairly assess and
children.
educational goals and their appropriateness for

3

The intent of this dissertation is to work towards such theory.

More specifically, the dissertation will* attempt to bring together
and examine critically a body of psychological, philosophical, and

ethical positions that could comprise

a

suitable theoretical basis

for Open pedagogy in the United States.

The underlying assumption

of this attempt is that a conceptual framework--a comprehensive and

consistent theory that derives implications for practice from epistemological, psychological, and ethical principles---is necessary to the

development and maintenance of good informal schooling.
like education, avers David Hawkins

In fields

(1972),

it is often believed that theory is a sort of idle
luxury or even a fraud, purporting to lay down encompassing generalizations which in fact have not been
On the contrary, it is in
'empirically established.'
just such fields as ours that theory is of the greatest
For we do in fact
importance, though much neglected.

already know a great deal about education and development; the problem is rather to marshal that knowledge in
Empirical investigations cona coherent usable form.
ceived within such a framework of theory can react upon,
They cannot amount to
can modify or extend knowledge.
288)
much without it.
(p
.

Charles Silberman (1971) has remarked that American teachers,
and American education in general, have traditionally suffered from
lack of a clear and coherent sense of purpose to guide practice.

Joseph Featherstone (1972b) also sees this as a contemporary problem.
"What is clear," he argues in an article on Open Education,

theory has to be re-united with practice.

is

that

Without a solid grounding

teaching will be
in children's development, much American informal
in classrooms,
gimmickry; and without a sound base in actual practice

theory will remain useless"

(p

•

100).
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In considering the relationship of theory to practice in the

more successful British schools he visited, Featherstone (1971b)

noted that theory was of "practical use" to teachers because

it had

either been derived from, or coincided with, a significant body of
good practice already in existence.

"Piaget is fortunate in that

much of the British teachers' practical work intersects with his
theoretical concerns" (pp. 5-6).

While it might be argued that this

practice was by no means nonderivative itself (the influence of John
Dewey, among others, is frequently mentioned), the fact remains that

theory and practice must grow hand in hand.

This dissertation will therefore seek to define theory for Open

Education as comprising pragmatic philosophical ideas that are consistent with defensible psychological, epistemological and ethical

precepts.

The aim will constantly be to identify related principles

that are true to the nature of the classroom teaching experience, and

both intelligible and useful to those entrusted to teach there.

David

Hawkins' remarks on theory can again help to elaborate on this charge.

—

theorizing has its own norms of self-consistency, of
completeness, of definition and organization, of adequacy
Because of these
to subject matter, of fruitfulness.
requirements a good theory outruns the hard evidence
a
available to support it and if it does not, it is not
not
are
But the basic postulates of theory
good theory.
taken as mere assumptions. They are
be
therefore to
they
supported by the kind and degree of organization
highlight.
or
to
lead
they
phenomena
induce, by the new
(1972, p.

288)

that we are gathering
The new phenomena in elementary schooling

been richly highlighted
under the label Open Education have indeed
and widely showcased.

legion.
Efforts to define Open Education are

5

They range from the succinct and general statement by Silberman
(1971.)

Open Education is a

'set of shared attitudes and convictions

about the nature of childhood, learning and schooling"

(p.

208) --to

the comprehensive and itemized list of characteristics reported by

Walberg and Thomas (1971)

.

Open Education

and Teachers (Nyquist and Hawes,

:

A Sourcebook for Parents

1972), Open Education

:

The Informal

Classroom (Rathbone, 1971c), and The Open C assrcom Reader (Silberman,
1973)

contain some of the most noteworthy definitional literature.

The following passage is by Nyquist (1972), and serves as a concise,

representative conception of Open Education and its objectives.
The purpose of open education is to provide a format
whereby children are free to learn at their own pace and
The teacher serves as a facilitator of
in their own way.
an invitingly arranged environment,
providing
learning,
She
materials, motivation, guidance, and assistance.
works with individuals and small groups helping to set
goals and achieve them, raising questions, intervening
when necessary, observing children, and assessing their
Children's growth is evaluated on an individual
progress.
basis with the teacher in terms of strengths and weaknesses
(p. 84)
and for the purpose of diagnosis and planning.

Two young educators in particular have become strongly linked

with the articulation of Open pedagogy:
Rathbone.

Roland Barth and Charles

They have attempted, in several articles and books, to

to
set down the fundamental principles or assumptions that seem

underlie Open Education.

What is at once both attractive

suspect-- in their writing is its dogmatic quality.

yet sli D htiv

There is an impli-

of the premises
cit faith in the common sense and moral correctness

feeling that they are
they put forward, justified, no doubt, by the

only codifying what is already

a

working reality.

Interestingly,

reads a lot like
Barth's list of "Assumptions About Learning" (1971)
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John Dewey's "My Pedagogic Creed" (1897b).

It will only be noted

here that creeds, by definition, are to be taken more on faith than
on objective evidence.

Indeed, Barth (1971) admits that "the state

of thought surrounding open education is still primitive.

The

.

.

.

assumptions about learning are hunches, based largely upon impressions, gut feelings, emotional responses, and informal observations
in classrooms.

Collectively, the assumptions do not constitute

There are inconsistencies and voids;

coherent system or philosophy.
there

is

a

little supporting research"

(p.

134).

The thesis to be supported is that there has been sufficient

research, as well as a substantial body of related philosophical

thought and educational experiment (some of it by no means recent)
to justify an attempt at piecing together a coherent system of theory

for Open Education.

The plan

I

intend to follow has

six.

parts, each
a

histori-

cal context for the current ideology of informal education.

It also

to be treated as a chapter.

The first tries to establish

represents an attempt to do some sorting out of those

assumptions" already ascribed to Open Education.

founding

The ensuing four

and
chapters will be concerned to identify a body of descriptive

earlier by
prescriptive theory that meets the standards suggested

David Hawkins.

Chapter III describes an integrated theory of

intelligence and learning.

Chapter IV then considers the implications

educational environment. Chapter V
of that theory for setting an
and Chapter VI, the impliexamines its implications for curriculum,

cations for the teacher- learner relationship.

These chapters will

professional
a look at some directions for
be followed by a summary, and

7

growth of practitioners, as well as for further
research and develop-

ment of theory.

Below is a more detailed discussion of this plan.

Chapter II:

The Ideological Temper of

Progressive Educational Reform in America

One of the salient characteristics of educational "movements"
is

that they are often borne along more by popular ideals and politi-

cal convictions than by critical thinking and professional insight.

Thus it has been noted of the current trend towards informal schooling that its so-called philosophical aims are often no more than

libertarian assertions and romantic notions of child development.^

A first step this dissertation will take will be

to look at the

American Open classroom movement in the context of the radical reform
currents of the 1960's and early 1970's.
In many respects these reform trends are not entirely new.

For

example, strong resemblances exist between the rhetoric of contemporary

school critics like Silberman, Holt, and Dennison, and that of certain

turn-of- the-century counterparts.

These resemblances will be examined

with an intent to sift out the political from the pedagogical, and
the romantic from the practicable.

Comparisons will then be drawn

between educational practices that grew out of these similar climates,
notably those of the Progressive and the Open Education Movements.
Again, the aim will be to consider trends towards informal schooling
as part of larger political and cultural phenomena.

This kind of

Peters^, "'A
A good example of such criticism is found in R. S.
(19b9)
Critique"
Constructive
A
Recognizable Philosophy of Education'
l

1

:

.
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critical historical perspective might yield certain
categorical judg-

ments of educational "principles" that can make ensuing value
judgments more informed and useful.
Some important sociological observations made by Dewey and

Featherstone will also be examined.

Allegations that informal school-

^^8 produces anti- inte 1 lectua lism and elitism will be touched on here,
in the context of our broader inquiry into the nature of liberal

educational reform:

who promotes it, in whose name is it promoted,

and for whom is it actually most beneficial.

Chapter III:

A Cognitive-Developmental Framework

for Open Educational Theory

My contention in this dissertation will be that theory for Open

Education can and should be developed on sounder, less "trendy"
premises than those which accounted for much of its initial, as well
as current, popularity.

The third chapter will be concerned with

identifying and describing an epistemology and

a

theory of cognitive

development that might serve as an authoritative foundation for Open
pedagogy.

This effort, while emphasizing developmental theory,

implicitly reflects those ethical assumptions commonly identified

with Open Education.
Featherstone (1972b) has stated that if "the current interest
in informal teaching leads to cumulative change,"

two factors in particular.

it

will depend on

One is improved teacher support.

The

other is "whether enough people can come to understand the essentially
good
different outlook on children's intellectual development which

9

informal work must be based on"

(p

.

This different outlook,

100).

as perceived in exemplary classrooms on both sides of the
Atlantic,

emanates largely from the research initiated by Jean Piaget.

Expon-

ents and interpreters of Piaget's work assert that it provides

universal criteria for the types of experiences which can lead to
the development of intelligence.

In the United States, cognitive-

developmental psychology for educators has been articulated most

notably by Jerome Bruner, and more recently by Lawrence Kohlberg.
The implications this research holds for Open Education will be
explored here, along with similar conclusions reached by John Dewey.

Dewey was also an epistemologist and, in his way

,

a

learning

psychologist; his theory invites comparison with that of more recent

vintage

Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) have argued convincingly for a PiagetDewey entente to provide the body of theory upon which education for

intellectual and moral development can be based.

Such theory

describes a constructionist and interactionist view of development.
It measures growth in terms of the ability to understand problems and

reach decisions.

Kohlberg has shown elsewhere (1971, pp. 171-174)

that his stage conception of the development of moral reasoning is

culturally universal.

He has also made a case (1971)

sophical validity of deriving "ought statements'

based notions of cognitive maturation.

for the pnilo-

from empirically-

A question like, "Why is

a

valuable
role-taking, problem-solving approach to education inherently
logic of his arguand desirable?" is tentatively answered within the

ment

.

This dissertation accepts Kohlberg'

s

position, and will not

10

be occupied with defending it.
a

Kohlberg and Mayer's definition of

progressive model for education serves as

a

touchstone for this

chapter, and its influence pervades the dissertation.

Chapter IV:

Implications of Developmental Theory

for Setting an Optimal Environment in the Open Classroom

The dynamic of growth embodied in this theory relies on such

factors as cognitive conflict, structural match between subject

matter and learner, and opportunities for role-taking and for "testing
things out."

Open classrooms, insofar as they encourage active and

individual confrontation of learning problems, as well as constructive
social interaction, would seem to have a natural potential to imple-

ment development.

Chapter IV will therefore prescribe some optimal

environmental conditions for classroom learning implied by cognitivedevelopmental theory.

In particular,

I

will be discussing here impli-

cations for diagnosis, provisioning for learning, and organizing the

Open classroom, as well as examining such terms as "active" and
"discovery" learning.

Chapter V:

Implications for Curriculum

in the Open Classroom

Curriculum innovation for informal schooling in both Britain
and the United States seems to have concentrated more in the early
grades, where, according to

a

Piagetian developmental schedule, the

concrete mode of intellectual operations dominates learning.

One of

Education can make
the contributions a comprehensive theory for Open

11

is

to provide guidelines for curriculum design throughout all the

developmental stages.

This chapter will begin by addressing the

problem of curriculum objectives that are stated too narrowly, both
in terms of grade range and of learning outcomes.

facilitating development must provide

a

Curriculum for

variety of contexts for learn-

ing, and must define learning outcomes in several ways.

The dynamics of cognitive growth suggest that curriculum essen-

tially be thought of as problem-solving activity.

varies according to how the problem

is

This activity

identified, and to the kind

of outcome that represents an adequate encounter with the problem.

Curriculum that sponsors problem-solving, inquiry behavior requires
subject matter that is cognitively challenging, and capable of engaging the learner's interests over a substantial period bf time.

Dewey's

ideas for an "occupations" curriculum acknowledges these requirements,

while linking them to a broad theme of social purpose.

The latter

part of Chapter V will examine those ideas, as well as considering
some implications for evaluating curriculum.

Chapter VI:

Implications for Teacher

Intervention in the Open Classroom

suggests
The interactionist aspect of developmental theory also

quality and
certain optimal conditions for learning that involve the

teacher-student
quantity of personal exchange, and in particular, of

relationships in the classroom.

There is already a body of psychologi-

relationship, and which
cal literature that speaks directly to this
is

frequently referred to by Open educators.

Carl Rogers is the leading

12

exponent of this so-called humanistic psychology, and terms like

"humanistic teaching" and "the helping relationship" have gained

wide currency through interest in the writing of Rogers and Arthur
Combs.

The sixth chapter of this dissertation will seek to explore

the implications of our epistemological and psychological theory for
the teacher- learner relationship.
I

will suggest here that Rogers' advocacy of non-directive

teaching is especially conducive to misinterpretation of the teacherlearner relationship as a function of development.

Perhaps more than

any other contributor to existing theory for Open Education, the

humanistic psychologist needs to be read critically and unsentimentally
His valuable suggestions for teacher practice,

I

will hold, can be

taken best advantage of within the framework of theory outlined earlier
The facilitation of learning is a crucial concept for Open educators,

and it needs to be

defied

in a broader context than that of psycho-

therapy and normative social psychology.

This thesis will rely heavily on the pedagogical writings of John
Dewey.

The breadth and consistency of Dewey's thinking, taken as a

the
whole, can provide a consolidating and unifying perspective for

theoretical foundations of contemporary Open Education.

Far from

that are
being obsolete in the light of more recent research findings

stage
influencing Open educators, Dewey's notions of developmental

are now increaspsychology, and his epistemology and learning theory,

and others.
ingly confirmed by the work of Piaget, Kohlberg,

Like-

with his interpretations
wise, Dewey's philosophical ideas, together

13

of the social problems endemic to urban, bureaucratized society, are

still cogent and seminal to contemporary,

liberal positions.

Dewey's field of inquiry was always broader than that of the

academics and professionals of today.

Psychology and sociology were

only beginning to be considered as separate disciplines, apart from

philosophy, when Dewey developed his theories as a student and then
as a teacher.

Furthermore, Dewey was not only a theorist but an

active and long-term critic of educational practice
States and abroad.

in the United

As he continued to elaborate and rearticulate

his philosophy of education, he was, at the same time, responding to
the problems he witnessed in implementing theory.

Dewey's vision had always been what we would today call

a

But the challenge to professionals and parents alike

holistic one.

who are attracted to Open Education demands this kind of vision.
There is also
a

a

great need here for a more uniform vocabulary--f or

greater evenness and substantive dialog among the various strains

of psychology that describe learning and teaching in an Open class-

While Dewey's prose style

room.

is

sometimes cumbersome, his termin-

ology seldom mystifies, and he might serve us well in this capacity.

Several leading advocates of Open Education have had frequent

recourse to Dewey's writings for statements of theory in support of
their arguments.

^

Others who do not mention Dewey still manage to

comprehensive vision
sound surprisingly like him, though they lack his

Featherstone
Silberman (1971) and (1973); Nyquist (1972);
(1971b); and Dennison (1969).
2

E g
.

.

,

14

if not his sophistication and incisiveness.

American education, Dewey

is

Yet in the history of

more often associated with a movement

that never achieved its potential, and seemed,
to be ill-defined and unworkable.

in so many

instances,

If Open Education is to embrace

theory that has in the past failed to produce the cumulative change
and sustained improvement that was hoped from it, it is imperative

for us to clearly identify and understand the reasons why

a

Deweyan

philosophy of education is any more suitable and practicable now
than it was before.

15

CHAPTER

II

THE IDEOLOGICAL TEMPER OF

PROGRESSIVE EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN AMERICA

everything begins in sentiment and assumption
and finds its issue in political action and institutions.
The converse is also true:
just as sentiments
become ideas, ideas eventually establish themselves
as sentiments.
(Trilling, 1950, p. ix)
.

.

.

We cannot escape, then, the major task of our time--a
task which we have helped to shape--namely that of
participating in historical actuality more consciously
and thus responsibly than have the generations before
,

us

(Erikson,

1964, p.

211)

Where the historian could be helpful, in my opinion, is
not by deeper but still inconclusive research into the
past, but by projecting alternative scenarios for the
future
(Lynd,

1968, p.

104)

To observe the Open Education movement, as an historical

phenomenon

is

to see it in an ideological context.

Open Educa-

tion in America is a manifest part of the liberal politics and
the radical rhetoric that define an era in our recent history.

Open Education "arrived" in this country in the late 1960’s.

methodology

,

it was

As

primarily an import from England, known widely

or just the
as the Leicestershire model, or the Integrated Day,

British Infant School.

A series of articles in The New Republ ic

innovative practices,
by Joseph Featherstone ably publicized these
efforts to analyze
and educators like Lillian Weber made notable
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and adapt them to American settings.

1

As ideology

,

however, Open

Education did not need to cross the Atlantic for inspiration.

The

Featherstone articles, and the signal interest in British schooling
that followed, were themselves preceded by a rash of criticism
of our

own public education system, which uniformly called for more libertarian and egalitarian practices in the schools.

There was already,

then, an atmosphere of reform ideology that easily embraced the

concept of an open, informal classroom where children might fulfill
their natural potential, instead of being stunted and alienated.

Open Education became a movement during a period of notable
social criticism and public activism.

Educational critics were

calling for radical changes in the school's attitudes towards children
at a time when anti-war demonstrators, consumer advocates, and

ecology -minded citizens everywhere were loudly clamoring for changes
in governmental and industrial attitudes toward all living things.

As such, progressive reform in education has seemed inextricably
allied, both ideologically and politically, to the prevailing

energies of

a

broad movement in social reform.

A remarkably similar

set of circumstances has been observed at least once before in this

country.

During the two decades or so flanking the turn of the

century, Americans were also vitally concerned with consumer advocacy

^Joseph Feathers tone s articles appeared in The New Republic
numbers of August 19, September 2, and September 9, 1967, and were
Lil later included in his book Schools Where Ch i Idr n Learn (1971)
InEnglish
lian Weber's contributions include a scholarly study, The
the
fant School and Informal Education (1971), and her leadership in
"Open Corridor" Program, described in Arthur J. Tobier et al., Learn'

.

in the Open Corridor"

(1973).

^See Richard Hofstadter (1955, pp.

171-173).
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and conservation 3 (today termed ecology), as
well as with education.

Historian Richard Hofstadter (1955) has spoken of this
critical
period as a time when disillusionment with "progress" was formed
by an increasing awareness (made more acute by an economic
depression)

of social injustice.

"The generation that went Progressive

was the generation that came of age in the nineties.

.

.

.

William

Allen White remembered them in his autobiography as the 'hundreds
of thousands of young men in their twenties,

thirties, and early

forties' whose 'quickening sense of the inequities, injustices, and

fundamental wrongs' of American society provided the motive power of
reform" (pp

.

166-167).

Reform in education seemed especially crucial.

"Progressive Education," explains Lawrence Cremin (1961)

,

"began

as part and parcel of that broader program of social and political

reform called the Progressive Movement.

.

.

.

The idea had its

origin during the quarter-century before World War

I

in an effort

to cast the school as a fundamental lever of social and political

regeneration.

It began as a many-sided protest against a restricted

view of the school, but it was always more than this; for essentially
it viewed education as an adjunct to politics in realizing the promise

of American life"

(p

.

88).

A major contention of this chapter

is that the

manner in which

founding ideas for informal education evolve historically can profoundly influence the practicability of these ideas, and their reception

3

See Christopher Lasch (1965, pp.

162-163).
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by American school communities.

Our propensity, in times of radical

protest and dissent, to propose "political solutions for
cultural
problems and cultural solutions for political problems" (Lasch,
1965,
p.

163) makes it difficult to thoughtfully fashion educational

improvement that transcends partisan ideology and sentiment.
this chapter

I

In

intend to present what appears to me to have constitu-

ted a four-part scenario for the phenomenon of progressive^ reform

movements in American education.

One objective of this presentation

is to identify those aspects of progressive reform--of advocacy for

open,

informal methods of schooling-- that are ultimately unproductive

and detrimental to the development of sound, acceptable pedagogy.

Basically, I will be examining how reform efforts have come about,
and what kind of thinking has contributed to reform ideology.
I

think it

the first place,

is

important to add two related thoughts here.

In

the discussion that follows is not meant as an

exercise in second-guessing history.

That is to say, it is my con-

tention that for improvement in the direction of informal schooling
to be realized it is necessary that we have "progressive movements"

for all the confusion and hostility, and the uneven, superficial

theorizing they engender.

But what is also necessary is that some

consistent, informed, and pragmatic theoretical guidelines emerge
after the initial energies of reform movements succeed in establishing

a
^The word "progressive" here appears in lower case to denote
generic kind of educational reform ethic, as opposed to the proper
noun denoting the name of a historical phenomenon, the Progressive
Movement
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a

beachhead for change.

I

will be attempting, therefore, to identify

those factors in the historical development of reform ideology that
tend to preclude the emergence of viable and useful pedagogical

theory

Part

1:

Social Criticism and the Schools

Educator James McDonald (1970) has claimed that "The concept of
an open school as a moral stance existed prior to the American

Progressive Education period, and it has continued on with the demise
of the leaders of progressivism"

(p.

26).

"Progressive education,

then or now, was and is a fundamentally ethical movement.

.

.

.

The concept of an open school as the bridge for then and now, is a

moral statement.

That is to say, it is unlikely that one would arrive

at this concept without overriding ethical concerns as one attempts
to construct social situations and technical conditions"

(p.

24).

To be aware of the essentially moral quality of progressive education
is crucial to an

understanding of both how such an educational move-

ment is ushered onto the public scene, and in what terms it is
defined.

When American institutions are perceived to be particularly
would-be
unresponsive- -and morally irresponsibl.e--social critics and
social engineers converge on the schools.

The school system has

the United
always been the most accessible public institution in

States.

and community
Its life and operation are open to parents

can presume to speak
they choose to be attentive), while almost anyone

and be listened to about school issues.

For the progressive intellectual
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particular, education can represent the ideal
forum for sounding

off against the system, and for sounding out
utopian ideas.

The

typical line of progressive reasoning is that by
instituting demo-

cratic school procedures, by cultivating the uncorrupted
energies of
children, and by training them to become resourceful and
ethical,
the school might turn out a new breed of citizen whose autonomy
and

moral responsibility could make democracy more of a working reality.

Naturally this opportunity to criticize and suggest becomes more of
an imperative during times of perceived anomie.

Theodore Brameld (1965) has thus argued that during a period of
cultural crisis, "the second of the two major roles of education,
the role of modifying, or innovating /.the other being one of trans-

mitting/, becomes stronger.

There is greater concern with the

causes and corrections of the dislocations that are chronic to crisis.

Simultaneously, education becomes both more diagnostic and prognostic,
in ways that remind us of medicine as it becomes involved in the

A crisis is a time when, as

diagnosis and prognosis of a disease.
it were,

the body politic becomes diseased.

Education then becomes

concerned with its therapeutic functions to a much greater degree
than in normal times" (p.

13).

While this argument represents no

more than an extension of John Dewey's "school-as-embryonic-community"
concept, the rhetoric is indicative of the way many contemporary

discussions of education are weighted.
The impetus for the essentially ethical tendencies in educational

reform trends has traditionally been

a

prevailing sense of social
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crisis.

Lillian Weber (1971) has observed that we Americans
are

only moved to review our public educational practice during
"periods
of great social pressures--from the unemployed,

from immigrants,

from 'cold war' competitive tensions, or as today from our racial

minorities

.

.

(p

.

234)

In all but one of these instances

.

(the

effect of sputnik on American curriculum priorities), it was the
social pressures from disenfranchised or victimized populations that

prompted, in the name of freedom and equality, a call to overhaul
the educational system of the country.

Large-scale immigration after

the Civil War necessitated more humane as well as efficient insti-

tutional means to accommodate

a

rapidly growing urban population.

The energies of the early Progressive educators, including John Dewey,

were explicitly directed to this problem.

The Progressives of the

thirties responded to another dimension of inequality, and demanded
of the schools a greater effort towards democratizing society.
is not

It

surprising, then, that the issue of racial injustice which

has confronted Americans so dramatically in the sixties and seventies

also spawned an acute concern for changes in education.
The harbingers of ethical reform trends during the sixties were,
for the most part, critics of direct (and indirect) racial discrimina-

tion in urban public schools.

It might be said,

in fact,

that the

ground for the ideological foundations of Open Education was dug by
a

group of fairly young men

— without

much educational experience

who entered the schools, were repelled by the situation they found,
and wrote books about it.

The titles tended towards the sensational,

but the message was the same:

Our Children Are Dy_ing, Death

at. fill
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Age, How Children Fail

,

Crisis in the Classroom

.

Nat Hentoff

(1966), Jonathan Kozol (1967), John Holt (1964)--as well as George

Dennison (1969) and James Herndon (1968)

— all

contributed valuable

spadework- -and Charles Silberman (1971) then drove in with

The achievement of these critics was largely

a

a bulldozer.

journalistic

one, with the emphasis on first-hand reporting and common sense

analysis rather than systematic research and scholarship.

What

bothered them most was the lack of sensitivity and justice that
characterized the attitudes towards children.

were best-sellers; Crisis in the Classroom

,

All of these books

the one title that did

contain considerable documentation and research, as well as being the
bulkiest of the lot, was even a Book- of - the -Month Club selection.

Their cumulative effect was to sound an alarm, to broadcast

a

picture

of overwhe lming tedium, mechanical rigidity, narrow-minded or sense-

less directives, and authoritarian cruelty that prevailed in many

American classrooms.

They also prompted a substantial number of lay-

men and professionals to look for ways to cure these ills.
The closest counterpart to these critics during the decade of
the nineties was probably Joseph Mayer Rice.

Cremin relates (1961, pp

.

Rice, as Lawrence

3-7), was a young pediatrician who had

become interested in innovative pedagogy.

After publishing

a

few

opinionated pieces on public schooling in New York City, he was hired
American public
by a magazine to write a series of articles appraising
education.

Just as Charles Silberman was to do seventy-seven years

public schools, and
later, Rice made an exhaustive survey of the
the most part, woerully
came to the conclusion that they were, for
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deficient and backward.

Furthermore, Rice also scored the mechanical,

unthinking, and oftentimes harsh qualities of classroom practice.

Cremin reports that, as with Silberman and the others, Rice's opinions were widely read and had substantial public impact.

So too

did the opinions about education of contemporaries like Jane Addams

and journalist Randolph Bourne.'’

Indeed, as Richard Hofstadter

(1955) has pointed out, "to an extraordinary degree, the work of the

Progressive movement rested upon its journalism.

The fundamental

critical achievement of American Progressivism was the business of
exposure, and journalism was the chief occupational source of its

creative writers.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the

Progressive mind was characteristically a journalistic mind, and
that its characteristic contribution was that of the socially

responsible reporter-reformer"

(p

.

186).

It would seem that the school critics of the 1960's are very

much the inheritors of this tradition, and have had some notably

similar effects on educational developments that followed in the

wake of their findings.

But it must be noted that the task these

individuals undertook-- that of creating a climate of awareness and

receptivity to ideas for change--of ten conduces more to being

exhortative and compelling than hard-headed

and thorough-minded.

exposure has been
In this respect, the tone characterizing efforts at

and Ran^See Jane Addams, Democracy and Social E thics (1902)
Cremin
and
dolph S. Bourne, Youth and Life (1913); also Lasch (1963)
(1961) on the impact of their writings.
,

24

typically one of civic indignation and moral urgency,
as the following opinion, given not by a "reporter-reformer"
but by a leading

professional exponent of Open Education, bears vivid witness

to:

"It is easy enough to be dispassionate in considering broad
social
and cultural influences upon our schools.

restrained when one

is

It is not so easy to be

closely familiar with what certain practices

mean in the lives of individual children who become the victims of
their parents' and their teachers' ambitions.
becomes institutionalized

.

.

."

(Hull,

When the exploitation

1971, p.

56).

A highly

charged polemical approach to problem analysis, while necessary to

overcome the inertia of apathy, can adversely influence the degree
of tact and thoughtfulness with which positions are formulated and

programs organized.

The work of the socially responsible reporter-

reformer in both eras has led to exciting new concepts for public
education, but has also helped set some unfortunate precedents for the

manner in which these concepts are explored and implemented.

For, as

we shall see, the achievement of the initial phase of the educational

reform phenomenon has been in part to commit constructive energies
to an ideology of reaction, and to a program founded on antithesis.

Part

2:

Reform Pedagogy

The second phase of the phenomenon involves the promulgation of

new principles upon which change will be based.

While my rhetorical

strategy here might imply a strict chronology for these "phases,
fact they are often coterminous.

My point

is that

while ideas for

changing educational practices are continually afloat during such
times, significant receptivity to them is determined by

a

certain

in
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momentum of ideological conviction and public sentiment.
suggested that the role of critical journalism, during
social disquiet,

is

precisely to create such momentum.

one can see throughout the reform phenomenon

— from

a

I

have

period of
In reality,

the onset of

criticism and exposure, to the restatement of educational objectives,
their reception, and the inevitable tendency towards orthodoxy--a

sequence of causality that is characterized more by sheer impetus
than by a logical and well-considered continuity.
The humanistic approach

.

Typically, advocates of progressive

reform argue from two basic and related standpoints:

a humanistic,

child-centered approach, and a social-meliorist approach.

Addams (1902)

Jane

took a typically humanistic position in stating "We

are impatient with the schools which lay all the stress on reading
and writing, suspecting them to rest upon the assumption that the

ordinary experience of life is worth little, and that all knowledge
and interest must be brought to the children through the medium of
books.

Such an assumption fails to give the children any clew to

the life about him, or any power to usefully or intelligently connect

himself with it" (pp

.

180-181).

Her contemporary, Joseph Rice (1893),

hammered out a distinction between old-fashioned, ineffective "mechanical" schools, and the innovative "scientific" schools that produced

startling results in the teaching of reading and writing--because
they attended to "the laws of mental development" and treated chil-

dren more humanely

(p.

21). ^

"While the aim of the old education,

of mental developIn the next chapter I will claim that the laws
But I would draw a crucial
ment are of signal importance to educators.
to Rice, and
distinction between the substantiating research available
6

that available at present.
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Rice argued, "is mainly to give the child a certain
amount of information,

the aim of the new- education is to lead the child
to observe,

to reason, and to acquire manual dexterity as well as to
memorize

facts--in a word, to develop the child naturally in all his faculties,
intellectual, moral, and physical.

.

.

.

_/i/ n

these schools the

teacher is guided in her work by the nature of the child mind
(p.

.

."

Randolph Bourne, the well-known social critic for the New

95).

Republic

.

,

abetted the cause somewhat later with opinions on the ideal

relationship of educators to children like this one:

"The best

thing they can do for /the children/ is to feed their curiosity, and

provide them with all the materials that will stimulate their varied
interests.
(Lasch,

They can then leave the 'influence' to take care of itself"

1965, p. 89).

It is significant that none of the three critics were,

speaking, educators--or even psychologists.

strictly

Contemporary educators

like Dewey and Francis Parker had, to be sure, more balanced and

sophisticated notions on the role of curiosity and self- initiative
in education, and we will have occasion to refer to some of them in

subsequent chapters.

But Parker and his pioneering school in Quincy,

Massachusetts, were rendered to the reading public largely through
the pen of journalists like Rice, just as Bourne and others served

importantly as publicists for Deweyan ideas.

Hofstadter and Cremin

observe also that even the professionals directly involved with
was
pedagogical research often employed a heavy-handed rhetoric that
just as tendentious as that of their journalist advocates.

Gathering

Stanley Hall,
evidence from the writing of Parker, psychologist G.
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and Dewey ("My Pedagogic Creed"), Hofstadter
(1966) concludes that
the new education was presented to the world not simply
as an

instrumentality but as a creed, which went beyond the hope of this
or that strictly educational result to promise some kind of ultimate

salvation for individuals or for the race" (pp. 366-367).

While there is not present today such an evangelical climate
underlying the efforts of proponents for reform, Open Education has
been ushered onto the American scene in much the same way:

with

a

wave of declamations for the rightness, if not the righteousness, of
discovery learning and curricula based on children's needs.

And

all too frequently, terms like "need," "interest," and "freedom" are

used with no more exactitude than is necessary to affirm essentially

libertarian sentiments.

John Holt has perhaps become one of the most

widely recognized propagandists for radical school reform, and his

mission seems to be to point out the general absurdity of school
curriculum and the dishonesty inherent in schools themselves (1964,
pp.

170-181).

Subject matter and didactic teaching, Holt has argued,

actually preclude opportunities for a child to be "learning naturally,
following his curiosity where it leads him, adding to his mental

model of reality whatever he needs and can find a place for, and
rejecting without fear or guilt what he does not need.

.

.

.'

(p.

178).

In a similar vein, educator Charles Rathbone (1971) suggests

that "the child learns best when given freedom to explore the world

around him, with a minimum of direction from others"

(p

.

100).

he contends that practitioners of Open education should reject

Thus,
«_he

traditional notion of 'coverage' as it affects school curriculum,
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along with the implication that "there exists some inherently
indispensable body of knowledge that every single child should know.
Both these implications they reject"

(p.

103).

It would be unfair to Holt and Rathbone not to allow the legi-

timacy of their criticism regarding the decidedly arbitrary and often

artificial ways that curriculum is organized in public schools.
ther, I would agree that "coverage," taken by itself,

adequate goal for instruction.

is

Fur-

hardly an

Yet an antithesis between prescribed

curriculum content and idiosyncratic development is clearly implied
in both arguments, while no justifications are offered save for a

tacit assumption that such claims are self-evident.

To argue that

children can learn only that which seems to them relevant, however,
or learn "best" when given their heads,

is

simply to ignore one's

own varied experience as a learner, and all that we know and have
found interesting only because circumstances pressed us to examine
or study it.^

In fact, these statements about children and learning

recall the arguments of Randolph Bourne and the other early advocates
of informal schooling,

following criticism:

toward which Hofstadter (1966) directed the
"the concept of individual growth became a

hostage in the hands of educational thinkers who were obsessed with
the chi Id- centered school."

For it "invited educational thinkers to

set up an invidious contrast between self-determining, self -directing

growth from within, which was good, and molding from without, which

discussed
^The issue of school-set curriculum objectives will be
at greater length in Chapter 5.
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was bad"

(p.

373).

Hofstadter saw the issue as essentially romantic, setting up "an
antithesis between the development of the individua l--his sensibility,
the scope of his fancy, the urgency of his personal growth--and the

imperatives of the social order, with its demand for specified bodies
of knowledge, prescribed manners and morals, and a personal equipment

suited to traditions and institutions.

Theirs /the Progressives//

was a commitment to the natural child against artificial society"
(p

.

368).

Most arguments for change presented by progressive apolo-

gists conform to this mold:

schools that impose physical and social

restraints (desks in rows, no talking), rely heavily on

a

prepared

curriculum, and mediate learning exclusively through the teacher and
the textbook, are oppressive and ineffective, and need to be replaced

by those that encourage freedom to talk and move about, sponsor a

need-oriented and experience-based curriculum, and emphasize discovery
learning.

While there are indeed important implications contained

within this assessment, the tendency for educational reform theory
is

research
to stop short of a rigorous application of psychological

and philosophical method.

Instead, we often find examples of "over-

of
simplification from inadequate knowledge," usually in defense

a

"romantic
learning process which, as one reviewer has alleged, a

with educaeducational reformer" like John Holt mistakenly confuses

tion (McCracken, 1970,

p.

46).

The social meliorist approach

.

If the humanistic position states

reform with respect to child
an oversimplified case for progressive

reform that has also generated
development, there is another approach to

30

considerable reductionist thinking.

I

allude here to the perspective

that sees the problems in public schooling as stemming from
a pre-

vailing sense of reason, scientific method, and rational purpose in
the management of social institutions.

This perspective describes

education as much from a societal point of view as from an individual
libertarian standpoint, and focuses on the level of institutional
needs moreso than upon psychological ones.

Critics who maintain such

a focus are often regarded as rather utopian "social engineers;"

ideologically, however, they are more frequently liberal (like a

Charles Silberman) than radical (like a Paul Goodman).
John Dewey (1928) provides a definitive argument from this

social-meliorist orientation:

"if one conceives that a social order

different in quality and direction from the present

is

desirable and

that schools should strive to educate with social change in view by

producing individuals not complacent about what already exists, and
equipped with desires and abilities to assist in transforming it,
quite a different method and content /than in a 'static educational

system// is indicated for educational science"

(p.

119).

During the

early Progressive period, this conviction was shared by a significant
sector of the business and industrial community, as well as by aca-

demics and journalists.

Historian Joel Spring (1970) points out that

such individuals "had in common the vision of a corporate society

dependent upon specialization and cooperation"

(p.

54).

What such

a

vision meant for the reform-minded was that "traditional notions of
rugged and independent individualism had to be replaced with the ideal
the whole
of the socialized, cooperative man who worked for the good of
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society," and who could contribute his special skill
within the

increasingly bureaucratic organization of corporate enterprise
54).

(p.

The first goal of the educators and the social reformers
who

adopted this vision of the well ordered society was to change the

/presumed/ basis of human motivation from desire for economic gain
to unselfish interest in working for the good of society"
(p.

55).

Since the mid 20th century, complacency and apathy have been

perceived to be at least as vitiating as unscrupulous economic
behavior.

But we should nonetheless recognize in those early Pro-

gressive reform sentiments strong resemblances to the liberal rhetoric
of President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, and the Great Society

plans of the Johnson administration.

Charles Silberman's important

study (1971) was in large part an outgrowth of the latter, and it
is

to Silberman's conclusions regarding the conditions necessary for

change in education, and to certain tendencies in liberal reform
thought in general, that

I

should now like to turn.

Along with his exposure of incompetence in the public schools,
Silberman made (as did Rice before him) significant efforts to describe what good schooling might be like.

He visited several schools

where children seemed happy and attentive, and where he found some
dramatic results in learning achievement.

Joseph Rice had assumed

that inefficient and oppressive teaching traditions could be corrected
if

the schools would embrace scientific laws of child development--a

more reasoned, enlightened approach to education.

The core of Charles

Silberman's critique of public education many years later follows
similar logic.

If the problem is mindlessness, Silberman suggests

a
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that "the solution must lie in infusing the schools, and the other

educating institutions, with purpose--more important, with thought
about purpose, and about the ways in which techniques, content, and

organization fulfill or alter purpose" (1971,

p.

379).

Open Education has already demonstrated how techniques, content,
and organization may fulfill or alter purpose.

One role of theory

for Open Education can be to articulate, in forms that are communicable and inherently meaningful, how this process might be understood,

and thence be transferred and implemented elsewhere.

believe Silberman*

s

advice is fairly well-taken.

Here, then,

I

But what about

the injunction to infuse schools with purpose, and with thought about

purpose?

How,

Has

in fact, do we inject mindfulness into education?

this not been an enduring goal of educators since Socrates, and is
it not therefore rather idle to propose nothing more instructive

than this?

"The public school system is generally harmful and destruc-

tive, as Silberman says.

But," as Allen Graubard (1972) asserts,

— that

people have forgotten to think about the

analysis of causes

his

purposes of education (apparently waiting for Charles Silberman,

backed by $300,000 of Carnegie money, to remind them to think)
/is/ totally inadequate"

(pp.

.

.

.

256-257).

the
Lionel Trilling (1950) has observed that "It is one of

tendencies of liberalism to simplify, and this tendency

is

natural

m

organize the elements of
view of the effort which liberalism makes to
life in a rational way"

(p

.

xii)

.

Both Dewey and Silberman shared

explanations of the
this trait, but their persistently clearheaded
the schools, for example)
mechanics of social melioration (as through
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led them to blanket diagnoses of "the problem"
that were too reductive

and abstracted.

As Joseph Featherstone (1972) points out, Dewey

vaguely and misleadingly" identified the common social
pursuit as
'"the method of intelligence'"

(p.

31).

While

I

will argue in the

next chapter that an appreciation of Dewey's conception of the
method
of intelligence is indeed essential to the improvement of schooling

methods, Featherstone

s

point is still well-taken.

For such a commen-

tary on the dynamic of social progress as Dewey's is in actuality no

more he lp fu
As

I

than Silberman's theory of mindlessness.

suggested earlier, the tendency to locate the source of

institutional failings in

a

condition of inconsistent purpose and

unreasoned behavior has not been uncommon to American social criticism.
Liberal intellectuals have long observed the waste and the injustice
that accrue from ill-reasoned and arbitrary methods of institutional

management.

But the liberal's faith in the efficacy of scientifically-

informed, purposeful planning to accomplish constructive social change

has often revealed two faults.

One is an indifference to the dictates

of bureaucratic politics; the other, an insensitivity to potential

class antagonisms and conflict of interest.
In their enthusiasm for and commitment to social engineering,

liberal intellectuals have often betrayed a kind of cause-and-ef feet
logic that relies more on a sense of the moral rightness of their posiO

tions than on historical and political acumen.

Richard Kofstadter

had
In point of fact, social reformers like Addatns and Dewey
secure
to
politics
at
often shown themselves quite skillful in playing
continued support for their respective ventures.
8
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(1966)

remarked, apropos of the Progressive Education Movement, that

what is important in a practical sphere like education

is

very often

not so much the character of a philosophy or creedal commitment as

certain questions of emphasis and proportion which arise in trying
to execute it; and there is no automatic way of deriving a sense of

proportion from a body of ideas.

For example, the early spokesmen

of the new education demanded that the child be respected, but it was

difficult to say where respect might end and a kind of bathetic
reverence might begin"

(p

.

368).

Hofstadter's argument implicitly

recommends the pragmatic approach to the problems of educational

reform that characterized Dewey's work at the Laboratory School of
the University of Chicago.

Yet it would seem, judging from the

ideologically authoritarian tone of several current apologists for
informal schooling (all their disclaimers to the contrary

)

,

that we

are ignoring the experiences of the past, and merely repeating the

mistakes born of zeal.
One other significant characteristic of progressive reform
schemes (both past and present) has been the tendency to expect too

much from any one public institution, or cultural event, tnat the
liberal intellectual feels can be manipulated to the advantage of

libertarian and egalitarian causes.

Ethical concerns in Ameiican

educational reform have often led to some rather doctrinaire theorizas levers for
ing, especially when the schools have been looked upon

and Rath^E.g., the rhetorical strategy of Barth (1971, 1972)
professional
culled
the
for
bone (1971a, 1971b) of claiming to speak
opinions of the best Open classroom teachers.
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social change.

Allen Graubard’s commentary (1972) on
libertarian

theory for free schools applies,

believe,

I

of educational reform phenomena.

to a much broader context

"The theory itself," he insists,

depends too much on a rhetoric that projects
unrealistic expectations.
The social and psychological penetration of the
theory
shallow.

What

I

is

often

mean is that, as with the spirit of educational

reform thinkinking in general, there

is an

overemphasis on the school,

whether good or bad, as a shaper of attitudes and behavior"

A perspective like this," he adds later, "can generate
can be seriously misleading.

163).

(p.

a mood which

It misconceives the nature of culture

by implying that a new one can be willed into existence by a small,

well-meaning group of good people

.

.

."

(p.

165).

Richard Hofstadter

(1966) maintained the same opinion with regard to the Progressive

Education movement:

"The notion that the authoritative classroom

would of necessity produce the conformist mind and that sociable
learning would produce the ideally socialized personality

first

is at

appealing, but there is about it a kind of rigid rationality of the
sort that life constantly eludes.

...

To expect that education

would so simply produce a hoped-for personal type was to expect more
than past experience warranted"

(p.

385).

The principle achievement of liberal thought with respect to

educational reform has probably been to impose some critical clarity
on situations that have grown muddled and counter-productive.

Its

shortcomings are related to its tendency to polarize issues and its
penchant for antagonistic rhetoric.

Dewey, in fact, frequently felt

obliged to caution against concentrating the energies of reform
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pedagogy

a g ai n st

"traditional” schooling.

It is a telling comment

that ten years after he had admonished the
Progressive Education

movement to develop a positive, prescriptive, and
consistent pedagogy
(1928, pp.

113-120), we find him observing, in Experience and Educa -

^ion (1938a), that "there

is always the danger in a new

movement that

in rejecting the aims and methods of that which it
would supplant,

it may develop its principles negatively rather than positively
and

constructively.

Then it takes its clew in practice from that which

is rejected instead of from the constructive development of its own

philosophy"

(p

.

20).

Unfortunately, Charles Silberman's assessment of fairly recent

educational reform strategies attests to just this kind of behavior.

Silberman contends that because of their "failure to study educational
history, particularly the history of progressivism'
failures,

.

.

.

s

successes and

contemporary reformers repeated one of the fundamental

errors of the progressive movement; they perpetuated the false dichotomy that the schools must be either child-centered or subject-

centered" (1971,

p.

180).

Education, for all its impressive beginnings,

would seem to be courting the same kinds of results, judging from some
of the statements cited earlier by influential figures like Holt and
v

Rathbone

.

only does ideological sides-taking seem endemic to the
educational reform phenomenon, but there is also a tendency to justify
partisan arguments with intuitive truths, or a sometimes spurious kind
A widely published list of philosophical premises for
of reasoning.
Open Education like Roland Barth's "Assumptions" (in Barth, 1972), ior
Barth
instance, provides an instructive example of the former. While
these
of
validity
the
about
tentative
himself is suitably modest and
*'°Not
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Part

3:

Responses to Reform

Just as they are susceptible to polemicism, vagueness, senti-

mentality, and political ingenuousness, liberal efforts to establish

new directions for pedagogical theory are also hampered--and at times
sabotaged- -by a class-specific way of setting down educational objectives
for all of American society.
(1971)

For example, when Charles Silberman

observes that "Our concept of education reflects our concept

of the good life, the good man, and the good society

.

.

.

(p.

389),

his contention is quite vaiid--but unless it is developed in the

context of a plurality of value-orientations, it
meaning.

is

empty of much

For there are, of course, many different visions of the

good life, just as there are different economic stations from which
such visions emanate.

Joseph Featherstone (1971a) has addressed this issue cogently,
and

I

shall begin my discussion of the third aspect of the reform

phenomenon- -the ways in which the curious mixture of progressive
educational theory and rhetoric

received and interpreted--by quot-

is

ing him at some length.

The American milieu is polarized culturally and politically;
this polarization conditions American responses to accounts
The responses tend to fall into the
of informal teaching.

appealing premises (he does, after all, call them only assumptions),
couched and the
the emphatic, almost dogmatic tone in which they are
axioms-format in which they are presented--rather like geometric
Rathbone,
augurs a somewhat less discerning approach than Charles
Bai.th s
Mr.
take.
we
suggests
sounding much like Dewey, wisely
for
need
the
"
out
point
reflections," Rathbone cautions,
educational
this
underlying
ther systematic analysis of the theories
116).
movement" (editor's preface to Barth, 1971, p.
.

•

•
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stereotyped categories of a cultural cold war raging between
the hip, emancipated upper middle class and the
straight
middle and working class.
It is a class and cultural conflict, and it takes the form of battles between those who
see life as essentially a matter of scarcity--and defend
the virtues of a scarce order, such as thrift, discipline,
hard work--and those who see life as essentially abundant-and preach newer virtues, such as openness, the cultivation
of feelings, and spontaneity.
Hip people like the idea of
open classrooms because they seem to give children freedom;
straight people fear the absence of order, discipline, and
adult authority, (p. 22)
;

Historically, there has probably always been such
the formulation of educational goals for America.

tension in

a

Up to the turn

of the century, as Oscar Handlin points out (1959), reform-minded
educators confronted a situation where "the culture communicated
through the school
32)

.

was unrelated to the life of its students"

(p.

Handlin alludes to the manners and attitudes that distinguished

"gentility and quality"--imp lying that class discrimination was
indeed institutionalized in the schools, and that gentlemanly virtues

were passed off as proper educational goals for everyone.

The efforts

of the early Progressives were in large part aimed at moving educa-

tional objectives in line with economic and social realities.

Interestingly, this action was supported by significant repre-

sentation from the industrial sector, and not just for charitable
purposes.

Joel Spring (1970) notes that "the vision of

society dependent, upon specialization and cooperation
ground for both educator and industrialist.

a

corporate

was a common

"Large corporate business

it
men and labor leaders supported this progressive movement because

recognition
rationalized the social and economic system and assured the
of their place in society"

(p.

54).

To be sure, for many Progressive
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educational leaders whose motives for reform were primarily
ethical,
the goal of "specialization" was not a paramount
one.

In the Dewey

School, for example, children were encouraged not to specialize
but
to experience skill-development in complete and natural ways,
and to

develop a variety of skills.

Cohen and Lazerson (1972) argue that

Dewey had in fact "contended that work in an industrial society,
'especially in cities,' was 'anti-educational,' because it took
its definition from the needs of the economy, rather than individual

or social needs"

(p.

60).

'*''*

But such change in cultural attitudes, even when advanced for

economic reasons as well as for moral and ethical ones, has to be

accomplished in the arena of conflict that Featherstone spoke to.
And progressive reform, no matter how egalitarian it has claimed to
be, has always been criticized as being in reality more suited to

the life and learning styles of the middle and upper-middle classes.

Thus, while the early Progressive Movement had contributed substan-

tially to reorienting educational objectives in the name of democracy

the connection between libertarian and humanistic
rhetoric and the changing requirements of the economy needs to be considered as a countervailing force amidst the generally antagonistic
Cohen and Lazerson argue, for
thrust of progressive reform movements.
instance, that the current emphasis on play as legitimate classroom
activity is tied to "the changing character of productive activity.
The increasingly technological nature of production has created a
demand for a more highly trained and differentiated labor force, engaged not only in goods production, but also in the production of culAmong the new strata of workers,
ture, socialization, and welfare.
cerebral, and mobile, and has
technological,
labor has become more
must the training period of
only
created more room for leisure. Not
of training must be
kind
such a labor force be extended, but the
An emphasis on 'creativity' replaces a pure emphasis on

^Nonetheless

,

changed.
discipline" (p. 62).
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and science, by the 1920

's

Progressive schools had already been

criticized for being elitist.

One of the critics was John Dewey.

"Upon the whole," Dewey would summarize in
1930,

progressive schools have been most successful in furthering
creativeness’ in the arts--in music, drawing and
picture
making, dramatics and literary composition, including
poetry.
This achievement is well worth while; it ought to
assist in producing a generation esthetically more sensitive and alive than the older one.
But it is not enough.
Taken by itself it will do something to further the private
appreciations of, say, the upper section of a middle class.
But it will not serve to meet even the esthetic needs and
defaultings of contemporary industrial society in its
prevailing external expressions.
(pp. 222-223)

Whether or not advocates of Open Education consider their
ideas for innovation in the schools appropriate to some groups more

than others, most American communities probably still reflect ambi-

valent attitudes about the role of education.

matter then, as Roland Barth implied

it

And it does not really

might, that once you explain

that your "reasons" for changing the schools are not radical in

either a political or
new methods.

a

cultural sense, you can go on to sell your

Barth (1972) argued that "Whereas the methods employed

in some free schools and the methods advocated by open educators may

frequently intersect, the reasoning through which these methods evolved
is

quite different.

Free schools have usually been established to

provide an alternative to the cultural setting characterizing most
public schools"

(p

.

12).

While this may be true enough, Barth's outlook was somewhat
naive, and it begged the questions that Featherstone raised.

For the

fact that Open Education's methods have always been integrally connected
(by Roland Barth among others)

to philosophical, epistemological and
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psychological premises that are no less radical than
those of most
free schools suggests that the distinction is far
from being a hard
one.

Indeed, the terms liberal and radical, as applied to
educational

reform positions, are often difficult to distinguish.^

Dewey,

for

example, considered himself a political liberal with an avowed faith
in measured, organic change,

tional frameworks.

to be achieved within existing institu-

Yet at bottom his ideas for democratizing the

schools, and fostering self-reliance and autonomy in the thinking of

students, were part of a distinct tradition of radical American
thought.

Most American communities were decidedly not ready for a

full dose of the Deweyan remedy for educational problems, and the

history of the Progressive Movement in education

is an

account of how

the dosage was continually diluted and contaminated.

The conclusion reached by hard-headed critics of informal educa-

tion must be that "to the extent that schools are symbols, open
schools are not for all communities" (Bane, 1972,
a school is

conceived and managed in such

a

p.

280).

And if

way as to call attention

^Actually, current educational radicals like Goodman and Holt
show a certain populist strain (as opposed to the more urbanized Progressive tendency towards centralization and organization) in their
advocacy of free, neighborhood schools, and decentralization as a
policy that automatically improves things by breaking away from unwieldy, as well as unresponsive, bureaucratic institutions. Here,
criticisms of schooling practices may be seen as an attack on the
drift towards a perceived cultural totalitarianism that corporate
politics in an advanced technological society can create. The indiAmerica,
vidual's autonomy, traditionally a basic cultural value in
repressive
institutions,
is now seen to be threatened by dehumanized
opinion
bureaucratic constraints, and the tyranny of mediated public
social
Although this view has historical roots in the
and tastes.
of Dewey
analysis of Thorstein Veblen, a contemporary and colleague
of liberal Progressive
at the University of Chicago, the main tenor
different.
reform in eduation was somewhat
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to its symbolic characteristics, while
perhaps obscuring its commit-

ment to more commonly held goals of learning
achievement, that school

will succeed in generating at least some hostility and
friction in
almost any community.

Unfortunately, the symbolic quality in pro-

gressive reform efforts is engendered at the outset--in the inflated
rhetoric of liberal journalists and radical critics.

Thereafter,

it

is perpetuated by the tendency, on the part of professionals and lay-

men alike, to reduce often complicated and sophisticated concepts to
cliches and dogma.

I

have suggested that this tendency is inevitable,

given the basically antithetical cast to the formulation and promul-

gation of founding principles for progressive reform.
In Open Education and the American School (1972)

,

Roland Barth

echoed the cautionary remarks of both Featherstone and Dewey in some

comments that speak to reform couched in antagonistic rhetoric.
expression, Barth observed, "frequently results in

a

Such

polarization of

issues, practices, and people, forcing teachers, parents, administrators, and children to 'choose up sides.'

.

.

.

_/T/he

idea of choosing

between two extremes inhibits flexibility, maximizes threat, and creates political and personal tensions which can only impede efforts
to move toward more informal classrooms"

(p

.

216).

When a progressive

philosophy of education (or its statements of principle)
in manifesto style,

it

is

is

presented

inevitably leading too aggressively with

its chin.

EducaWriting in 1952 about the mounting attacks on Progressive

social-historical
tion, Dewey put the movement in a much warranted

perspective.

life and
"The educational system is part of the common
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cannot escape suffering the consequences that flow from the conditions prevailing outside the school building.

When repressive and

reactionary forces are increasing in strength in all our other institutions

economic, social and political

the school to get off free"
as Dewey testifies,

(p

.

129).

— it

would be folly to expect

To an important extent it is,

impossible to isolate the study of education and

the challenge to improve its practice from the social milieu and the

course of events.

It is, however, also difficult to ascertain,

from

this statement of Dewey's, how clearly his hindsight enabled him to

understand those ways in which the Progressive Movement in education
itself made it more difficult "to get off free."

Part 4:

Ideology and Orthodoxy

There is, as several educators have noted, a tendency for

reform programs to harden into orthodoxies.

Such a development can

have unfortunate consequences for extended professional growth and

self-examination, and when it occurs in the cause of informal education,

the irony is especially grating.

asserts Robert Goldhammer (1969)

"Commitment to orthodoxies,

,

well documented by the metaphorical pendulum that is
known to thrash back and forth through educational
The most familiar contemporary example of how
theory.
an orthodoxy was formed and of the chaos it produced
exists in the educators' adoption of John Dewey's thinking and of the travesties of PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION that
The pattern is for a fervent commitment to a
followed.
body of theory to arise, for simple elements of the
for
theory (that seem to make sense) to be isolated, and
practices to be innovated around such elements which
inevitably bear no sensible relationship to the parent
is

theory,

(p.

32)
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The pattern Goldhammer alludes to
is an illustration of how
the rhetorical climate of educational
reform can serve to pose and

prioritize the problems to be dealt within terms less precise and
less studied than are necessary to be
truly useful.

Goldhammer has

put his finger on a process of interpretation
and implementation in

which some elegant theorizing can be reduced or
prostituted, under
circumstances that mitigate vital ideas through pressures from
popular causes and the need to be innovative.
(1965)

As Christopher Lasch

remarked, "The sentimentality that ran through so much of the

progressive world view
moments as

.

.

.

...

is

never more apparent than at such

when the 'quest for adventure' that Jane Addams and

others invested with such complicated and subtle meaning seemed

finally to dissolve into the cliches which the phrase itself so

readily calls to mind"

(p

.

244).

Roland Barth, who had initially appeared as a leading advocate
and codifier of founding principles for Open Education, then as
a

wiser-for-wear practitioner telling us to tone down our tactics,

most recently takes the stance that good informal practice

is

more

intuitive than anything else, that the greatest hindrance to Open

Education

is

precisely its identity as a movement, and therefore we

need to "forget about open education."
a lready

Barth feels that we have

created an orthodoxy of Open EduCation--"one more rigid

formula for reform that can be imposed on the schools from outside.

This," he adds philosophically, "is educational reform the American
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way"

(

1973 , p. 58). 13

Barth

s

point is a trenchant one, for it alludes not only to

the ideological nature of American educational reform, but also to

our propensity to standardize process so as to make it more a pro-

duct--which then can be reproduced and marketed by the textbook and
school supplies industry.

The American Open classroom is modelled

too much upon what it sees in British infant schools (e.g.,

learning

centers, manipulable materials for math and science, rugs on the
floor, etc.), and "explained" too frequently with a kind of Madison

Avenue superficiality.

Barth concludes that "To the extent that we

are preoccupied with the English model or our own orthodoxy regarding education, we neglect students in the classrooms.

Trying to

identify, adopt, adapt, or simulate open classrooms is the easy and
less promising road to educational reform, and it is one that relieves
us of the responsibility of hard work, precision, scrutiny, and

autonomous decision making"

(p

59 ).

.

Some of Barth's advice to eschew the movement syndrome in

American education may be overstated--the result of disappointed expectations where plans had been too hopefully formulated, and too
ingenuously implemented.

The way for schools to embrace the best

approaches to good informal methods and more effective curricula is
not by turning inwards, or by studiously ignoring the implications of

research that did not occur in classroom situations.

Barth

s

concern

with Dewey's advice that "those who are looking ahead
should think in terms of Educato a new movement in education
education, even
tion itself rather than in terms of some 'ism about
such an 'ism as progressivism'" (1938a, p. 6).
13 Compare

.

'

.

.
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is

most properly focused on the disposition
of teachers and other

educational professionals to
it to teacher's manuals,
a new orthodoxy.

a

kind of functional subservience-be

prescribed curriculum, or the dictates of

The danger inherent in the latter, as Barth
the

school principal knows,

is

manifested in a staff of anxious teachers

wondering if they're teaching the "open" way.
The other latent danger in educational orthodoxies

is

that they

contain, within their own terminology, the means for self-deception
and complacency on the part of practitioners.

I

have argued at some

length that progressive reform is in large part a language--a rhetoric--

with a high investment in persuasion.
observes, "The confidence

...

And as Richard Poirier (1971)

in labels reveals how the form of

an argument can deny the realities that need to be confronted"

(p

.

x)

.

We have witnessed how Progressive Education failed, over the long
run, to evolve viable and enduring forms of informal practice,

foundering eventually in the shallow depths of its undeveloped insights and applications.

What remains most conspicuously from the

Progressive Movement in education

is

the collection of appealing

cliches that initially expressed the promise of important change (and

which now, somewhat ominously, seem to have a renewed currency with

Open educators)

.

Unfortunately, then, it would seem that the progres-

sive rhetorical tendency is to deny history as a teacher.

But pro-

gressivism must transcend rhetoric, for rhetorically-based movements
have proven either politically vulnerable, or too easily flattened
and contained.

As Marcuse (1968) suggests, the task for progressive

reform must involve "the translation of values into technical tasks
(p.

232).
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This chapter has reviewed some essential aspects
of the pro-

gressive educational reform phenomenon:

its beginnings,

attempts to define itself, and some conditions
self.

At the start,

I

it

its

creates for it-

noted that essentially ethically-motivated

reform trends usually appear as politicized concerns to many Americans, and that during

times

of social "crisis"--as the late 1890'

the late I960' s-through-early-1970'

s

s

and

are generally perceived to be--

ethical concerns are often expressed polemically.

When the impetus

for change is created and sustained in an atmosphere of tendentious

rhetoric and sentimental philosophizing,

it

is

difficult to establish

effective theoretical guidelines for practicable school reform.

Contemporary reformers like Holt, Barth and Rathbone have
shown themselves to be typically astute observers of children, and

fairly knowledgeable students of learning psychology.

It is the kind

of inferences they often draw from basically sound observations that

needs to be received critically, for advocates of informal schooling

frequently make unjustified leaps from observations to prescriptions-from how children fail to how children learn, and from intuitions
Such uneven theorizing

about learning to theories about schooling.
is

liable to the kind of criticism R.

S.

Peters (1969)

levied on the

implicit ideology of the "Plowden R.eport," the frequently cited

statement recommending informal education in British primary schools.
"My contention," states Peters, "is that this summary of a 'recogniz-

able educational philosophy' proliferates in important half-truths
that are paraded as educational panaceas" (p

.

3).
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In John Dewey's case,

to be sure,

there was from the start a

lack of substantial research in cognitive development to support
his

theories of experimental learning, as well as any significant precedent in informal schooling through which theory could be tested,
refined, and extended.

The United States in the 1970's presents

a

different potential for progressive educational reform, if only for
the fact that those two supporting conditions Deweyan progressives

had lacked are now effective:

namely, fifty years of notable research

in the development of intelligence in children, and the examples of

the British primary schools and their scattered American counterparts.

The question

is

whether or not efforts to develop and extend informal

schooling at present will adhere to the same patterns

as before, and

become so strongly identified with ideological (rather than pedagogical) notions as to render them vulnerable to shifts in political mood,
if net to backlash from the effects of cultural tensions that "liberat-

ing trends" so easily aggravate.

So far, as Barth has observed, "If

'open classroom' has been the banner that rallied advocates of a more

humane, informal, and productive educational experience for children,
it has

also become a red flag" (1973,

Two broad imperatives

d_o

p.

59).

appear clear for the future success

of progressive educational reform efforts.

The first refers to the

disposition for sides-taking, and suggests the necessity to work
labels,
towards avoiding invidious comparisons and politically-charged

solely on a
and evolving directions for practice that are not founded

standard of contrasts.

There is a corresponding need to transcend

and arbitraiy
creedal commitments and to guard against doctrinaire
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policy-making for reform.

It

is the

intention of this dissertation

to suggest theoretical guidelines,
based on a model of development,

that are responsive to both these
imperatives.
In 1930 John Dewey issued what was both a
warning and a challenge
to progressive educational reform.

My feeling

is

that Dewey's comments

are just as appropriate, and just as noteworthy,
for Open Education
today.

If, he argued,

progressive schools become complacent with

existing accomplishments, unaware of the slight foundation of knowledge upon which they rest, and careless regarding the amount of

study of the laws of growth that remains to be done, a reaction

against them is sure to take place"

(p.

222).

The potential for ad-

verse reaction to informal schooling is certainly with us now, as
should be.

it

It will become increasingly realized as educators delay,

or simply fail,

to translate into sensible and viable classroom prac-

tice the theoretical foundations that do now exist, but are too often

misconstrued, or ignored.
a

The next chapter, therefore, will attempt

selective study of "the laws of growth" in intelligence that may

be instrumental in guiding practice for informal classrooms.

I

have

chosen, in this dissertation, to emphasize ontogenetic theory--rather
than social and political ideas--as the most appropriate focus for
the growth of Open Education.

That is, Open pedagogy, having been

conceived largely in ethical terms, now requires a deeper, more profoundly psychological foundation to make its ethical bias a coherent

part of

a

larger understanding of how education may best serve demo-

cratic purposes.
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CHAPTER

III

A COGNITIVE -DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORK FOR
OPEN EDUCATIONAL THEORY

the existing evils in pedagogy, the prevalence
of merely vague principles upon one side and of altogether
too specific and detailed methods (expedients) upon the
other, are really due to failure to ask what psychology
is called upon to do, and upon failure to present it in
such a form as will give it undoubted value in practical
.

.

.

applications
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 205)

To the educator, therefore, the only solid ground of
assurance that he is not setting up impossible or artificial aims, that he is not using ineffective and perverting methods, is a clear and definite knowledge of the
normal end and the normal forms of mental action.
Briefly, only psychology and ethics can take education
out of its purely empirical and rule-of-thumb stage.
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 198)
.

.

.

the struggle for truth ... is the essentially
human project.
If man has learned to see and know what
really _ij3, he will act in accordance with truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology.
.

.

.

(Marcuse,

This chapter proposes to describe

a

1968, p.

125)

body of theory in the areas

of genetic epistemology and cognitive-developmental psychology that

provides a framework for Open elementary education programs.

advantages of such

a

The

conceptual framework to elementary education in

general would be its contributions of coherence, logic and integrity
in a profession that typically constructs its practice disconnectedly,

and its rationales for practice retroactively-- if at all.

For Open

Education, such a framework would serve to clarify, validate, and
that
correlate the various assumptions about knowledge and learning

applications.
Open practitioners attempt to translate into pedagogical
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Any conceptual framework for
educational theory cannot be
value-neutral Insofar as It posits
desirable end-conditions for its
objectives. Cognitive-developmental
stage theory derived from the

research of Piaget and others describes
a hierarchical pattern of
development, with each succeeding stage
in an Invariant sequence
of stages deemed more functionally
adequate than those it succeeds.

Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) explain that
"development is not just any
behavior change, but a change toward greater
differentiation, integrat ion, and adaptation.

Cognitive-developmental psychological

theory postulates ft he existence of an?

.

.

.

'internal standard

of adequacy'" that leads individuals, especially
children, to prefer

thinking on higher--but accessible--levels, or stages
(pp. 483-484).'*'
If functional adequacy is the standard by which cognitive
develop-

ment

is

to be measured, and such traits as open-mindedness and

intellectual autonomy are seen as "end-points" to this development,
then we are of course implying that development as the general aim
of education can only be acceptable in a culture that values open-

mindedness and autonomous thinking.

Kohlberg (1971) states that "a developmental definition seeks
to isolate a function, like moral judgment or intelligence, and to
define it by a progressive developmental clarification of the function" (p. 217).
Thus, in describing theory for the development of
moral reasoning, he contends that "our 'claims of superiority' for
higher stages are not claims for a system of grading the moral worth
of individual persons, but are claims for the greater adequacy of one
form of moral thinking over another.
In our view, the basic referent
of the term 'moral' is a type of judgment or a type of decision making process not a type of behavior, emotion, or social institution" (p. 215)
,

.
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Ibe philosophical positions assumed by exponents
of Open school-

ing are in fact quite congenial to such an aim for
education.
it

is

But

not readily seen, within their published statements
of princi-

ple, and their assumptions about children and the processes
of learning, how intellectual development is integrally connected
with

ethics, motivation, and personal identity-all important categories
of Open Education beliefs.

Given the need to justify assumptions

that predicate children's rights to make decisions, a human climate
of openness and warmth, curriculum that relies heavily on intrinsic

motivation, and instruction that acknowledges individual styles of

learning as well as individualized pacing--the Open educator can

often offer no more instructive an argument than "that
believe in, and I've seen it work in my classroom."

is

what

I

While such

justification may be valid enough for him, it might fail to convince
others because of its apparent subjectivity and arbitrariness.

Ultimately such a manner of rationalizing the precepts of Open Education serves only to limit the number of communities whose sensibility

can accommodate them.
If the philosophical and the psychological assumptions characteriz

ing Open Education are seen as separate domains, they are vulnerable,

each in its turn, to inevitable criticism from the point of view of
the other.

Thus, the philosopher may challenge the logic of a

hierarchical developmental model as being relativistic, and ethically
arbitrary, while the psychologist can question tne validity of
of
ethical principles that claim to influence the effectiveness

learning.

Historically, as noted in Cremin's The Transformation

ojc
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the Schools (196 1)^ educational programs that did not
clearly establish

comprehensive and unified theoretical framework were easily prone

a

to fragmentation and distortion

usually through an emphasis on one

aspect of theory and a neglect of the others.
For an informal pedagogy to be truly useful and transferable,
its various founding principles must logica 1 ly and demonstrably cohere

and support each other.

With such an inner consistency, Open Educa-

tion might be better able to justify itself as something more than
just an ideological posture, or an approach to educational practice

catering to a special kind of student.

Furthermore, a unified

conceptual framework would contribute both to an informed extension
of imaginative practice into the upper elementary grades (and into
a

wider variety of social and cultural settings), and to more appro-

priate and systematic strategies for training professional educators
at all levels.

Congruent with most of the characteristic assumptions of Open

Education (and instructively contrary to some others)

is the

Piagetian-

Deweyan theory of cognitive development that Kohlberg and Mayer (1972)
set forth in their article on development as the aim of education.

They argue that "the distinctive feature of the developmental-

philosophic approach

is

that a philosophic conception of adequate

principles is coordinated with

a

psychological theory of development

and with the fact of development."

This is important, because

until
"philosophical principles cannot be stated as ends of education
they can be stated psychologically.

This means translating them into

484-485).
statements about a more adequate state of development" (pp.
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Cognition, Affect and Ego Development

Before proceeding with a review of this developmental theory,
and a particularized examination of its implications for learning,
I

would like to deal briefly with another matter.

question of how appropriate it

is

This is the

for a theory of intelligence to

serve as a basis for approaching human development in all its aspects,
but especially those aspects of affect and motive, and of ego and
identity.

It is unfortunate that the efforts to be more efficient

in the delineation of educational objectives have, for conveniency,

effectively distinguished the cognitive aspect of human functioning
from the affective, describing them as two separate "domains."

On

several levels of educational practice, this dichotomizing has led
to essentially unproductive and misleading ideas about curriculum and

instruction.

It has also contributed to a further disjunction of the

student's experience as a learner, insofar as learning can be said
to break down into separate compartments--each with its own distinct

set of conditions.

Hirst and Peters (1971) have thus claimed that

"the tendency to disregard the importance of cognition in this area
/of the emotion^/ has led to the neglect of the specific features of

interpersonal understanding as a mode of experience which is of

manifest importance in the recognition of emotions and motives in
oneself and others.

.

.

.

The separation of intellectual from

affective development is as untenable as the study of emotional

development without stress on the role of cognition"

(p.

50).

Kohlberg
Cognitive-developmental theory elaborated by Piaget and
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emphasizes the interconnectedness of cognitive and affective
modes
of functioning.

It suggests that situations

in which emotion is

aroused have first to be defined by the cognitive faculty.

Kohlberg

(1969) extends this logic to development, observing that developmental

change in motives and affects "is largely mediated by changes in
thought patterns"

(p.

390).

Piaget and Inhelder (1969) have argued that "there is no behavior
pattern, however intellectual, which does not involve affective
factors as motives; but, reciprocally, there can be no affective

states without the intervention of perceptions or comprehensions

which constitute their cognitive structure.
a piece.

.

.

.

The two aspects, affective and cognitive, are at the

same time inseparable and irreducible" (p.

Mayer (1972)

,

Behavior is therefore of

158).

For Kohlberg and

then, "the progressive or cognitive-developmental view

attempts to integrate both behavior and internal states in

epistemology of mind"

(p

.

461).

a

functional

The theory of development that will

be discussed in this chapter is therefore based on a notion of the

unity of experience.

This is, of course, a preeminently Deweyan

notion, for Dewey was always concerned to explore the ways in which

thought directs action, and, in a larger sense, how logical forms

organize and differentiate experience.

2

Less easily ascertained is the nature of the relation of cognitive

"intellectLike Piaget, Dewey (1938b) was also committed to the
connected
be
ual responsibility of indicating how the logical may
development"
(p. 25).
continuous
of
process
with the biological in a
2

56

development to ego development.

Kohlberg and Mayer have remarked

that "much recent research demonstrates
that the development of the
ego, as attitudes and beliefs about
the self,

involves step-by-step

parallel development of attitudes and beliefs
about the physical and
social world.

ment

.

.

Further, it indicates definite stages of ego-develop-

which imply step-by-step parallels to Piaget's cognitive

.

stages, although they include more social emotional
content" (1972,
491).

p.

Kohlberg (1969) has also argued that "cognitive advance is

the more basic or causal factor in this parallelism"
(p

.

464), al-

though it would seem that such a contention needs to be supported by

additional research on the correlation of cognitive development and
ego development.

Loevinger and Wessler's statement that "the

search for coherent meanings in experience is the essence of the ego
or ego functioning"

(1970, I, p.

8)

does suggest an integral similarity

between these two facets of development.

3

Education should be primarily concerned with the dynamic of
development--that is, how growth of intelligence and identity formation occur.

In this regard,

there do seem to be some clear parallels

between cognitive and ego development.

Kohlberg and Mayer noted

above that attitudes and beliefs about the self are functions of

3

Elkind (1970a) has argued that "A consideration of ego-centrism
would seem to be a useful starting point for any attempt to
reconcile cognitive structure and the dynamics of personality" (p. 71).
He points out, for example, that "the presence of structures which
enable the adolescent to construct multiple alternatives ]_and hence,
to display thinking and behavior that is "decentered_/ sets the stage
for characteristic conflicts between young people and their parents
final
as well as for the increased dependence upon the peer group for
decision-making" (p. 78).
.

.

.
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both developmental modes.
ear

^ er

Kohlberg has elsewhere (1969) summarized

studies that suggest "the self-concept is largely a concept

of shared self, or a self like other selves.
a

The child cannot have

self-concept without having concepts of other selves"

(p.

394).

Thus, activities like role-taking and empathizing, which will be dis-

cussed at some length later in this chapter, have educational implications for both modes of development.

Similarly, since identity

formation (as Erikson describes it) is a phenomenon of integration
and continuity of sequential stages, it resembles the cognitive

process of equilibration that lies at the heart of Piagetian develop-

mental theory.

Piaget and Inhelder (1969) have remarked, in fact,

how aspects of personality "unquestionably involve conflicts or
crises and reequilibrations, for the formation of personality is

dominated by the search for a coherence and an organization of values
that will prevent internal conflicts (or seek them, but for the sake
of new systematic perspectives such as 'ambiguity'

tive syntheses"

(p.

158)

.

and other subjec-

Equilibration and its relation to learning

will also be examined in the following pages.
The plan for the rest of this chapter is to review the epistemology,

stage theory, and concept of equilibration that Piagetians

basically hold in common with Dewey, and which represent the foundaaim.
tion for a theory of pedagogy that has development as its

Theory of Knowledge

knowledge is desThe Deweyan and Piagetian concept of mind and

cribed from a "transactional" point of view.

Mind functions as an

and his world.
ssion of interaction between the individual
expression

"To
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know an object, to know an event, is," according to Piaget
(1964b),
not simply to look at it and make a mental copy, or image,
of it.

To know an object is to act on it.

To know is to modify, to trans-

form the object, and to understand the process of this transformation, and as a consequence to understand the way the object is

constructed"
"operation."

(p

.

8).

This process of the mind Piaget terms an

"An operation is thus the essence of knowledge;

an interiorised action which modifies the object of knowledge
/

/

(p.

a

it

.

is

.

.

particular type of action which makes up logical structures"

8).

An operation may be an act of classifying, or ordering, or

measuring, but its essential, quality is that of interior ized construction of reality--hence

,

of reconstruction.

Deweyan and Piagetian epistemology posits the existence of
logical structures to describe general forms of operational intelligence, or knowledge.

never isolated.

"Above all," says Piaget, "an operation is

It is always linked to other operations, and as a

result it is always a part of

a

total structure.

For instance, a

logical class does not exist in isolation; what exists is the total

structure of classification" (1964b,

p.

8).

Dewey (1938b) discusses

this structural aspect of knowledge in a chapter on the pattern of

inquiry.

"Logical forms," he asserts, "originate out of experiential

material, and when constituted introduce new ways of operating with
they
prior materials, which ways modify the material out of which

develop"

(p.

103).

Stage Theory

principles that inform
The notion of structures as organizing
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the functioning of intelligence contributes
to a theory of stage

development, since the various logical structures that are
operative

with any given individual mind seem to share

a

fairly common level

in their potential for differentiated and coordinated thinking.

In

Dewey's words, "the mind at every stage of growth has its own logic"
(1933, p.

83).

Piaget's hiararchical stage model--like Dewey' s--

identifies several levels of cognitive functioning along a continuum
of "decentering"--or moving away from a highly subjective, egocentric

mode of understanding toward greater objectivity and a capacity to
think in more complex ways.

David Hunt (1966) has described cognitive

stage differences according to the "degree of abstractness" that

characterizes thinking.

Citing the conclusion of Harvey, Hunt and

Schroder, Hunt argues that "greater abstractness is associated with
'lower stereotypy and greater flexibility in the face of complex and

changing problem situations, toward greater creativity, exploration
behavior, tolerance of stress, etc.'

...

At a more interpersonal

level, more abstract systems are associated with greater self-under-

standing and empathic awareness of others" (pp. 278-279).
Piaget has designated the several sequential stages that comprise
his model of cognitive development in such a way as to describe a

progression toward more complex and abstract reasoning abilities.
is

It

incorrect, however, to read from the nomenclature of developmental

represents
stage theory an interpretation such as the following, which
a not

"Intellectual

uncommon generalization made by informal educators:

concrete
growth and development take place through a sequence of

experiences followed by abstraction^ (Barth, 1971,

p.

1^8)

.

In

equated with
first place, development is probably being wrongly

tl
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learning in such a statement, for development is a
more complicated
and gradual affair than indicated in this simple formula
(see section
on

Development and Learning" below)

.

Furthermore, it is also

incorrect to infer from Piagetian theory that learning can be reduced
to an invariant sequence of concrete experiences followed by abstrac-

tions.

Dewey once remarked that "the notion that we have only to

put physical objects before the senses in order to impress ideas

upon the mind amounts almost to

a

superstition" (1933,

What cognitive stage theory does suggest

is

p.

225).^

that at certain

levels of cognitive functioning, verbally transmitted information

is

not alone sufficient to induce structural change, and that some

concrete referent, or some experience in which the individual acts
on the material to be assimilated,

place.

is

required for learning to take

Open Education's contention that "premature conceptualization

based upon inadequate direct experience leads to lack of real understanding" (Walberg and Thomas, 1971,

p.

D-10)

is quite

consistent

with developmental theory, but we must not infer that some sort of
"direct experience" needs to be always freshly provided as
step in the learning process.

a

first

Dewey's sound advice on this matter

is that to '"begin with the concrete'

signifies that we should, at

the outset of any new experience in learning, make much of what is

already familiar, and if possible connect the new topics and principles

the
^Dewey argued further that "Things and sensations develop
and
body
his
mastering
in
child, indeed, but only when he uses them
coordinating his actions" (1933, p. 225).
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with the pursuit of an end in some active occupation"
(1933,
Unevenness of sta^e development

.

p.

224)

Piaget's stage theory does not

hold that the dimension of abstractness, or differentiation,
of

cognitive structures occurs as an even, across-the-board progression
in development.

Rather, there are often chronological gaps dividing

the acquisition of different operations that characterize the same

stage of reasoning ability.

Cognitive-developmental psychologists

have observed a certain degree of heterogeneity, or "stage mix,"

obtaining within the system of mental schemata that constitutes
individual intelligence.
zontal decalage

.

"

Piaget refers to this condition as

"The concept of horizontal decalage

,

"

a

"hori-

notes

Flavell, "represents the fact that, whereas it may be useful to think
of an individual as being generally characterized by a given cognitive

structure, he will not necessarily be able to perform with in that

structure for all tasks" (1963,

p.

23)

of experience assumed this condition.

5

Dewey's notion of continuity

Development, as Dewey realized,

was a process wherein the acquisition of one particular cognitive

•’Flavell (1963) explains the implication of vertical decalage
In effect, vertical cecalages
as seeming to be "quite the opposite.
difference between
apparent
the
within
uniformity
hidden
a
express
in common between
little
be
to
seems
There
another.
and
one stage
project
map-making
a
and
toddler
the
of
perambulations
the spatial
structural
are
there
Yet
participates.
in which a fifth-grader
similarities buried in the obvious differences, and it is this reBoth Kcnlberg
currence which defines vertical decalage" (p. 23).
indicated an
have
and Mayer (1972) and Athey and Rubadeau ( 1970 )
functioncognitive
apparent correlation between vertical decalage in
developego
of
ing, and the observations made by Erikson in the study
to the
refers
ment. Athey and Rubadeau note that "Vertical decalage
different
at
fact that a problem with similar content is approached
In the
functioning.
of
level
different
stages with a completely
different
the
to
attention
drawn
has
social-emotional realm, Erikson
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operation makes that of another possible, while
for development to

take place, the individual has to see the relatedness
of similar
operat ions

Development and mot ive

.

Dewey's broad epistemological theory

differs from Piaget's primarily insofar as Dewey incorporates more

explicitly an element of motive into his scheme of the development
of intelligence.

His model of stage development, as elaborated in

•Essays -iQ Experimental Logic (1916b), assumed that "thought is to be

interpreted as

a

doubt- inquiry function" and that "various stages

of thinking could be marked out according to the amount of play

which they give to doubt, and

the.

consequent sincerity with which

thinking is identified with free inquiry"

(p

.

216).

Dewey's theory

here resembles that of Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (cited earlier) in
its inclusion of certain behavioral traits as indicators of develop-

mental stage.
Development for Dewey follows a course from inability (and
unwillingness) to doubt the literalness of "facts," to an inclination
to initiate inquiry and seek out areas of uncertainty that comple-

ments the "more elaborate and systematized methods of investigation"

which obtain at this stage (1916b, pp

.

184-185).

Interestingly,

Dewey's stage theory is quite similar to Kohlberg's sequential model

mainlevels of approach at various ages to lifelong problems such as
one's
establishing
or
taining a balance between trust and mistrust,
is
autonomy with respect to others. The difference in these levels
xv)
undoubtedly related to development of cognitive functioning" (p
.

.
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of the development of moral reasoning, expressed
through the aspects
of choice

("Mechanisms of resolving or denying awareness of conflicts")

and rules ("The ways in which rules are conceptualized,
applied, and

generalized.

The basis of the validity of a rule.")

(1969, p.

378).

It also anticipates efforts to combine psycho-emotional factors with
a

cognitive-developmental model (such as Kohlberg's above) to explain

predispositions to ignore data that seems discrepant or inconsistent.
This issue will be discussed later in a section on "Disequilibrium."

Development and learning

.

For Dewey and Piaget, stage develop-

ment is continuous, characterized by

a

process of integration rather

than mere substitution of a more adequate concept for a less adequate
one, or addition of new mental operations onto the old repertoire.

Substitution or addition of new concepts and skills

£

is more character-

Piaget has described

istic of what we refer to commonly as learning.

learning as "the accord of thought with things," and the process of

development as "the accord of thought with itself" (Smedslund, 1964,
p.

94).

In effect, he is distinguishing between two processes, one

Piaget (1964a) argues

of which might be said to subsume the other.

that

The development of knowledge is a spontaneous process, tied
Learning
to the whole process of embryogenesis
is prolearning
general,
In
case.
opposite
presents the
experimenter;
psychological
a
by
-provoked
voked by situationsor by a teacher, with respect to some didactic point; or by
It is provoked, in general, as opposed
an external situation.
limited
In addition, it is a limited process
to spontaneous.
.

.

.

.

see
&For a discussion of structural change as integration,
Pinard and Laurendeau (1969, p. 127).
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to a s_ingie problem,

or to a single structure.
development explains learning,
contrary to
the widely held opinion that development
is a sum of discrete learning experiences. ...
In reality, development
is the essential process and each
element of learning
occurs as a function of total development, rather
than
being an element which explains development,
(p. 8)

_/Thus_j_/

.

.

.

While a symptom of development might be the replacement
of one
means of explanation by another more sophisticated one, the
develop-

mental change has constituted a reconstruction, so that

a

new way

of making sense of experience can be coordinated within a consistent

and integrated model of reality.

Old ideas are not really thrown

away, so much as they are revalued in the context of new structural

organizations.

In the domain of moral reasoning, Kohlberg and his

colleagues have argued that stage advance represents changes in judg-

mental thinking that reflect more differentiated rationales for
moral judgment.

Movement to the next higher stage therefore "involves

internal cognitive reorganization rather than the mere addition of

more difficult content from the outside" (1971,

Structural Change:

p.

194).

Assimilation and Accommodation

In cognitive-developmental theory, mental structures change

because the nature of the process of thinking is such that while
thinking acts to modify the object of thought, its own scheme of
ref erence- - it s way of processing the o'bject--can be altered too.

For Dewey (1934)

,

this phenomenon of operational intelligence was a

"prolonged interaction of something issuing from the self with
objective conditions,

a

process in which both of them /self and

object/ acquire a form and order they did not at first possess

(p

.

65).
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Piaget (1967) describes "this fundamental
interaction between
internal and external factors" as "an
assimilation of reality to

prior schemata

.

.

.

/and/ at the same time an accommodation of

these schemata to the actual situation"

(p.

103).

Accommodation

to new situations leads to the reconstruction
of a previous schemata,
or structure, and thus to the emergence of new structures.

(1938b) points out, consistent with Piaget,

Dewey

that "restoration of

integration can be effected only by operations which actually modify

existing conditions"

Equilibration

.

(p

.

106).

Development occurs, according to Dewey and

Piaget, as a continuous seeking of equilibrium between individual

mind and outer reality.

Dewey (1938b) has noted that in a larger

biological sense, "The greater the differentiation of structures
and their corresponding activities becomes, the more difficult it
is to keep the balance.

Indeed,

living may be regarded as a

continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium.
The 'higher' the organism, the more serious become the disturbances
and the more energetic (and often more prolonged) are the efforts

necessary for its reestablishment"

(p

.

27).

Situations of cognitive

and affective disequilibrium are regularly incurred under conditions

determined by factors of heredity, and of experience with the physical
'

and social world.

Dewey calls these situations "indeterminate;"

they are resolved to the extent that new organizations can be formed
to restore integration of experience.

Thus for Dewey the dual process

of accommodation and assimilation is the process of inquiry,

the

controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation
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into one that

j_s

so dete rminate in its constituent
distinctions and

relations as to convert the elements of the original
situation into
a u nified wh o le"

of inquiry

is

(1938b, pp.

104-105).

Dewey's notion of "the pattern

in fact an equilibration phenomenon--a process
of

cognition described in existential, or situational, terms.

Disequilibrium

.

Disequilibrium may be regarded as the source

of momentum for development.

The clear implication of this idea is

that a person's mode of thinking will only change if he feels some-

thing

is

wrong with the way he presently explains reality.

Further-

more, it is important to note that disequilibrium refers to an

affective state as well as

a

cognitive one, and that both are probably

necessary to the phenomenon of developmental change.

As Piaget (1967)

observes, "affectivity is always the incentive for the actions that

ensue at each new stage of this progressive ascent, since affectivity

assigns value to activities and distributes energy to them"
Implicit in Dewey's theory of stage development

is

(p.

69).

the idea

that certain individuals may either ignore the symptoms of disequilibrium, or resist the encroachment of such stimuli that might challenge

and disrupt the closely guarded "mental equilibrium known as assurance
or knowledge"

(1916b, p.

216).

Dewey's definition of development

as related to inquiry assumes, therefore, a condition of willingness
to inquire as prerequisite to change.

"Organic interaction becomes

inquiry when existential consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are examined with reference to their potentialities,

with reference
and when responsive activities are selected and ordered
rather than others,
to actualization of some of the potentialities,

67

in a final existential situation"

(1938b, p.

107).

Elkind (1970b) has pointed out that stimulus
seeking "only
occurs to its maximum in emotionally secure
children.

Intellectual

growth is never independent of the child's emotional
involvements

with the world, and the insecure child is less likely
to seek out
challenging stimulation than is the child who feels secure in his
interpersonal relations" (pp

20-21).

.

Such a statement is congruent

with recent conclusions of ego development theorists, who posit that
identity and self-concept are aspects of

"self-system" that func-

a

tions to minimize anxiety in dealings with the world.

Loevinger

and Wessler (1969) explain that "This is accomplished by selective

inattention to observations discordant with current, however erroneous
or limited, conceptions of self and others.

Opening of the self-

system to new and corrective observations

unusual.

is

Normally, it

occurs to some extent at each developmental threshold, in response
to newly maturing needs

.

.

."

(I,

p.

113).

In Dewey's doubt-inquiry continuum, "successive stations or

arrests constitute stages of thinking" (1916b, pp. 183-184).

This

conception relates well to ego development theory, since it acknowledges that the tendency to inquire after other explanations or other

points of view--to be able to entertain uncertainty--requires
of tolerance or strength as well as cognitive sophistication.

a

kind

Dewey

idea of equilibration is that "just in the degree that what has been

accepted as fact--the object of assurance-- loses stable equilibrium,
until a
the tension involved in the questioning attitude increases,

readjustment gives a new and less easily shaken equilibrium

(191ob,

s
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p.

However, observes Dewey, "The natural
tendency of man

184).

is

not to press home a doubt, but to cut
inquiry as short as possible"
(p.

184).
Ojsen p e riods .for stage

advance

Recent research in cognitive

.

development has discovered certain factors that seem to
influence
when, and under what organizational conditions, disequilibrium
can

best be handled by the individual to facilitate developmental
pro-

gress--to move forward from a "station or arrest."

Kohlberg and

Mayer (1972) have suggested that
there is what approaches an optimal period for movement
from one stage to the next.
When a child has just
attained a given stage, he is unlikely to respond to
stimulation toward movement to the next stage.
In addition, after a long period of use of a given stage of
thought, a child tends to "stabilize" at that stage and
develops screening mechanisms for contradictory stimulation.
Accordingly, it has been found that both very
young and very old children at a given stage (compared
to the age-norm for that stage) are less responsive or less
able to assimilate stimulation at the next higher stage
than children at the age-norm for that stage. The notion
of an "open period" is not age-specific, it is individual.
Nevertheless, gross age periods may be defined
which are "open periods" for movement from one stage to
Avoidance of retardation as an educational
the next.
aim means presenting stimulation in these periods where
the possibility for development is still open, (p 490)
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Turiel (1969)

,

a

colleague of Kohlberg, adds another dimension to

the notion of an "open period" in his observation that "The child

whose functioning

is

mainly on one stage, but who uses other stages

as well, will more readily perceive contradictions and thus experi-

ence conflict more frequently.

In other words, stage mixture serves

to facilitate the perception of contradictions, making the individual

more susceptible to disequilibrium and consequently more likely to
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progress developments lly"

(p

.

130).

The implications of this

research for diagnosis and setting the environment
in an Open class-

room will be taken up in the next chapter.

This chapter has tried to present a general theoretical frame-

work that might elucidate and coordinate the various ideas about
learning and teaching held by most Open educators.

It is based on

the philosophical premise that development should be the aim of

education, and owes much of its definition to the epistemological
ideas of Jean Piaget.

A second goal of the chapter was to demonstrate how John Dewey's
epistemological and psychological theories were essentially similar
to those of Piaget.

Given this similarity, an earnest (and more

knowing) reconsideration of Dewey's prescriptions for education--

derivative from his philosophical and psychological theory--would
seem to be in order, especially for Open educators who desire to

effectively develop and extend the ideas that presently inform the
best examples of progressive practice in America.

Paying particular attention therefore to Dewey's pedagogy, the
following three chapters will explore how a coherent theory of

development can suggest guidelines for provisioning and organizing
the Open classroom, and diagnosing for optimal match (Chapter IV),
for curriculum design (Chapter V)
the learning process (Chapter VI)

;

and for teacher intervention in
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CHAPTER

IV

IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY FOR SETTING AN

OPTIMAL EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE OPEN CLASSROOM

the general principles of the new education do not
of themselves solve any of the problems of the actual or
practical conduct and management of progressive schools.
Rather, they set new problems which have to be worked out
on the basis of a new philosophy of experience.
(Dewey, 1938, pp. 21-22)
.

.

.

/The teacher/ needs to be a student of the conditions
that modify for better or worse the directions in which
individual powers habitually express themselves. He
needs to recognize that method covers not only what he
intentionally devises and employs for the purpose of
mental training, but also what he does without any conscious reference to it--anything in the atmosphere and
conduct of the school that reacts in any way upon the
curiosity, the responsiveness, and the orderly activity
of children.

(Dewey,

1933, p.

57)

/We need to clear ujg/ the confusion of "open" used as a
developed and perfected organizational form, existing in
itself, with "open" as a new floor of possib/lity for
further development of better /instructional/ match.
(Weber,

1972, p.

65)

Open educators set high priority on such educational objectives
as self-motivation,

learning how to learn, and the development of

confidence, autonomous thinking skills, and a feeling of self-worth.

These are clearly long-term objectives, and can be viewed intelligently only within psychological perspectives that comprehend the

development of intellect and ego.
the.

next two,

I

In this chapter, as well as in

should like to suggest some prescriptive theory for

realizing such objectives.

Chapter IV will consider wnat might

developconstitute an ideal educational environment for facilitating
and VI will treat
ment in the elementary classroom, while Chapters V
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curriculum building and the role of the
teacher in supporting
developmental learning, respectively.

Organizing the Open Classroom
Pr ovisioning

.

Stocking a room with an abundance of diverse

books and materials, but with little knowledge or intuition
as to

how these things might be used by students to discover new relationships and new meanings, would represent, of course, an incomplete

and irresponsible kind of provisioning.

On the other hand, a

rigidly orthodox Montessori approach of delimiting the learning

potential in the environment by assigning specific learning tasks
to specific materials, while discouraging any divergent use of them,
is also undesirable.^

-

Open Education does recognize the importance

of unprogrammed interaction with the environment.

It also acknow-

ledges the responsibility of the teacher to modify "the content and

arrangement of the classroom based upon diagnosis and evaluation of
the children's needs and interests and their use of materials and

space" (Walberg and Thomas, 1971, pp. D 4-5).

Open classrooms are typically characterized by

a

rich variety

of materials, and the "subject matter" of the lower elementary

grades especially is in large part an environment of manipulable and
exp lorable stuff.
of instruction'

Thus, Rathbone (1972) can observe that

"

'organization

becomes 'organization of learning materials --that
'

distinction is implied here which acknowledges that many
Montessori schools, particularly in America, are considerably more
flexible
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is,

investigation of the selection, arrangement, and assignment
of

specific items of instructional equipment within the classroom"
531)

.

(p.

Hasset.t and Weisberg (1972) add that instruction in the Open

classroom ought to center around subject matter "found frequently

within the child's environment," or teacher- introduced "'turn-on'
agents--that is, sources of motivation with many possibilities for
educative projects"

(p.

6).

Open Education has not yet, however, really articulated cogent
rationales for its provisioning strategies.

It needs to confront

questions like "What are the psychological criteria for organizing
learning materials, and for ensuring that encounters with them will
be educative?"

Aside from a realization that common, familiar

materials often hold more potential for increasing understanding,
and that provisioning should aim to create learning situations that
are flexible and open-ended, and capable of sustaining extended

exploration, Open educators have usually failed to draw the necessary
inferences from developmental psychology that could suggest optimal

conditions for developmental learning.
One interesting reason for provisioning a classroom with a range
and variety of possibilities for problem-solving and random explora-

tion is suggested by the research of Turiel (1969)

.

Turiel contends

that "A complex heterogeneous environment that presents

a

variety of

process
contradictions is more likely to facilitate the equilibration

than a more homogeneous environment.

Children in the complex environ-

with high stage
ment would have greater stage mixture, and children
structural contradictions
mixture are more likely to perceive higher stage
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in the environment"
S cheduling

.

(p.

130).

The integrated day plan of scheduling
in the Open

classroom, allowing for individuated activity
of flexible duration,

meant to complement the richness and variety
of the physical

is

environment.

Dewey (1928) has provided a typical developmental

rationale for the integrated day in this statement:

"A child's

individuality cannot be found in what he does or in what he
consciously
likes at a given moment;

of his actions.

it can be found only

in the connected course

Consciousness of desire and purpose can be genuinely

attained only toward the close of some fairly prolonged sequence of
activities.

Consequently some organization of subject-matter

reached through a serial or consecutive course of doings, held together within the unity of a progressively growing occupation or
project, is the only means which corresponds to real individuality"
(p

.

121).

The implications this statement holds for curriculum will

be addressed in the next chapter.

In a classroom situation organized to facilitate individuated

activity, the developmental goal of greater integration in under-

standing is also being implemented.

The Open classroom sponsors a

significant degree of learner control over the forces affecting what

happens to him in school.

Presumably, the higher the degree of

learner control, the more individualized, or self-directed, the

learner's classroom activity will be.

Eiseman (1973) has suggested,

apropos of a study of classroom learning environments, that "the
more individuated the activity, the more likely it

is

that the
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individual's behavior will be highly integrated"
is more aware of the activity

larger role in its definition.

in all

(p.

21) ,2 since he

its aspects, having played a

This in turn suggests the potential

for more integrated understanding of classroom learning experience.

Responsive environments
Piaget

s

.

As

I

argued in the previous chapter,

epistemological and developmental theories hold some obvious

implications for what, when, and how classroom experience can be most

conducive to the development of intelligence.

Essentially these

theories suggest that "Good pedagogy must involve presenting the
child with situations in which he himself experiments.

may be said to experiment

_i/n the

/The child

broadest sense of that term--trying

things out to see what happens, manipulating things, manipulating
symbols, posing questions and seeking his own answers, reconciling

what he finds one time with what he finds at another, comparing his
findings with those of other children" (Duckworth, 1964,

p.

2).

To maximize the developmental potential of such experience, the
school environment must be "responsive" to the child's experimenting.

Eiseman (1973) suggests that such an environment would comprise
materials and situations "from which the child receives information
regarding his own immediately previous behavior either through sensing
any of the social or physical object's reactions or through recognizing any resulting changes in the social or physical configuration'

^Eiseman then cites findings indicating that "high integration
than
ratings are far more frequently associated with learner control
with teacher control" (p. 22).
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(p.

20).

Dewey (1899) saw the matter of provisioning and organizing

in similar psychological terms:

as

the affording of an environment in which the child acts,
which stimulates him adequately with sufficient variety
and yet with coherence so that the various stimuli serve
to cooperate with each other, and an environment of
sufficient content, sufficient wealth of its own, so
that when the child acts in it, his return wave of
consciousness, his income, his impressions, may be valuable and sufficiently orderly, (p 309)
.

Providing for Active Learning

Open educators frequently use the phrase "active learning" when
articulating their philosophy of instruction.

Active learning can

be defined, in accordance with an epistemological theory that des-

cribes knowing as constructionist and interactionist
manner:

it refers to

,

in a twofold

learning as a function of thinking

,

activity between the individual and the total environment.

and as

The notion

of active learning points to a need for the child to "have in his

own personal and vital experience a varied background of contact and

acquaintance with realities, social and physical.

This is necessary

to prevent symbols from becoming a purely second-hand and conventional

substitute for reality" (Dewey, 1915,

p.

112).

In this section,

would like to examine briefly how the idea of activity as
learning
I

is

sometimes considered by Open educators.

I

a mode of

As a focal point,

will refer to Bruner's concept of "discovery learning," which seems

meaningful
to reflect many of Open Education's assumptions about how

learning takes place.

After this,

I

will discuss how an understanding

to include a more
of active learning environments needs to be expanded

significant social dimension.
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Disco very,

l

earning

.

Bruner (1964,

1966) has argued that learn-

ing is meaningful and useful primarily when it
represents a "finding-

out-for-onese If" proposition, a product of "autonomous and self-

propelled

thinking

hence, an "act of discovery."

Discovery learn-

ing takes place as an independent data processing activity, best

facilitated when the learner is allowed to explore on his own terms,
and to make his own construction of reality.

Discovery can represent

either the recognition of some new relationship, or the "invention"
of some sort of logical connection in the environment.

Bruner (1964)

states that the act of discovery "is in its essence a matter of

rearranging or transforming evidence in such a way that one

is

enabled to go beyond the evidence so reassembled to additional new
insights" (p. 83).

This definition is similar to Dewey's conception

of discovery as a term which expresses the way in which
is

"

all thinking

original" that constitutes "a projection of considerations which

have not been previously apprehended" (1916a,

p.

159).

Some dangers exist, however, when Open practitioners proceed to

organize their programs for discovery learning with only a vague idea
about how curiosity and exploratory behavior function in the develop-

ment of intelligence, and about the conditions necessary for structural
change to occur.

This kind of awareness is necessaiy, for example,

to guard against simplistic inferences of "learning by doing

formulas.

Just as Bruner's idea of discovery does not imply that learning

is

active,
merely a process of disclosure or revelation, the notion of
that
discovery learning should not be reduced to the suggestion

experience-learning simply follows from activity--from some concrete
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as if the learning were in the act of
doing.

As Dewey (1916a)

reminded us, experience "is not primarily
cognitive.

- —sure

.

.

.

the

of the value of experience lies in the perception
of relation-

ships or continuities to which it leads up.
the degree in which it
(p.

But

.

.

.

It includes cognition in

amounts to something, or has meaning"

140).

Another danger

is the

tendency to infer from discovery learning

arguments that this kind of learning experience

is

inherently more

effective than "verbal reception" learning, and that consequently
the teacher's traditional functions of lecturing and direct instruc-

tion are somehow illegitimate.

While

I

argue in this dissertation

that the elementary school needs to provide opportunities for students
to act on their total environment

(and to reflect upon their actions)

such a directive does not exclude didactic teaching from having a most

important role in structuring, clarifying, and extending the student's
own active inquiry (see Chapter V)

.

Ausubel (1963) explains that

Discovery learning is a psychologically more involved
process than reception learning because it presupposes a
problem-solving stage that precedes the emergence of
meaning and the interiorization of information. But
reception learning, on the whole, appears later developmentally and, in most instances, implies a greater degree
The young child learns most new
of cognitive maturity.
concepts and propositions inductively through autonomous
discovery, although self-discovery is not essential if
concrete-empirical props are available. Reception learning, however, although occurring earlier, is not really
prominent until the child is both capable of internal
mental operations and can comprehend verbally presented
propositions in the absence of current concrete-empirical
experience

....

(p.

17)

Perhaps the most compelling aspect of discovery learning
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arguments is their contention that meaningful
learning

is

accomplished

only when the learner's involvement in his
activity is based on

intrinsic motivation.

Such motivation occurs when the learner pur-

sues an activity that finds its source in "the natural
energies that

sustain spontaneous learning--curiosity

,

a desire for competence,

aspiration to emulate a model, and a deep-sensed commitment to the

web of social reciprocity" (Bruner, 1966,

p.

127).

Bruner suggests

therefore that "to the degree that one is able to approach learning
as a task of discovering something rather than 'learning about'

it,

to that degree will there be a tendency for the child to carry out

his learning activities with the autonomy of self-reward or, more

properly, by reward that is discovery itself" (1964,

p.

88).

For

when "the child comes to manipulate his environment more actively,"
he "achieves his gratification from coping with problems"

(p.

92).

Open educators must be aware, however, that curiosity and

natural exploratory tendencies in children need to function within

responsive environment in order for them to be "self-perpetuating."

a

3

Furthermore, curiosity needs to be stimulated, and the motive to

explore needs to be challenged and guided (see section on "Providing

Appropriate Match" below).

As Lillian Weber (1971) has pointed out,

"Bruner starts with the will to learn and assumes the necessary
curiosity"

(p

.

193).

Bruner has perhaps, therefore, merely hypothesized

the Open Education assumption that "children's innate
curiosity and self-perpetuating exploratory behavior should form
the basis of their learning in school" (Walberg and Thomas, 1971,
D 10)
p
^Viz.

.

.
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on what might occur, given certain optimal or ideal conditions for

learning.

Social learning

.

The assumptions about the social aspect of

learning held by Open Education constitute

a

weak and psychologically

unsophisticated link in the composite beliefs about children’s learning that inform its pedagogy.

Aside from some obvious contentions

that children like to collaborate and play together, and to share

their achievements, there is relatively little indication given as
to how the social nature of experience contributes to the individual's

classroom learning, and to his overall development.

And in most of

the literature on Open Education, the social environment is usually

mentioned in essentially non-cognitive terms.
I

have already noted that while Open educators acknowledge the

implications of the constructionist premise of Piagetian epistemology,
they seem to neglect the implications of Piaget's view that cognitive

development is a function of interaction.

This tendency probably

derives in part from Bruner's lack of emphasis on the social context
in the process of cognitive growth.^
is

Another possible explanation

that the Open classroom has primarily been an infant classroom,

^"For Bruner, the learner is to be seen as a cognitive, developmental, individual psyche, somewhat influenced by and inf luencing Jiis
of
environment, but primarily as independently following a program
self-contained
cognition which is its own, which is directed by its own
of
nature
social
the
and
habit
of
For Dewey, the effect
logic.
of
orbit
the
within
psyche
individual
language put, irrevocably, the
be
to
are
they
if
thought,
the social, and the effects of individual
society
the
or
group,
meaningful, at work in the classroom, or the
(Fox,

1969

,

p

.

69)
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where interaction in the epistemological
sense might be seen to
focus more dramatically on the physical
environment than on the
social. For both Dewey and Piaget, however,
active involvement with

the environment was in no way one-dimensional.

realized that "there

is no

the medium of people.

Dewey (1899)

contact with things excepting through

The things themselves are saturated with

the particular values which are put into them, not only by
what

people say about them, but more by what they do about them and

with them"

(p.

47).

For Dewey, the psychology of mind is a social

psychology, since cognitive development

is

essentially an interaction-

al process.

Congruent with this idea is the cognitive-developmental notion
that growth is a function of interaction with things and people.

"When

I

say 'active,'" Piaget explains, "I mean it in two senses.

One is acting on material things.
in social collaboration,

But the other means doing things

in a group effort.

This leads to a

critical frame of mind, where children must communicate with each
other.

This is an essential factor in intellectual development.

Cooperation

is

indeed co-operation" (Duckworth, 1964,

p.

4).

In his

research, Piaget (1967) has thus observed that among school-age
children, "there is progress in two directions:

individual concentra-

tion when the subject is working by himself and effective collaboration in the group.

These two aspects of the behavior that starts at

around seven years are in reality complementary and derive from the
same source.

They are, in fact, so intimately linked that one is hard

degree
put to say whether the child has become capable of a certain
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of reflection because he has learned to
cooperate with others or

vice versa"

(p.

39).

Cooperation and collaboration are therefore terms that
are

meaningful in a developmental sense because of the way
in which
they facilitate and determine the growth of intelligence.

"As far

as intelligence is concerned," Piaget (1967) has argued,
"co-operation
is thus an objectively conducted discussion (out of which
arises

internalized discussion, i.e. deliberation or reflection), collaboration in work, exchange of ideas, mutual control

therefore clear that co-operation

is

.

.

.

,

etc.

It is

the first of a series of forms

of behavior which are important for the constitution
of logic" (p

.

aid

development

Like Dewey, Piaget contends that logic in fact

162).

"expresses itself as

a

complex of states of awareness, intellectual

feelings and responses, all of which are characterized by certain

obligations whose social character
primary or derived"

Role-taking

.

(p.

is

difficult to deny, be it

163).

Cognitive-developmental theorists discuss matur-

ing states of awareness in children in terms of role taking-ability.

Role-taking is described as the disposition of the individual to

discern role attributes of others, and to understand them vis-a-vis
his own role behavior.

According to Kohlberg (1971) therefore,

"The primarv meaning of the word 'social' is the distinctively human

lkind (1970a) has remarked how Piaget's notions of reflection
Mead,
and internal discussion are parallel to those of George Herbert
for
Dewey
to
indebted
was
But Mead in turn
the American sociologist.
reasoning.
and
his opinions on the social nature of reflection
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structuring of action and thought by role-taking, by
the tendency
to react to others as

like the self, and to react to the self's

behavior from the other's point of view"

190).

(p.

Role-taking is

preeminently an activity of cognition, with reference to

a social

context.

Flavell (1968) has subsumed under role-taking more conventional
terms like empathy, sympathy, imitation, introjection, identification,

and projection

(p.

227), while distinguishing role-taking from role

playing, or role enactment; in role-taking, the "subject seeks out
the other's role attributes, not to

stand it" (p.

7).

p lay out

his role, but to under -

Selman (1974) suggests that role-taking develop-

ment plays a part in such social behaviors as "A) children's general
social problem-solving ability (e.g., playing cooperative or competitive games, playing hide-and-seek, etc.),

children's communicative

B)

and persuasive abilities, C) children's understanding of feelings
of others (sympathy, empathy) and D) children's understanding of

fairness and justice, and the development of moral reasoning"

Role-taking skill is 'Embedded in
effects" (Flavell, 1968,

p.

200),

a

(p

.

8).

complex network of causes and

implying its integral relationship

Because "cognition and

with the development of logical thinking.

feelings about the self and others are inseparable" (Selman, 1974,
p.

emotional
47), role-taking also links logical thinking to moral and

functioning.

To assume the perspectives of others involves trying

to comprehend not only their motives and opinions but their feelings
as well.

Role-taking increasingly becomes

improve understanding of human ecology.

a

conscious effort to

Flavell (1968) has concluded
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that "The eventual incorporation of an
effective regimen of role-

taking training into the school curriculum

.

.

.

would constitute a

most defensible form of Dewey's 'education for life"'

Role-taking

is

(p.

200).

related to cooperation then in the sense that

all effective social behavior necessitates the ability to perceive
role expectations for a given situation.

As Dewey (1916a) remarked,

Social perceptions and interests can be developed only in a genuinely social medium- -one where there is give. and take in the building

up of a common experience.

Informational statements about things

can be acquired in relative isolation by anyone who previously has

had enough intercourse with others to have learned language.

realization of the meaning of the linguistic signs

.

.

.

But

involves a

context of work and play in association with others /'intercourse,
communication, and cooperation, --all extending the perception of

connections//"

(p

.

358).

The significance, therefore, of social

role behavior for cognitive development rests on the conceptualiza -

tion of social interaction, as a result of reflecting on role

behavior

.

fi

"Piaget had suggested that the child sharpens his role-taking
and communicative skills through actual exchanges with others,
But," as Flavell observes in Development of Role
especially peers.
Taking and Communicat ion Skil Is in Children (19o8) "it may be that
they are also sharpened through covert (or overt, as in solitary play)
activities when the child is by himself, in between social exchanges.
He may not only practice adult social roles, later to be enacted
overtly, but also role-taking activities of the residual variety, for
example, those involved in competitive or cooperative social enterThat is, he may rehearse past or antici
prises, or in communication.
pated interchanges with others, mentally recoding when an imagined
readjustinterlocutor fails to understand or to be persuaded, covertly
other
imagined
an
by
ing his actions in the fact of new behavior
,
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Role-taking development occurs as the individual
continually
reassesses role expectations and his own role perception,
in order
to arrive at a more differentiated state of social
awareness.

It

entails a task of cognitive decentering, and depends upon
the

opportunity to engage in and reflect upon personally significant
social behavior, including group participation and decision-making.

Kohlberg (1971) has noted that "opportunities to role-take are
opportunities to experience conflict or discrepancy between one's own
actions and evaluations and the actions and evaluations of others"
(p.

194).

This aspect of development seems crucial to a more informed

understanding of active and social learning, as these terms are
employed in Open pedagogy.

Active learning that conduces to develop-

ment in the domains of moral reasoning and social awareness in

particular must involve role-taking opportunities.

Role-taking

development would of course seem more readily forthcoming in a classroom where children were encouraged to negotiate for themselves, so
far as suitable,

their own learning experience (in Rathbone’s words,

to be "active agents" in their own learning)

Providing for

r ole-taking

activity

.

Dewey (1899) emphasized

that the school environment be designed with an aim to "organizing

and enlarging" the student's "tendency to act, and to learn through
his acting" (p.

306).

An awareness of the learner’s tendency to

occupying some complementary role, etc." (p 23). Susan Issacs remarked in Intellectual Growth in Young Children (1930, p. 104) a simiimaginative
lar kind of reflective activity in instances of children's
and
past
hypothesize
to
ability
play, and noted the child's growing
and
emotional
his
with
adequately
future as a factor in dealing more
intellectual needs of the present.
.
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assume role behaviors, and of the
benefits of role-taking to development, should lead the Open teacher to
organize for role-taking

activity as a routine part of the school
experience.

An environment

responsive to role-taking activity would be one
onto which the
learner could project his own values, or
intimations of value, and

have a sense of the purpose of his efforts towards
inquiry and study.

This idea has been fundamental to progressive pedagogy.
for one,

Dewey (1899)

frequently asserted the importance of the learner's having

a sense of

what he

is

doing," of finding "a sufficient sense of

value of what he is doing, so that the development of the side of
intelligence, of meaning, shall keep pace all the time with the

growth of the power itself

.

."

.

(p.

62).

If learning is to contri-

bute to total development, it must occur in ways that illustrate

and emphasize the continuity of experience.

Since role-taking is primarily activity in a social context
(real or imagined)

,

the teacher must also provide opportunities for

purposeful social interaction.

Dewey (1934) has said that "Communica-

tion is the process of creating participation"

(p

.

244).

In this

respect, social interaction needs to be organized so that individuals

assume genuine responsibility for making judgments and decisions.
Social role-taking opportunities need to afford students real

decision-making power, and occasions to experience the consequences
of their actions.

Role- taking and grouping

.

Kohlberg and his colleagues have done

some important research on the potential for group interaction to

contribute towards the development of moral reasoning.

Their findings
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point to the relevance of the classroom peer group
for moral education, given the likelihood that within any grade
level of school

children, there exists a variety of cognitive stage functioning.

Since children at certain ages are sometimes more likely to be

influenced by the reasoning of their peers than by their teachers,
and since examples of cognitively novel and challenging moral opinion have the capability of inducing intellectual restructuring and

growth, the teacher can provision for learning by the way she organizes groups and suggests topics.

Most Open educators are against homogeneous grouping, or
streaming, on the grounds that is is undemocratic, and demeaning
and discouraging to slower learners.

The foregoing findings of

cognitive-developmental research would seem to provide another, more
cogent rationale for exposure to

within a group setting.

a

variety of levels of reasoning

In addition to demonstrating the importance

of social interaction among peers, developmental psychologists also

"emphasize the possible heuristic value of interchanges with certain
non-peers:

with parents and other tutor-socializers on the one

hand, and with younger children on the other" (Flavell, 1968,

p.

222).

The common incidence of peer teaching, often in vertically grouped

classrooms, gives evidence of Open Education's implicit awareness
of these benefits.

Role- takirvg and reflection

.

The development of role-taking and

upon
other social-cognitive skills requires opportunity to reflect
the meaning and significance of transactional activity.
is educative

"Experience

about what one
to the extent that it involves thinking
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is doing,

why he is doing it, the general significance,
usefulness,

and applicability of the methods he is using in
doing it" (Thelen,
1967, p.

67).

It is necessary,

therefore, that class procedures

and routines be flexible to allow for "the time it takes
to interiorize actions as thought" (Piaget, 1972, p.

31).

Dewey (1933)

frequently observed that teachers have a tendendy to deny the student’s

developmental need for systematic reflection.
"

teacher is aware," he pointed out,

"More often than the

his mind carries and supplies

the background of unity of meaning against which pupils project

isolated scraps" (pp. 245-246).

^

Whereas Open classrooms presumably

sponsor extended opportunities to explore problems, there is still
the danger that frequent interruption of such activity to check up

on comprehension, as well as forcibly directing the student's "com-

prehension" toward some pre-determined concept or end-point, will

actually interfere with learning.

Bussis and Chittenden (1973)

caution that the teacher must know when to refrain from obtaining diagnostic and evaluative information.

"The meaning that is derived from

valuable experience (by adult or child) takes time in evolving; and

Dewey has argued in School and Society (1915) that "It is
hardly too much to say that in the traditional education so much
stress has been laid upon the presentation to the child of readymade material (books, object-lessons, teacher's talks, etc.), and
the child has been so almost exclusively held to bear responsibility
for reciting upon this ready-made material, that there has been only
accidental occasion and motive for developing reflective attention.
Next to no consideration has been paid to the fundamental necessityleading the child to realize a problem as his own, so that he is
self-induced to attend in order to find out its answer" (p 149).
.
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a likely result of premature demands
for evidence of learning is to

interfere with this process and cause the event
to be dismissed as
'

over"

1

(pp.

225-226). 8

One of Dewey's recurrent exhortations to Progressive
educators
was that students be encouraged to actively consider
the logical

consequences of thoughts and behaviors.

Dewey's aim was to stimulate

the development of a more conscious and enlightened sense of
social

responsibility.

Reflection was the sine qua non for this process.

Herbert Thelen (1972) has argued that
Reflection is encouraged by five conditions:
first,
keeping anxiety within bounds and translating it into
issues to be resolved; second, noninterference and
respect for the individual's privacy while he is trying
to think; third, establishment of a generally nonthreatening "climate" through the habit of listening and responding with clarification, encouragement, and the objective
definition of hard realities of all sorts; fourth, stimulation through challenge and confrontation by novel situations; and fifth, encouraging and utilizing suggestions
and creative ideas ("contributions") which result from
reflection (pp. 156-157)
Open classrooms have been notable for their efforts to provide
for noninterference and respect, to define non- threatening climates
in terms of the teacher's method of interacting with children, and

to employ children's ideas and responses in the planning of further

activity.

On the other hand, Open classrooms have been critized

for creating in some children unproductive levels of anxiety,

®David Hawkins (1971a) has wisely remarked that "When the mind
comprehension,
is evolving the abstractions that will lead to physical
all of us must cross the line between ignorance and insight many
times before we truly understand" (p. 62).
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ostensibly due to the conditions
of free choice and autonomy that
characterize activity scheduling

(I

will speak to the issue of free-

dom and autonomy in Chapter VI)
In the following section,

I

will outline some further develop-

mental prescriptions for establishing an
optimal learning environment, wherein the student is challenged
and encouraged to inquire 9

and to reflect upon the consequences of his
actions.

Providing Appropriate Match:

Instruction and Development

Cognit ive match and opt ima 1 disparity

.

Open educators and

developmental psychologists have each addressed the social-

psychological conditions that influence readiness for developmental
learning, and the disposition to inquire.

Developmenta lists usually

cite, as the crucial ingredient for progressive change, the element

of cognitive dissonance, or disparity, between the learner's approach
to a problematic situation, and the terms by which the situation may
be effectively understood.

McV. Hunt (1961) points out that in the

phase of concrete operational thinking, for example, "It

is the

unexpected in concrete phenomena which can most readily arouse the
curiosity that motivates inquiry.

.

.

.

_/Thus_j_/

problems are

probably best posed in terms of concrete situations which present
information that is to a proper degree dissonant with the child's
systematic expectations"

9

(p.

282).

r
"inquiry" will be defined in this dissertation as a process or
purposeful, problem-solving activity with potential learning outcomes
Inquiry involves reflection,
that can lead to cognitive restructuring.
an individual one.
as
well
and can occur as a group process as
.
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In the domain of ethical problem
solving, Kohlberg and his

colleagues have reached similar conclusions.

Kohlberg (1966)

argues, therefore, that "The child will
listen to what the teacher
says about moral matters only if the
child first feels a genuine

sense of uncertainty as to the right answer
to the situation in question.

The pat little stories in school readers in which
virtue

always triumphs or in which everyone is really nice are
unlikely to
have any value in the stimulation of moral development.

Only the

presentation of genuine and difficult moral conflicts can have this
effect"

( PP

.

22-23).

10

Developmental psychologists argue that the problem of facilitating inquiry and accommodative reflection appears to be one of determining a suitable cognitive match--an optimal disparity--between persons

and environmental stimulus. 11

Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961)

point out that "the discrepancy might be so great between the subject's concept and the impinging situation that the event (another's

evaluation, say) would be interpreted as irrelevant to the issue
at hand.

and

.

.

.

/Or^/ an individual, instead of noting the discrepancy

interpreting it as irrelevant to his own concept, may

Dewey's theory of the development of moral reasoning, like
Kohlberg' s, is based on the notion that moral conflict is prerequisite
Dewey argued (Dewey and Tufts, 1932) that
to progressive change.
"Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what
is right and what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection.
It emerges when men are confronted with situations in which
different desires promise opposed goods and in which incompatible
courses of action seem to be morally justified" (p 173).
.

^David Hunt (1971b) discusses other kinds of match as well:
for example, motivational orientation (preferred form of feedback
and reward); value orientation; and sensory orientation (preferred
sensory modality) (pp. 71-72).
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actually fail to note the concept-event
incongruity and, at least
so far as measured effects reveal,
to act as if no discrepancy

existed"

(p.

53).

The environment must therefore present
"stimuli

which are both sufficiently incongruous as
to stimulate conflict in
the child's existing stage schemata and
sufficiently congruous as
to be assimilable with some accommodative
effort"
p.

242).

To illustrate, we might cite Kohlberg'

s

(Kohlberg,

1971,

observation that

while children are able to understand moralizing that

is

talking

down beneath their level, they do not seem to accept it nearly as
much as if it is comprehensible but somewhat above their level.

It

is obvious that the teacher's implementation of this principle must

start by his careful listening to the moral judgments and ideas

actually expressed by individual children" (1966,
Diagnosing the child

.

p.

25).

Individual diagnosis is obviously a cru-

cial prerequisite to effective organization for learning in the classroom.

Walberg and Thomas (1971) have noted that Open teachers

typically acknowledge the importance of paying diagnostic attention
to "the understanding and reasoning processes which led the child to
the particular response or solution" (p. D 4).

Informal plans for

organizing instruction allow the teacher frequent opportunity for

observation of individual pupils that is necessary for the gathering
of adequate diagnostic information.

Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) have suggested that extensive preand post-testing are necessary to determine the level of operational

thinking in children, but effective and efficient diagnostic testing
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procedures in this area have yet to
be developed for classroom use.
It is probably unrealistic,

in any case,

to expect that teachers will

have the time and the expertise to
diagnose cognitive functioning to
the extent that optimal match conditions
can be established for each

individual.

Open teachers might instead develop an
awareness of at

least the range of operational thinking of
children in their classes

for general provisioning and curriculum design
purposes.

tactic, while crucial to the overall preparations

a

Such a

teacher would

make, would not of course preclude the gathering of as much
individual

diagnostic information as he can manage, without compromising the

students

needs to engage in relatively uninterrupted inquiry and

reflection.

Developmental psychologist Robert Selman has wisely argued that
"Stage analysis will best serve teachers and clinicians interested
in child development if it de-emphasizes reliance on standardized

assessment and emphasizes the professional's need to understand the
child's eye-view of his life experience and to maintain with him an

open-ended and mutual dialogue"

(p.

51).

This professional responsi-

bility involves particular skills--notably listening perceptively,
and recognizing common logical constructions of children at one's

grade level.

Duckworth (1973) has addressed this matter nicely:

Words that people hear--and the younger the child is, the
stronger the case--are taken into some thoughts that are
already in their minds, and those thoughts may not be the
ones the speaker has in mind. ... A good listener, or
a good understander of explanations, is aware that his
first interpretation of what is being said may not be the
right one, and he keeps making guesses about what other
interpretations are possible. This ability is singularly
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undeveloped in little children but it should be
highly
developed in good teachers, who try to listen to
what
children are trying to say to them.
(pp. 141-142)
-Diagnosing the environment

.

Dewey saw (1899)

the problem of

match as the "organizing function of the school," wherein
the
school "selects or reduces the complexity of the forces operating
outside.

Thus,

The first factor in

.

.

.

the organizing of the

resources that make for growth, would be that the school pick out
those elements from the existing social conditions which are best

adapted to the child in his existing stage of growth, and which are
most necessary to him in order that
growth may be set up" (pp

.

a

fairly conscious, uninterrupted

66-67).

Consistent with this advice, Flavell (1963) has argued that
'it will be the teacher's task, and one often demanding considerable

ingenuity, to analyze the content to be learned in terms of the

operations implicit upon it.

Having done this, he will arrange the

learning materials /or social situation/

so that these operations

can actually be carried out by the student himself, and then see to
it that the student does carry them out"

(p.

368).

What

is

involved

here is a need to understand possible classroom activities as
examples of logical operations like ordering, conserving, hypothesizing,

etc.

(or as related to such logical operations), and to be able

to devise curriculum that contains exercise in such operations (see

next chapter)

.

Related to this understanding is the need for aware-

ness of the logical similarities and interrelationships that obtain

among diverse activities (e.g., the variety of activities that
involve a common logical task like classification).

A third imperative
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the teacher is an ability to
ascertain the approximate level of

cognitive sophistication inherent in a
particular skill or field of
understanding, and to know how and when certain
materials and situations might be especially appropriate.

Kohlberg has also pointed to the need for teachers
to "diagnose"
their own modes of expression, so that their
communication can be

effective in inducing reflection or promoting and extending
inquiry.

Facilitating developmental learning is not only

a

matter

of matching the logical requirements of a learning task and the
cognitive capability of the learner.

Particularly in schools where

cultural backgrounds of teacher and students differ markedly, there
is also a problem of matching up symbolic codes (grammars and idioms).

The problem of making effective communication

is at

least twofold.

"It is," as Langer (1969) suggests, "both a question of how the

organism interiorizes knowledge, and how cognition
by the organism and the community.

.

.

.

is

exteriorized

While the forms of know-

ledge are progressively becoming interiorized schemata, the forms
of expression are increasingly becoming exteriorized symbols.

this dual process which insures progressive communication" (p

Confidence

.

It is
.

82).

While cognitive conflict and optimal disparity are

important for inducing accommodative thinking, the disposition to

reflective activity, or to inquiry behavior,
universal as a response to problem

s

ituat ions

is

.

not automatic or

As Dewey (1933)

notes that "It does not follow, however, that
optimal
the degree of disparity that is optimally motivating is also
It might be that the degree of disparity
for structural development.
12 Eiseman

(1971)
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remarked, "One can think reflectively
only when one

is

willing to

endure suspense and to undergo the trouble
of searching.

To many

persons both suspense of judgment and intellectual
search are disagreeable, they want to get them ended as soon as
possible" (p

.

16).

The

implications of cognitive-developmental theory for
setting conditions
that support and encourage inquiry and role-taking
behavior do not

usually extend to factors like trust, acceptance, and reinforcement.
Open Education's approach to classroom environmental conditions

is

characterized, on the other hand, by an emphasis on "humaneness"
respect for each child's style of thinking and acting, and openness
to children's feelings and attempts at self-expression (Walberg and

Thomas, 1971, pp. D 7-8).

Open educators need to consider how such

"humanistic" conditions contribute to development, and in particular,
how they can be instrumental in maximizing the learning potential
of cognitive conflict situations

in Chapter VI)

.

(this issue will be discussed again

Similarly, cognitive developmental psychology must

expand its theory to address other factors that influence development.
Some steps have been taken to make these connections.

Harvey,

Hunt, and Schroder have pointed out the important interrelationship

between psycho-emotional strength and intellectual functioning.

David

Hunt (1966) has noted that

Although the desired state and ultimate goal /of intervention/ is to increase level of abstractness, the short-term

required to coerce accommodation is greater than that which is maxi
mally motivating. On the other hand, one could argue that the high
motivalevel of structural activation that is associated with maximal
63).
process"
(p.
growth
the
of
tion is the critical ingredient
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goal of inducing openness supersedes
the goal of progression
/G/enerally speaking, the initial
tactic for inducing openness is for
the training agent
to provide the optimal environment
with an emphasis upon
his intrinsic acceptance of the
child, a term
defined by us as follows:
"By intrinsic acceptance we
mean that the subject is valued for
himself, for what
e is rather than for what he
can accomplish in relation
to some external criterion.
(p. 288)

....

.

Clearly, the teacher's human relations
techniques--the kind of safe,

supportive atmosphere in which he couches instruction--need
to be

determined in individual cases by his perception of the
degree of
openness a learner brings to various inquiry activities.

Such per-

ception will obviously be aided by diagnostic information relating
to the level of a child

s

cognitive functioning:

the logical opera-

tions he can perform, and the ways in which they contribute to his

understanding of himself and the world.
Palmer (1970) claims that

Although Piaget typically speaks of equilibrium states
in normative terms, they are clearly subjective states
of the individual.
A state of disequilibrium is a state
of 'subjective dissatisfaction.'
In the present interpretation, equilibrium states, or levels, correspond to
levels of confidence.
There may be much to gain through
following this interpretation.
First, confidence may
be viewed as the resultant of all the influences, from
within and from without, which determine one's level of
equilibrium in a given circumstance. Secondly, any measure
of confidence will serve to provide an operational defini20 )^
tion of equilibrium.
(p
.

Palmer hypothesizes that "all else being equal, the higher his

l^it is possible that Kohlberg's concept of an open period to
structural change (see Chapter III) could become instrumental in
determining how and when instruction might be optimally provided to
Considerably more research needs to be done, however,
the learner.
before it becomes feasible for teachers to make use of this insight
for diagnostic purposes.
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confidence, the more likely he will be to terminate his search
for
a solution, and the
.

.

.

lower,

the more likely he will be to persist.

Theoretically, the condition of overconfidence will result

in the premature termination of the search for

a

solution /what

Piaget called "false accommodation//, while the condition of under-

confidence will lead to the use of redundant searching strategies"
(p.

25).

14

Factors of emotional security and coping confidence will, of
course, also have an influence on whether--and for how long--a child

will undertake a problem-solving

task.'*"-’

Palmer's point is that

confidence needs to be considered in several dimensions, and that one
of them is predicated upon the individual's cognitive stage disposi-

tion, or whether or not he is in an open period (to use Kohlberg's

term), with high potential for structural change.

Paradoxically then, inducing openness seems to be a matter of

undermining overconfidence, while at the same time conveying "intrinsic
acceptance" of the child.

To answer this apparent contradiction, we

need to state that in accepting the child on his own terms, the
teacher does not necessarily forfeit the right to encourage him to

Thelen (1972) has observed that just as in instances of
individual inquiry, there are also conflicting forces that influence
'In the group, the two natures in
a group's disposition to inquire.
of interconflict are its tendency to seek comfort through development
out and
personal friendships and alliances and its tendency to seek
deal with situational realities" (p. 115).
15 Loevinger and Wessler (1970) argue, with regard to the individuhence not "see" the
al's disposition to ignore discrepant data, and
its identity, and its
problem, that "The ego maintains its stability,
inconsistent with its
coherence by selectively gating out observations
current state" (I, p. 8).

98

inquire further if his attempt at problem
resolution has been

inadequate for r easons of cognitive
overconfidence

.

Acceptance and

support of the learner would obviously play an
important part as

well in dealing with uncertainty once uncertainty
has been truly
acknowledged.

Here the strategy would be to help the learner
dispel

underconfidence by giving credence and recognition to tentative

resolutions and attempts at understanding.

From this chapter's discussion of optimal environmental conditions for fostering development,

I

would like to proceed to the

implications developmental theory holds for curriculum in the Open
classroom.
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CHAPTER

V

IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM IN THE OPEN CLASSROOM

The heart of the educative process is a matter of
sensitively enlarging and enriching the experience of
the immature so that adequacy of meaning may be tested
in contexts of expanding comprehensiveness.
As patterns of meaning are reconstructed and enlarged, the
processes of formal education should increasingly bring
to the fore an understanding of the standards by which
beliefs may be grounded and judgments controlled.
It
is thus that the capacity for self-education is increased.
(Hullfish and Smith, 1967, p. 75)

Utilization of consciousness to guide experience, and to
improve the constructiveness of subsequent experience,
requires that experience be seen as inquiry; and this
includes such functions as explanation, experimentation,
and test of the consequences of behavior.
(Thelen,

1967, pp. 67-68)

Progressive education must have a much larger, more
expansive and adaptable body of materials and activities,
developed through constant study of the conditions and
methods favorable to the consecutive development of
power and understanding.
(Dewey,
I

1930, p.

221)

have argued earlier that statements of goal priorities for

Open Education are often reflections of
position.

a

particular ideological

This position sometimes tends to devalue such broad

educational goals as cultural transmission and the imparting of
socially useful skills to all learners.
to be sure,

Such educational goals,

do not necessarily lead directly to the development of

reasoning and judgment, or to creativity and self-reliance.

On

the other hand, they play an important role in the individual’s

efforts to make sense of experience, and give meaning to himself
and the world.

development.

As such, these objectives clearly do contribute to

Dewey has aptly remarked that the problem of education
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"is the harmonizing of individual
traits with social ends and values"

(Mayhew and Edwards, 1936, p. 465).

It follows,

then, that any

prescriptive theory of education must recognize
that either culturally "organized patterns of meaning or
relatively unique con-

structions

.

.

.

/are/ likely, in a given case, to increase
control

over the course of subsequent experience"
(Hullfish and Smith, 1967,
p.

185).

Before passing directly to a discussion of
implications of

developmental theory for elementary curriculum,

I

would like to pose

the issue of seemingly conflicting curriculum objectives
from the

perspective of developmental theory.

Curriculum Objectives and Genetic Epistemology

Alan Graubard (1972) has summarized the several philosophical
positions that inform radical reform pedagogy (and which also have
influenced Open Education):

"that everything is learning, or that

any learning is as good as any other, or that

it

is only the spirit

that determines the value of learning, or that the fact that we don't

know what knowledge will be most useful in the future means we must
avoid making judgments now about the relative value of what is
learned" (p

.

218).

Graubard finds these positions "very dubious."

Developmenta lists would undoubtedly concur, for such

a

typical state-

ment as this one by John Holt (1964) --that "Schools should be a
place where children learn what they mcst want to know, instead of

what we think they ought to know" (pp.

174-175), seems both epistem-

ologically naive and socially irresponsible.
Unfortunately, an Open educator like Barth (1972) can draw

conclusions quite similar to Holt's, as evidenced in his argument that
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since knowledge is "a function of the synthesis of
each individual's

experience with the world,"

(p.

45)

there is therefore "no minimum

body of knowledge which is essential for everyone to
know"

46).

(p.

If intellectual development is to occur, however, and a
sense of

cultural identity

to,

form,

there needs to be transactions between

the individual and his world whose terms cannot be dictated solely

by the learner's egocentric understanding of reality.

For accommo-

dation to take place, the individual needs to be confronted with
cognitively and emotionally challenging situations.

The child does

not "choose" the learning that attaches to these situations, nor is

knowledge, defined in a constructionist way, something that children
or adults can always identify operationally beforehand.

Furthermore,

while it may be argued that knowledge defined as information cannot
be arbitrarily prescribed as necessary for everyone's learning,

everyone needs to learn how to reason logically, and perceive reality
and assess situations with some objectivity.

Underlying the issue of subject matter and curriculum--of what
we should learn to know--is really an issue of how it

is we come to

"know," and what conditions are optimally conducive to learning and
development.

Dewey (1899) stated this succinctly when he argued

By the psychological formulation of the subject matter
of the curriculum, I mean a statement, a selection and
arrangement or classification, not on the basis of the
purely ob j ect ive relationship of the facts and pr inc ip 1 es
to each other, but on the basis of their most natural and
most fruitful assimilation in somebody's experience.
_/T/he scientific or logical subject matter has to be
psychologized, it has to be translated over into the terms
of the experiences and mental workings of the individual
child; and it is only as it is thus translated over, so
.

.

.
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that it does become a part of his concrete
everyday experience and is assimilated, that it does really
become educative to him.
(pp. 128-129)

School critics who attack the curriculum for being
irrelevant,
and arbitrarily determined by educators without
the active participa-

tion of students, are really remarking how schools
establish certain

conditions that are either unfavorable to development, or
that lead
to the creation of habits which themselves represent
deterrents to

classroom learning.

Thus, "relevancy"--def ined as having some

direct connection with the student's own personal experience — is not

nearly so important a criterion for curriculum as

is

the potential

for that curriculum to be cognitively challenging because of the

kind of problem situations it poses.
For the student to experience the curriculum as

i ntellectually

and psychological ly relevant, he needs to be able to "operate" on
it.

Ke needs, as Dewey (1933) said, "Fewer subjects and fewer facts

and more responsibility for thinking the material of these subjects
and facts through to realize what they involve"

(p.

33).

In this

regard, schools are probably least beneficial to development when

they deny such responsibility to students, and when they systemati-

cally prohibit a student from experiencing self -corrective learning
situations.

This is done not so much through the use of fixed

curriculum content per se, but by the imposition of solutions as
well as criteria for judgment--thereby promoting "dependence on
authority, stereotyping, rigid interpersonal relations, and a dislike
for the doubt and confusion that pervades any really thoughtful

attempt to find answers" (Joyce, 1965,

p.

91).
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Two important consequences detrimental to
learning and develop-

ment can ensue when such conditions prevail.

One concerns a "false

accommodation" to problematic solutions, wherein
resolution is
effected not through some mental reconstruction--an
acting on the

situation--but through some verbal formula the student has
been
given.

The result, according to Piaget, is "a false equilibrium

which satisfies a child by accommodating to words--to authority
and
not to objects as they present themselves to him" (Duckworth,
1964,
p.

4).

This in turn can lead to a situation where students "tend

to become intellectually irresponsible;

they do not ask for the

meaning of what they learn, in the sense of what difference
to the rest of their beliefs and to their actions" (Dewey,
p.

it makes

1933,

33).

The other consequence represents a kind of intellectual alienation from "official" classroom agendas.

Dewey has aptly observed

that "there are built up detached and independent systems of school

knowledge that inertly overlay the ordinary systems of experience
instead of reacting to enlarge and refine them" (1933,

experience within and without the school

p.

is discontinuous,

289).

If

the child's

developmental need to evolve structural similarities in his understanding of the world is not being met.

Furthermore, the "learning''

that accrues to mutually isolated experiences is probably not trans-

ferable.

Educational goals need to be flexible enough to allow for
idiosyncratic learning within a framework of univeral prerequisites
curriculum
for cognitive development, and some culturally significant
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content objectives.

Elliot Eisner's position that there are
really

three kinds of curriculum objectives
suggests a format to provide

such flexibility

.

Eisner (1972) argues that learning outcomes can

differ according to the way a "problem" is
identified and according
to the locus of the "solution."

He distinguishes three kinds of

learning outcomes, each of which can then be restated
as a generic
type of curriculum objective (pp.

580-585).

The first is called an "instructional objective," because
the

learning outcome is

teacher-specific" in the sense that both

problem and outcome are known beforehand, and are traditionally

mediated by the teacher.

Instructional objectives would pertain to

the transmission of certain culturally significant information and

tradition, and the acquisition of skills for which there exist certain
formulas and grammars that must be memorized.

Eisner calls the

second type an "expressive objective," where both problem and outcome are open.

This objective assumes that learning can occur within

a student- structured situation that is not programmed by external

agents like teachers and texts.

Open educators rally around the

expressive, or student-specific, objective, while sometimes ignoring
the validity and importance of the other two.

This tendency creates

some difficulties in maintaining a balanced view of instructional

priorities (with respect to developmental prerequisites), and
speak to it later in a discussion of Hawkins'

a case

will

term "messing about."

Eisner's third objective (labelled "Type III" because
occurred to him after he had made

I

it only

for the necessity of a

dichotomous view) describes situations where the learning outcome

is
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content-specific in that the problem

is

stated, often in terms

inherent to materials or circumstances, but where the
solution is
open.

An example that conforms to this objective would be the
task

of constructing a paper plane that could stay aloft for more
than

ten seconds.

outcome

is

We might add a fourth kind of objective, in which the

fixed, but the learning, or problem-solving

open, allowing for individual styles of learning.

process, is

This type of

objective would also be very much in keeping with the philosophy of

Open Education.

Eisner's multiple platform for stating curriculum objectives
helps to avoid the pitfalls of most traditional versus progressive

debates on whether or not curriculum can be predetermined.

Within

the context of developmental theory, the only factors that are indeed

predetermined are the dynamics of cognitive growth and the direction
of stage advance.

Thus, for learning to reflect the constructionist

and interactionis t nature of cognitive development, educators need
to consider how each type of curriculum objective contributes to

the reorganization of mind to more adequately understand and control

experience.

For Dewey, the ends of instruction were always focal

points within activity--they could be both directive and emergent,
but were dependent upon transactional experience for their definition.

Definition of ends for developmental learning
heuristic.

is

in this sense

As Hullfish and Smith (1967) caution us, "We must be

careful not to confuse learning with the behavior from which it
an abductive inference.

.

.

.

is

From the point of view of the teacher

it should prove more fruitful to think of

'meanings'

rather than
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kinds of behavior' as the products of
learning"

(p.

179).

Curriculum and the Teaching of Concepts
Since the early 1960's, elementary school curriculum
design in

America has focused on the teaching of meanings rather
than on meaningless skills and information.

There has been an avowed emphasis on

teaching structures, or "organizing concepts," and an appeal
to
the higher mental processes.

Essentially, the aim of the new

curricula was to have students learning to think like historians,

mathematicians, and scientists, rather than simply learning history,

mathematics, and science as codified, inert subject matter.
As Featherstone (1971) points out, the new reformers "concen-

trated on content- -organized in the form of the standard graduate
school disciplines--and ignored the nature of children and their

ways of learning.

Too often children were regarded as passive recipi-

ents of good materials, and teachers as passive conduits.

The

reformers lacked a coherent vision of the school environment as a
whole, a sense of the entire curriculum and the necessary human cli-

mate for learning"

(p.

22).

Open classroom practitioners, while not

overly dependent on the programmed materials and packaged curricula
that 'emerged from this trend, have inevitably been influenced by it.
In focusing on the teaching of basic concepts, such reform often

merely substituted one externally determined content for another,
thus ignoring both the constructionist and interactionist aspects of

developmental learning.

Whether the new curriculum objectives were

labelled as basic concepts, organizing concepts, significant ideas,
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or logical structures, so long as they constituted
predetermined

curriculum content they merely continued the tradition of assuming
that education is sufficient and adequate for having processed
stu-

dents through certain pre-set instructional agendas.

Open Education

and developmental theory alike imply that there should be more to

education than this.
Dewey (1916a) provides what

is

perhaps the simplest develop-

mentalist response to the arguments for teaching concepts:
no thought, no idea /meaning an element of cognitive structural organization/, can possibly be conveyed as an idea
from one person to another. When it is told, it is, to
the one to whom it is told, another given fact, not an
idea.
The communication may stimulate the other person to
realize the question for himself and to think out a like
idea, or it may smother his intellectual interest and
suppress his dawning effort at thought.
But what he directly
gets cannot be an idea.
Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first hand, seeking and finding
his own way out, does he think. ...
If he cannot devise
his own solution (not of course in isolation, but in
correspondence with the teacher and other pupils) and find
his own way out he will not learn (pp. 159-160).

Dewey's point is consistent with the developmentalist notion that
logical structures exist as characteristics of the individual learner's
own cognitive capacity, and cannot be developed in a functional sense

merely by casting the mental energies of the learner in
gested by a discipline, or a concept.

a

mold sug-

Such an approach to elementary

curriculum simply presumes too much about how understanding
how knowledge-as-structure develops.

While there

is

is

formed

obviously a

structure inherent in all disciplines, it does not follow, according
to genetic epistemological theory,

that a structure can be impose_d

on knowledge as it exists dynamically for the learner.

and Smith (1967) point out,

"

_

As Hullfish

thinking cannot be scheduled; it cannot
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be^

h eld within a rigid pattern when it occurs"

(p

.

220)

1
.

For

elementary school children, training in disciplinary
method, so as
to arrive at an understanding of a concept, can too
readily result
in learning a form of ritual behavior rather than in
the kind of

learning that enables them to assimilate a range of new experience.

The new curricula also failed to recognize that children func-

tioning below the level of formal reasoning could hardly be expected
to assimilate the rationales underlying mathematical equations,

scientific laws, or principles of reciprocal justice.

The focus of

the new math, new science, and new social studies "was to be upon

understanding the basic logical assumptions and structure of the
discipline."

But, as Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971)

testify, "the new

curricula assumed formal-operational thought, rather than attempting
to develop it"

(p

.

1082).

Curriculum for Development

How can curriculum help to develop conceptually adequate thinking?

Piaget suggests, apropos of the question "whether to teach the

structure, or to present the child with situations where he is active
and creates the structures himself," that "Teaching means creating

situations where structures can be discovered" (Duckworth, 1964,

p.

3).

Curriculum as "situations where structures can be discovered" has been

authors argue further that "In continuing the assumption
that something to be called a concept may be isolated by analysis,
the richness of the related meanings which arise during a_ conceptual
a
response is overlooked. The resulting so-called concept is barren,
experithe
of
qualities
lonely abstracted element, shorn of the vital
160).
ential fields in which it meaningfully appeared" (p
1-These

.
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misunderstood prescription for Open educators.

Interpret-

ing Piaget and others to mean that the
child can only act on experience

and make discoveries when he is not following
the dictates of a

particular task or assignment, they have tended to
exaggerate the

relative importance of what Hawkins has called "messing
about."
Rathbone (1971a) illustrates this tendency when he
argues that
the child learns best when given freedom to explore
the
world around him, with a minimum of direction from others.
Through messing about" with his immediate environment,
his manipulations advance from a general, nearly random
search to a more planned and specific search for
Spontaneity, improvisation, and serendipity mark the start
of his learning; only after prolonged exploratory contact
with an object or a concept does he begin explicit verbalization about the object, his activity, or the effect of
one upon the other.
(p. 100)
.

Such statements about learning are potentially misleading on two
counts.

First, there is the implication that serendipity will

naturally lead up to more carefully considered intellectual activity.
Dewey (1933) has suggested that this
that the teacher must be

is not always the case,

and

careful not to set out such conditions as

"occasion a mere succession of excitements which have no cumulative
effect."

Instead the teacher's "province is

...

to provide the

materials and the conditions by which organic curiosity will be
directed into investigations that have an aim and that produce results
in the way of increase of knowledge, and by which social inquisitive-

ness will be converted into ability to find out things known to
others, an ability to ask questions of books as well as of persons"
(p.

40).

Second, there is implied in Rathbone'

s

contentions an orderly

progression to the learning process he describes, in which the child

no
moves from random exploration to more rational and
systematic understanding.

The danger here is that this progression might
suggest

an optimal sequence for experiencing reality in a
classroom.

The

stimulus to developmental learning need not always come
from "serendipity.

It can just as easily be provided by specific demands
of

a problem to be solved,

or directions given by a teacher or a text-

book (in this sense we can talk about provisioning
ment with symbols as well as with materials).

a

learning environ-

Hawkins (1971b), whom

Rathbone quotes frequently, identifies three patterns or phases in

classroom learning activity which are "different from each other in
the relations they induce between children, materials of study, and

teachers"

(p

59).

.

They include "messing about" (or free explora-

tion), "multiply programmed" activity, and whole-class discussion

and lecturing.

Hawkins pointed out as well that there is no natural

or optimal sequence governing their organization in time (p.

69).

Subject Matter

Curriculum is still generally thought of in terms of diverse
subject matters.

Open educators have made significant attempts to

blend elementary school subject disciplines so that children's

exploration and invention are not constrained within artificial
parameters.

The Open classroom emphasizes children's inquiry and

creative expression, rather than "subjects," as the locus of educative activity.

Developmental theory suggests some other reasons

why learning in the various disciplines can and should be
interrelated endeavor.

a

common,

For Dewey, subjects were simply not so

Ill

l ogically distinct

that they should necessarily parcel up
the experi-

ence of children in school.

If intelligence consists of schemes
and

structures for construing relation, probability,
classification,
etc., and if development of these structures
occurs in an approximately

parallel way (thus enabling developmentalists to
posit a stage theory),
then the several traditional elementary curricula
may be thought of
as embodying common intellective processes, and
in need of ongoing

coordination according to criteria of logical sophistication,
or
"developmental stage."
In order to serve as catalysts for structural change, elementary

curriculum should be built upon "exercises (questions, problems,
tasks)

that require thinking (modifying, reconstructing, transform-

ing)" (Furth,

1970, p.

Dewey (1933) stated that "at every

154).

stage of development, each lesson, in order to be educative, should

lead up to a certain amount of conceptualizing of impressions and
ideas.

Without this conceptualizing or intellectualizing, nothing

is gained that can be carried over to the better understanding of

new experiences"

(p

.

153).

Dewey here speaks explicitly to the busi-

ness of assimilation--interiorizing actions as thought-- that is the

essential process of knowing.

Developmentalists and educators alike have argued that traditional subjects and skill areas--mathematics

,

science, reading and

writing, social studies, art--should be regarded more in terms of
the thinking processes they involve, and the experience they provide
to organize cognition and emotion.

Dewey (1928) asserted that progres-

sive teachers should be developing "organized subject-matter" that
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could serve as prototype, to be shared.

Such subject matter would

differ from the material in standardized
texts, and the methods of
instruction associated with them, in two
respects.

"In the first

place, the material would be associated
with and derived from occupational activities or prolonged courses
of action undertaken by the

pupils themselves.

In the second place, the material presented

would not be something to be literally followed
by other teachers
and students, but would be indications of the
intellectual possibilities of this and that course of activity-statements
of carefully

directed and observed experience

....

exactly duplicate the first"

124).

(p.

No second experience would

The work of Piaget and his colleagues in areas like the child's

conception of number and geometry, and of physical causality, space,
time, and speed and movement,

is by now fairly familiar to most

developers of mathematics and science curricula.

Taken as a whole,

it suggests that these elementary school subject areas represent

manifold opportunities for the child to actively determine the
properties of objects and explore the characteristics of natural
phenomena, thereby "assuring him of extensive practice in abstracting

structural similarities and common principles from diverse material
contents or specific tasks" (Wohlwill, 1964,

p.

100).

Piaget (1973)

has indeed remarked that "Mathematics is nothing but logic"

(p.

96),

and "the true goal of mathematical learning-- the development of the
o

deductive capabilities"

(p.

100).

^Sullivan (1967) points out, however, that educators should take
care, in drawing inferences from Piaget's research, not to ignore the
validity of traditional rote learning of arithmetic. He notes, for
instance, that "A substantial correlation between number readiness
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But the logical tasks of mathematics
and science--to determine

relationships of order, causality, and
probability--are also common
to other school subjects, and contribute
similarly to the overall

growth of intelligence.

Thus geography represents, for Dewey and

McLellan (1895), "a certain grouping of facts,
classified on the
basis of

th_e

mind

1

s

attitude towards these facts

.

...

It is simply

some interest, some urgent need of man's activities,
which discrimin-

ates the facts and unifies them under different heads"

(p.

The

209).

task for the student, therefore, is to discover "the fundamental

interest and purpose which underlie this classification"

209).

(p.

History as curriculum for Dewey's Chicago elementary school

was likewise considered "not as an accumulation of results or
effects, a mere statement of what happened, but as a forceful, acting thing.

The motives /that is, the factors of causality/

must stand out.

.

.

.

To study history is not to amass information, but

to use information in constructing a vivid picture of how and why

men did thus and so, achieved their successes and came to their
failures" (Skilbeck, 1970, p. 66).

Current trends in social studies

emphasize "values clarification" and improving human relations
skills.

Both of these concerns should consider their underlying

agenda as being the task of getting children to understand more and

(e.g., conservation of number) and the achievement of addition and
subtraction can be interpreted in both directions. Simply, it
raises the question of 'which came first, the chicken or the egg;'
that is, we do not clearly know whether learning of addition and
subtraction enhances conservation or whether the opposite obtains"
(p.

21)
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reason better about the importance of reciprocity
in social relationships.

Helping children to identify causality factors--to see
the

reasons behind their own actions, as well as those of
others--is but

another area of logical operations whose development can be
facilitated
in the classroom.

Reading literature holds enormous potential for the development
of judgment and reasoning--for seeing new relationships, and
under-

standing new aspects of causality in human experience.

Paul Goodman

(1971) has remarked that "literature instructs by moving, by disturb-

ing rigid or stereotyped responses" (p.

114).

Analagous to Goodman's

comments about reading literature is the fact that through writing,
a student

is often forced to confront

inconsistent or vaguely held

ideas, and in his reconciling or clarifying them, cognitive accommo-

dation may take place.

Writing also provides opportunity for role-

taking, for trying out new postures as well as new ideas.

Learning

how to write clearly and persuasively is exercise in constructing

more logically consistent and integrated argument.
Finally, we should note that artistic expression also involves
logical problems of construction and organization.
by Dewey (1934)

work of art
s

is

It has been argued

that the experience of creating and of witnessing a
in part a process of logically perceiving pattern and

true ture- - th e unity of form in the work--whi.ch is itself the epitome

of educative experience.

that is

a_n

experience.

"Form is a character of every experience
Art in its specific sense enacts more deliber-

ately and fully the conditions that effect this unity.

Form may
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then be .defined as the operation of forces
that carry the experience

—
f

an

e vent

illment

,,

,

(p.

object

,

scene

,

and situation to its own integral ful-

137).

Problem-Solving, Creative Thinking, and Inquiry

Open classrooms' are characterized by children's individual

explorations with materials and ideas.

Problem-solving experience,

however structured, is a fundamental element in Open classroom
learning.

Children are especially encouraged to pose their own

questions, and to pursue problems in which they are truly interested.
For such activity to contribute to structural change, the problems

must be genuinely challenging, but not overwhelming, and must induce
some form of accommodative thinking.

There is also a complementary

need for the individual to articulate and test his new insights, and
to discover other applications and extensions for them.^
In earlier chapters,

discussed the significance of cognitive

I

conflict in stimulating structural change.

Cognitive conflict situa-

tions can provoke accommodative thinking--in effect, a problem-solving

process-- that contributes to more adequate ways of assimilating experi-

ence.^

Problem-solving as

a

term used by learning theorists and

educators thus gains special significance when it

is

regarded in this

^Pinard and Laurendeau (1969) suggest the strategy of "focusing
on one set of operations (common task) --like seriation--instead of on
one level of understanding of an operation" (pp. 158-159).

^Dewey (1938b) explained that the "indeterminate situation becomes
problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry" (p.
107)

.
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context of equilibration and developmental theory.

When Dewey used

the term, Progressive educators often did not
so regard it, and one

result was a much narrower, more literal understanding
of what

problem-solving meant as

a

pedagogical method.

In Dewey's construc-

tionist scheme of the development of intelligence, the act of
inquiry-the deliberate employment of the powers of ref lection--was
always set
in some kind of problem-solving context.
in this sense was a broad one;

The definition of "problem"

to be "conscious of problems" was to

be conscious "not simply of things to be done, but ends to be

reached, points to be worked out" (Dewey, 1899,

p.

318).

Dewey (1933)

haa also noted that "The word 'problem' often seems too elaborate
and dignified to denote what happens in minor cases of reflection.
But in every case where reflective activity ensues, there is a pro-

cess of intellectualizing what at first is merely an emotional quality
of the whole situation.

This conversion is effected by noting more

definitely the conditions that constitute the trouble and cause the
stoppage of action"

(p.

109).

Curriculum that has development as its aim must therefore describe means to provide cognitive conflict situations for the learner.
Here, developmentalists join forces with educators like Paul

Torrance who argue that problem-solving, or inquiry, should employ
creative, "divergent" thinking.

Creative thinking is frequently

accommodative thinking, because, as Torrance (1965) states, it
"requires modification or rejection of previously accepted ideas,
"high motivation and persistence, taking place either over a considerable span of time (continuously or intermittently) or at high intensity
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(p.

666), while involving the task of formulating the
problem

itself.
C u rriculum .strategies _to facilitate
creative thinking

.

Creative

thinking occurs in response to a problem, and represents
an alterna-

tive to the usual or conventional response an individual
might be
disposed to make.

It is elicited through confrontation with ambiguity

and uncertainty, or some other cognitively challenging stimulus.

Charlesworth (1964) suggests that creating situations that have the
potential to arouse cognitive conflict can be accomplished in two
ways.

"We either allow the child to construct correct but incomplete

hypotheses or expectations about events before presenting him with
a new single

non-conforming instance which challenges his hypothesis

to the extent that he seeks to expand it, or we allow him to pursue

misleading ideas before presenting him with

a

carefully selected

fact or event that will suddenly contradict and hopefully rectify

them" (pp.

90-91).

The following additional, but related, curriculum strategies

may also produce cognitive conflict situations, and the potential
for growth of logical understanding:
1)

Having children estimate, predict, and anticipate^

2)

Transforming or rearranging information (juxtaposing
£

apparently unrelated items)

5 See

p.

Pinard and Laurendeau (1969,

p.

157); also, Torrance (1970,

8).

^Torrance (1970, p. 8); see also the "synectics" strategy of
"making the familiar strange" by imposing "an intentionally naive or
apparently 'out of focus' look at some aspect of the known world,
in Gordon (1971, p. 37).
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3)

Providing elements of surprise, mystery,
puzzlement 7

4)

Encouraging synthesis of diverse elements

5)

Encouraging search for solutions which take into
account
the largest number of variables

6)

Encouraging the formation of multiple hypotheses

7)

Extending inquiry to next steps (including the testing
out
of hypotheses)

Curriculum models

.

The notion of a curriculum model for the

Open classroom might seem at first inimical to the assumptions held
about idiosyncratic learning and shared involvement in planning and
instruction.

But as Dewey (1930) pointed out, "Full recognition of

the fact that subject matter must be always changing with locality,

with the situation and with the particular type of children

is,

however, quite consistent with equal recognition of the fact that it
is

possible to work out varied bodies of consecutive subject matter

upon which teachers may draw, each in his own way, in conducting his
own work" (p

.

222).

Curriculum considered not as uniform content but in terms of
fundamental cognitive operations couched in socially useful purpose
is a

legitimate organizing principle for developmental learning in

the Open classroom.

Hawkins (1971b), Thelen (1972), Parker and Rubin

(1966), and Suchman (1972), among others, are essentially of common

mind when they suggest that learning be structured upon

a

curriculum

that focuses on inquiry and problem-solving, and that systematically

7

For items #3-7, see Torrance (1970, p. 8).

t
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enables the learner to build more
comprehensive and integrated

explanatory schemes o£ reality.

would

allow

At the same time, such curriculum

him to put his insights into practice,
to experience and

understand the consequences of his actions,
and to assume intellectual
and social responsibility for himself.

Dewey's notion of the project

activity also represents a valuable set of
criteria for a developmental

curriculum model.

For Dewey (1928),

the test of a good project is whether it is
sufficiently
full and complex to demand a variety of responses
from
^iff eren t children and permit each to go at it and make
his contribution in a way which is characteristic
of
himself.
The further test or mark of a good activity,
educationally speaking, is that it have a sufficiently
long time-span so that a series of endeavors and explorations are involved in it, and included in such a way that
each step opens up a new field, raises new questions,
arouses a demand for further knowledge, and suggests what
to do next on the basis of what has been accomplished and
the knowledge thereby gained.
(p. 122)

(Unfortunately, through the decades of "Progressive" education, the

classroom project typically degenerated into

a

rather mindless

data -collecting activity, or some artistic or model-making endeavor
that more often than not represented an intellectual cul-de-sac.)

Individuated activity, extended over

a

period of time, constitutes

the substance of curriculum that could, when combined with a challenging and responsive environment, truly sponsor development in the

elementary classroom.

Projects so considered should have particular

significance for middle and upper elementary grades, where students
have an increasing capacity to train their attention on project-type
activity.

Children in Open classrooms frequently engage in deliberated

construction projects, and crafts like book-binding, and textile
weaving and dying, are also commonplace.

Dewey's injunction here would
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merely be that the teacher should be actively involved
"in working
out _the

i n tellectual

possibilities resident in various arts, crafts,

and occupations, and reorganizing the curriculum accordingly
Any
underlining-?' (1933, p. 217). "Not the thing done, but the
quality of

mind that goes into the doing"

(p.

216)

determines what potential

such activity holds for development.
For Open Education today, an occupat ions-based curriculum

would have students engaged in technological and artistic work projects
that involve creative problem-solving activity.

An occupation in

this context represents exercise in invention, through a dynamic,

purposeful involvement with materials, natural and social phenomena,
and the ideas that relate them.

Dewey

1

s

" occupations "

curriculum

.

At Dewey's University of

Chicago Laboratory School, teachers developed

a

project activity

approach to elementary curriculum based on fundamental human occupaO

tions.

This model evolved from Dewey's paramount concern that school

experience be socially, morally and intellectually continuous with
itself, and with the child's natural educative interests:

"physical

mastery, constructive abilities, intellectual or theoretical activity
(interest in discovery), and social interest" (1913,

p.

67 passim).

The idea, according to Dewey (1915), was
to furnish the child with a sufficiently large amount
activity in occupations, expression, conversation,
personal
of
(1)

as
^At the Dewey laboratory school, occupations were considered
sociothe
suggesting
they have emerged historically, thereby
curricula
industrial history of civilization as a basic thread linking
(1936).
Edwards
and
See Wirth (1966), ch. 9: and Mayhew
year by year.
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construction, and experimentation, so that his individuality, moral and intellectual, shall not be swamped
by
a disproportionate amount of the experience
of others
to which books introduce him; and
(2) so to conduct
this more direct experience as to make the child feel
tne need of resort to and command of the traditional
social tools
furnish him with motives and make his
recourse to them intelligent, an addition to his powers,
instead of a servile dependency.
(pp. 112-113)

As Dewey (1915) noted, "The fundamental point in the psychology
of an occupation is that it maintains a balance between the

intellectual and the practical phases of experience"

(p

.

133).

Dewey's occupations-based curriculum combined opportunities for

educative peer interchange, and for social role-taking as well.

Within such

a

9

format of active, sustained inquiry and inventive

thinking, the child could be "continuously conditioned to responsible social participation, while at the same time the tasks that are

expected of it are adapted to its capacity" (Benedict, 1938, pp. 2324)

.

The original context of this quotation (taken from an article

entitled "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning")
was an argument contrasting non-Western ways of rearing and educating children with those of an "industrial" society like contemporary

America.

School curriculum that facilitates responsible social

participation, in activity conducive to total development of the
individual, could therefore have an effect on lessening the trauma
of passage into productive adulthood- -the "discontinuity" in cultural

^The recent use of simulation games in elementary school curriculum marks a psychologically consistent effort, albeit sometimes rather
contrived or exotic, to structure play interests around a complicated

group problem situation.

12 ?.

conditioning-- that commonly produces in American
adolescents such
symptoms as alienation and identity confusion.

For Dewey, it was this focus on social purpose that
gave the

occupations curriculum its primary value.
a social

If the school exists as

institution, to prepare children to become efficient and

resourceful members of a "democratic and progressive society," a
child

must be educated for leadership as well as for obedience.

He must have power of self-direction and power of directing others,

power of administration, ability to assume positions of responsibility"
(1909, p.

10).

^The school's ultimate function is therefore a moral

such a premise represents the most

fundamental commonality existing between Dewey's position, and that
of Open Education.

But as Dewey (1909) reminded, "The school cannot

be a preparation for social life excepting as it reproduces, within

...

itself, typical conditions of social life.

To form habits of

social usefulness and serviceableness apart from any direct social
need and motive, apart from any existing social situation," is a
futile hope (p.

14).

Dewey saw a need, then, for the development in

school children of an intellectual and pract ica

welfare, and viewed subject matter "as

a

to realize the social sense of action"

(p

interest in community

means of bringing the child
.

31).

Evaluation of Curriculum

How is curriculum with such long-term and comprehensive objectives
to be evaluated?

Dewey (1909) contended that "Only as we interpret

school activities with reference to the larger circle or social

activities to which they relate do we find any standard for judging
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their moral significance" (p

.

The developmental significance

13).

of curriculum would, of course, need to be evaluated
in terms of the

growth changes in individual children.

Kohlberg and Mayer (1972)

have stated that

The progressive or cognitive-developmental view
attempts to integrate both behavior and internal
states in a functional epistemology of mind.
It
takes inner experience seriously by attempting to
observe thought processes rather than language
behavior and by observing valuing processes rather
than reinforced behavior.
The cognitive
developmental approach stresses the need to examine
mental competence or mental structure as opposed to
examining only performance, but it employs a functional rather than an introspective approach to the
observation of mental structure.
461)
(p
.

.

.

.

A functional approach to evaluating mental competence--as the measure
of educative experience derived from a school curriculum--would be

obliged to determine how adequately a learner can understand and
act upon his understanding.

Competence would be indicated by

differentiation and integration in reasoning, and by the ability to
transfer knowledge when dealing with logically interrelated problems
or tasks.

A further indication would be the learner's faith in his understanding in the face of seemingly discrepant data (not to be confused with cognitive overconfidence, which is characterized by a

tendency to ignore discrepant data).

The research of Smedslund has

shown that conceptual understandings that are little more than

memorized generalizations "are more readily discarded when data are
discrepant to the concept.

But when the concepts result from the

normal
resolution of conflicts in successive accommodations as in the
not easily
course of conceptual growth, a conceptual structure is

124

given up even in the face of
(Suchman,

1972, p.

152).

a

heavy weight of discrepant data"

Consonant with curriculum guidelines of

continuity and activity extended over

a

substantial time-span,

evaluation of such curriculum should also be
conducted over

a

period

of time sufficiently broad as to measure
advances in operational

thinking across

a

range of diverse tasks.

Chapter V has examined the implications of cognitive-developmental
theory for curriculum in the Open classroom.

In the following chap-

ter, I will discuss the place of teacher intervention in develop-

mental learning, and how such topics as "the helping relationship"
and

freedom and discipline" are illuminated by developmental theory.
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CHAPTER

VI

IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHER INTERVENTION
IN THE OPEN CLASSROOM

Since learning is something that the pupil has to do himself and for himself, the initiative lies with the
learner.
The teacher is a guide and director; he steers
the boat, but the energy that propels it must come from
those who are learning.
The more a teacher is aware of
the past experiences of students, of their hopes, desires,
chief interests, the better will he understand the forces
at work that need to be directed and utilized for the
formation of reflective habits.
(Dewey,
.

.

.

1933, p.

36)

a tendency toward optimum mutual activation exists

in the ego and in society.
_/T/he concept of reality,
or so it seems to me, already implies an optimum correspondence between mind and the structure of the environment.
But, we may now add, he is also inactivated in
actuality; and we can help him grasp reality only to the
extent to which we, within our chosen method, become
actual to him.
This, at any rate, I want to offer for
.

.

.

our consideration.
(Erikson,

1964, pp.

175-176)

Many of the implications cognitive-developmental theory holds
for classroom instruction have been addressed in earlier chapters.

The tasks of creating and sustaining an environment that stimulates

development, and of helping to design and extend curriculum that

engages active social and intellectual participation--these are tasks
that represent an integral part of, and overlap with, the instruc-

tional role in the Open classroom. The purpose of the present chapter,
then,

is

to consider this role from another dimens ion- -that of

teacher intervention in the child's activity.

Specifically,

I

will

be attempting to set forth some prescriptions for teacher behavior

during the child's experience as inquirer and problem-solver.

126

Two interrelated issues will be examined in this
context:

the

humanistic' educator's emphasis on the teacher's interpersonal
behavior, and how it may influence pupil development; and
the issue
of teacher authority, and how it affects the learner's
freedom to

function as an autonomous, self-educating individual.
Autonomy, Independence, and Development

An educational goal that developmental theorists and Open
educators both embrace is the growth of independent thinking and

intellectual resourcefulness in children.

Open educators, however,

sometimes see autonomy and independence more in libertarian terms-as a direct outgrowth of the kinds of freedom the classroom environ-

ment allows the child--than as "something men have by degrees"
(Hawkins,

1972, p.

307)

to be nurtured and developed, and to be

regarded in terms of developmental schedules.

They are concerned,

therefore, with defining the teacher's role in such a way that it

does not infringe upon the natural learning tendencies of children.
Both Holt (1964) and Rathbone (1971a) have argued, for instance,
that the teacher cannot force a child to learn.

They each see "un-

willingness to be coercive" as an important characteristic of

a good

teacher. The problem then lies in differentiating between coercive

behavior and behavior in which the teacher may legitimately direct
a child to some task,

contention that "there

or set up standards for work done.
is no

them afraid, or more afraid"

Holt's

way to coerce children without making
(p.

179)

could be construed,

in its

and
context, as a statement that all teacher directives, rules,
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standards are potentially harmful to the child, and
detrimental
to learning.

Rathbone's position is

statement that "each child

a

is his own

more considered one, but his

agent--a self-reliant,

independent, self-actualizing individual who is capable, on his
own,

forming concepts

find

of learning"

(1971a, p.

still ignores

104)

by implication the interactionist aspect of knowledge and develop-

ment--and the necessity of an environment of significant others,

within which the child can develop role-taking skills as

a

means to

self -actualization.

Dewey saw the problem this way:

"The ground of democratic

ideas and practices is faith in the potentialities of individuals,

faith in the capacity for positive developments if proper conditions

are provided.

The weakness of the philosophy originally advanced to

justify the democratic movement was that it took individuality to
be something given ready-made; that is, in abstraction from time

instead of as a power to develop" (1938c,

p.

242).

Thus, "it is the

danger of the 'new education' that it regard the child's present
powers and interests as something finally significant in themselves.

...

It will do harm if child-study leave in the popular mind the

impression that a child of a given age has a positive equipment of
purposes and interests to be cultivated just as they stand.

Inter-

ests in reality are but attitudes toward possible experiences, they
not
are not achievements; their worth is in the leverage they afford,
in the accomplishment they represent"

(1902, p.

15).

Cognitive-developmental psychology charts development towaras
human
independence and appreciation of the reciprocal nature of
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relationships in terms of "decentration," or
movement away from an egocentric understanding of the world.

"In the degree that the individu-

al is self-centred," states Piaget
(19/3), "he creates an obstacle by

his moral or intellectual egocentrism to the inherent
relations of

reciprocity that all evolved social living contains"

(p.

90).

Thus,

education "'directed to the full development of the human personality
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms

is

really to create individuals capable of intellectual and

moral autonomy and of respecting this autonomy in others by applying
the rule of reciprocity that makes it legitimate for themselves" (p.

91).

Development of intellectual and moral autonomy describes a
decreasing dependency upon understandings that are logically unsophisticated and not always reliable or adequate, and upon rules and sanctions which are too confining and inflexible.

A characteristic of

the cognitive functioning of elementary school children is that it
is

still largely dependent upon more advanced intellectual and moral
Thus, while we posit that development is preeminently

authorities.

an active process, and that children need to role-take, to experiment,
to explore,

to form their own questions and make their own mistakes,

it does not necessarily follow (in the context of this theory)

that

children learn to be independent and autonomous simply by practicing
such behavior.

In a revealing study of the factors that contribute

to the formation of self-esteem, Coopersmith (1968)

developmental contentions.

bears out these

His findings "indicate that children

develop self-trust, venturesomeness and the ability to deal with

1

See Kohlberg (1969), pp.

376-389.

V

129

adversity if they are treated with respect and are
provided with

well-defined standards of values, demands for competence
and guidance
toward solutions of problems.

It appears that the development of

independence and self-reliance

is

fostered by a well-structured,

demanding environment rather than by largely unlimited
permissiveness
and freedom to explore in an unfocused way"

(p.

106).

The Teacher as Authority
In the Open Classroom

Developmental theory suggests several approaches for legitimizing the authority of the teacher with respect to the classroom learn-

ing process. Dewey (1928)

observed that "the teacher, as the member

of the group having the riper and fuller experience and the greater

insight into the possibilities of continuous development found in

any suggested project, has not only the right but the duty to suggest
lines of activity" (p.

The teacher can also provide freedom

124).

for the child to act by suggesting a field of alternatives from

which to choose, without, of course, so limiting and "processing"
the field as to deny the opportunity to construct his choice in a way

that is intellectually significant for him.

Teacher intervention in

this sense is directed to maximize the developmental potential of
the child’s freedom to explore and to grow in understanding.

Dewey (1936) has stated that "The issue that requires constant

attention is the intimate and organic union of the two things:
authority and freedom.

.

.

.

of

The idea of attaining a solution by

separation instead of by union misleads and thwarts endeavor whenever
it is acted upon"

(p.

94).

Seen in this light, the authority of the
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teacher need not be defined in apposition to the learner's freedom
to develop, but rather in support of it.

The teacher's authority in

effect becomes part of the climate that encourages active inquiry,
and as a potential consequence, cognitive-structural change.

When the teacher intervenes in the learning process, he may also
be serving developmental needs indirectly by virtue of his providing
a model for children's inquiry and role-taking activity.

precedents for inquiry behavior can in fact be

a

Establishing

mutual affair,

involving a joint teacher-child dialogue over some element of "subject

matter"--what David Hawkins calls the "It" in his "I-Thcu-It" triad.
"The teacher," claims Hawkins (1971a), makes possible this relation

between the child and 'It,' just by having 'It' in the room; for the
child even this brings the teacher as a person, a 'Thou,'
picture.

For the child this is

...

a basis

into the

for communication with

the teacher on a new level and with a new dignity"

(p

.

92).

The teacher who recognizes and respects the fact that the child

comprehends reality with his own peculiar system of logic may in turn
be perceived as a person who makes an effort to understand another's

"To show lack of respect for persons, is, for instance,

point of view.

to ignore his point of view when we use him purely for our own pur-

poses or to settle his destiny for him without taking account of his
views about it, or to treat him purely as the occupant of a role by

ignoring his more general status as a rational being" (Hirst and
Peters,

197

J.,

p.

92).

Finally, in a climate of collaborative inquiry,

his authority in
the teacher would demonstrate and communicate that
per se,
instruction is not really vested in his "official" position
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but in the intellectual skills, emotional attitudes,
and the fair-

ness in judgment he brings to problem-solving, including
those

problems he can't himself solve.
importance of the

I-Thou'

Hawkins (1971a) comments that "The

relationship between the teacher and

the child is that the child learns something about the adult, which

can be described with words like 'confidence,'
(p-

'trust,' and 'respect'"

90).

The child can also feel a greater sense of self-respect when
he knows that significant recognition is not so much a measure of

achievement, but of his efforts in

responsible to him.

a role that

seems meaningful and

For the child, it is of paramount importance

"that he be responded to and given function and status as

a

person

whose gradual growth and transformation make sense to those who begin
to make sense to him"

(Erikson,

1968, p.

156).

On the teacher's

part, respect for individual children therefore involves considera-

tion not only of their feelings, but of the logical bases for their

motives and intentions, and for their judgments and opinions as well.
This is of course consistent with the diagnostic and instructional
responsibilities of a teacher whose aim is to facilitate development.
"Humaneness" and the Helping Relationship

Walberg and Thomas (1971) state that the intervention of Open
teachers is characterized by qualities of humaneness:
ness, and warmth (pp. d 7-8).

respect, open-

Carl Rogers, whose ideas have contri-

of the Open
buted heavily to determining this aspect of the role

terms as
classroom teacher, defines such humaneness in operational

"the helping relationship."

For Rogers "the facilitation of
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significant learning rests upon certain attitudinal
qualities which
exist in the personal relationship between the
facilitator and the
learner

(1969, p.

106).

Such qualities would include realness, or

genuineness; prizing, accepting, and trusting; and empathic
under-

standing (pp.

106-112).

conditions of

Their function would be to help create

psychological safety" and "psychological freedom" for

the learner (1970, pp.

356-359).

From a cognitive-developmental perspective,

a

human relations

climate that supports active confrontation with intellectually

challenging situations and the opportunity for role-taking activity
would help facilitate development.

Developmental theory posits that

for cognitive structures to change, the

s

ine qua non is not a set of

protective, supportive, personal relationship factors, but the

occurrence of cognitive conflict--of a need for accommodative thinking.

To be sure, the learner must feel psychologically secure and

willing enough to acknowledge, and then deal with discrepant data,
or with higher-level examples of reasoning.

As Holt (1964) has aptly
i

stated, two basic tasks for teachers are "to stop children from being

afraid, and then to break them of the bad thinking habits into which

their fears have driven them"

(p.

49).

But

I

would argue, from a

development a list position, that these are not so much psychotherapeutic tasks as they are the responsibility of
to curriculum,

a

coherent approach

instruction, and organizat ion--an approach whose theo-

retical foundations

I

have attempted to sketch in these chapters.

strategies
A Rogerian definition for the teacher's human relations

developmental philosophy
in the classroom is a valuable complement to a
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of pedagogy, so long as it does not obscure the cognitive
aspect of

development, and the importance of conflict, both cognitive and
emotional,

in human growth.

Furthermore, the teacher's personal

attitudes need not be uniformly warm, accepting, and affectionate,
nor should he always try to foster such attitudes within the classroom.

Hunt (1971a) has reported that in working to improve moral

reasoning capacities in adjudicated delinquents,

a

"differential-

treatment model" that varied treatment worker characteristics according to the interpersonal maturity level of the client, made effec-

tive use of qualities ranging from tolerance and protectiveness, to

firmness and willingness to punish, to warmth and understanding (pp.
247-248)

.

Similarly, Kohlberg (1971) has argued that

The environment which provides role-taking opportunities
is not necessarily a warm, loving, identificationinducing environment, and an environment deprived in
role-taking opportunities is not necessarily cold or
rejecting. A certain minimum amount of warmth in faceto-face groups or institutions is required if a child
or adolescent is to feel a sense of participation and
membership in the group. However, the conditions for a
child' s_maximal participation and role-taking in a group
is /sic/ not that he receive maximal affection from the
group, or that the group be organized on communal affiliation lines. At the extreme negative end, impersonal
cold environments are also deficient in role-taking
opportunities.

(p

.

191)

Sympathy and openness can indeed enhance the quality of interpersonal relationships, and increase the potential for teachers to
sensitively diagnose and provide for learners.

Rogers and the

by pro"humanistic psychologists" have done a considerable service

viding guidelines for the teacher as
health and self-actualization.

a

facilitator of psycho-emotional

On the other hand, it would be

a
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mistake not to recognize the resemblance of the
psychotherapeutic

evangelism of humanistic educators (those for whom positive
selfimage and

being in touch with one’s feelings" are the primary

objectives for the classroom teacher/facilitator) to the ersatz

Freudianism that characterized much of the later Progressive Movement's
self-promotional efforts.

(The libertarian evangelism of the free

school advocates has similar historical precedents, and frequently

couches its argument in the language of humanistic psychology also.)
Finally, we should be alert to any drift in humanistic education

towards a technology of the spontaneous in interpersonal behavior-an orthodoxy of human relations for the classroom, cast as a grammar
of motives and actions.

Teacher Intervention

Rathbone (1971a) has stated that "To the proponent of open

education who holds each child to be an agent, much of the job of
teaching entails trying to convince the child to see himself from the
same perspective"

(p.

112).

Carl Rogers'

suggestions for establishing

a helping relationship certainly speak to this charge from a psycho-

But from the standpoint of

emotional angle (1970, pp. 39-57).

cognitive development, the task presents a somewhat paradoxical
problem.

For while the teacher wants on the one hand to refrain from

Cremin notes that for some,
See Cremin (1961), pp. 209-215.
of the school amost entirely
focus
"Freudianism seemed to shift the
For these
concerns.
to nonintellectual, or indeed, anti-intellectual,
authority,
of
denial
people oreoccupat ion with repression became a
Once again
preoccupation with the emotions, a denial of rationality.
•" (p
210).
license began to pass for liberty
2

.

.

•
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interrupting the child's process of assimilating
reality for himself,
there is a parallel need to stay in close contact
with the child's
activity, so as to guide it towards truly educative
ends.
(1938a) noted,

As Dewey

informal approaches to instruction "may mean more

multiplied and more intimate contacts" between teacher and child.
The problem, then,

is:

how these contacts can be established

without violating the principle of learning through personal experience" (p. 21).

Intervention seems both legitimate and necessary for diagnostic
purposes, to encourage inquiry, and to provide the procedures and

information that might be crucial to further inquiry.

Walberg and

Thomas (1971) characterize the Open teacher as one who "amplifies
and extends the possibilities of activities children have chosen,

through conversation, introduction of related materials, direct
instruction when warranted, and assignments appropriate to individual
needs"

(p

.

D

3)

.

To foster development, such extension of children's

activities would aim to consolidate their present understanding
through contact with parallel or related intellectual operations,
and to challenge the limits of that understanding by directing it
to more complex problems.

In general,

such teacher intervention pro

natural
vides an organizational function by attaching the child's
remote, that
exploratory and inquiry behavior "to ends that are more

objects, and ideas"
require finding and inserting intermediate acts,

(Dewey,

1933, p.

39).

usually overlooked in
One role of teacher intervention that is
in the Open classroom is
the statements characterizing instruction
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that relating to the actual initiation of students' activity.

Probably

because it chooses to see itself primarily in contrast to traditional

"teacher-directed" schooling, Open Education typically avoids describing the teacher's role in ways that might seem to contradict
the premise that "activities arise from children's interests and

responses to materials."

Nonetheless, teachers always indirectly

initiate specific activities through the environmental setting and

curricula they help create.

And as Hawkins (1971a) comments, "the

real importance of teacher intervention comes out in situations where
a child is not involved in very many things,

anything provided"

(p

.

is not responsive to

90).

Depending on the kind of learning outcome that

is

foreseen (re.

Eisner's three types of curriculum objectives), and assuming that we
can, according to Hawkins (1971b), describe at least three basic

patterns of classroom learning activity that are "different from each
of
other in the relations they induce between children, materials

study, and teachers" (p.

59), we might consider teacher interven-

giving of directives,
tion, exclusive of diagnostic intention and the
to employ these several strategies:

and feedback.
is,

questioning, direct instruction,

that
Each of these strategies can occur spontaneously;

with which the teacher comes
in response to some student activity

programmatic intervention wherein the
into contact, or as a planned,
directive role.
teacher assumes a more predetermined^

Questioning

.

probably devotes
The teacher in an Open classroom

intervention to asking questions
good portion of his spontaneous
interest in the substance
Questioning can communicate real
of students.

a
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of the student's activity, while serving
to model "an attitude of

inquiry and investigation toward all events
in the environment"
(Resnick, 1971, p.

Furthermore, the use of questions fulfills

13).

management function in the classroom, contributing "to

a

a sense

that children must make choices--and commitments--concerning
both
the content and manner of their work" (p.

Extended questioning as

a

13).

means of leading the child to consider

and articulate the reasons underlying his understanding and behavior
is a

proper intervention tactic for inducing some potentially

accommodative thinking.

The "clinical interview," used by Piaget

and Kohlberg to gather psychological data, is really a sequence of

responsive, yet leading, questions that probes for level of structural organization in the child's understanding.

It represents a

skilled technique that can clearly have educative as well as diagTeachers need to build similar plans for batteries

nostic value.

of related questions that can help extend the child's inquiry and

amplify his ideas within given areas of operational thinking.

Davis (1964)

Robert

in a discussion of instructional strategies to imple-

,

ment mathematical learning, contends that an effective teacher must
possess "the ability to construct quickly, in his head,

a kind of

programmed sequence of questions that builds carefully from one idea
He is also attentive to cues from the class which

to the next.

and to
indicate when to abandon his present sequence of questions,

replace it, or supplement it, with
questions

.

•

(p*

a

new programmed sequence of

134).

Direct instruction.

'We
David Hawkins (1965) has advised that
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must learn better to Instruct
children when, after absorption
in
subject matter, they communicate
by their behavior those
directions
which they are prepared to find
meaningful because they themselves
have begun to define and seek them.
And then there is the opposite
transition, when formal instruction
has brought children to new levels
of understanding and interpretation:

to open again the door to less

directed probing and testing at these new
levels--and thus to

consolidate what has been learned, to use
it for further learning"
(pp.

551-552).

In this view, direct instruction would
be scheduled

according to interest and developmental readiness,
and set in the

continuum of active inquiry behavior.

As procedure, direct instruc-

tion could be either informal, brought forth as immediate
response
to a child

s

question or uncertainty, or programmatic--a lecture, or

part of a planned discussion.

This notion of direct instruction

coming in response to indications of children's curiosity or need
is

basically consistent with the position that growth in understanding

is

dependent upon factors of cognitive conflict and cognitive match.

It also recognizes that children can assimilate verbal information

only if there
if the

is

prior concrete experience to serve as referent, and

information is comprehensible within the child's present cogni-

tive structural organization.
If Hawkins'

statement is read to mean, however, that formal

instruction on a given topic or skill must wait until the child's
individual inquiry experiences lead him to request it, then the imperative to develop understanding in areas that reflect culturally rele-

vant skills and abilities might not always be well-served.

It is both
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unfeasible and unnecessary, for example,
to wait for the child to
invent explanations for all the
phenomena that inform significant

scientific and technological concepts.

Atkin and Karplus (1962)

argue that the teacher must intervene,
for reasons of expediency,
to introduce certain conceptual understandings--to
"invent" them
for the child when he feels the child can
assimilate them.

"During

this introduction," they note, "the teacher must
make clear which

previous observations of the children can be interpreted (or
perhaps
reinterpreted) by using a concept.

Further, he must follow the intro-

duction with opportunities for the children to discover that new
observations can also be interpreted by using
Implicit in these prescriptions, of course,

is

a

concept"

(p.

47).

the acknowledgement

that 'hn invention is not complete and static, but it is the germ of
a

concept that is developed to greater significance by the subse-

quent discoveries.
is not evident.

When an invention

is made,

its full significance

Still, the concept must be introduced and the

invention must be made, if it is to grow in meaning"

(p.

45).

Open

pedagogy is obliged to recognize and incorporate this position on
instruction for children in the middle and upper elementary grades

who are capable, in varying degrees, of operating on the verbal
content of direct instruction as well as on concrete experience.
feedback.

Like questioning, feedback is an aspect of interven-

tion that is more likely to occur spontaneously in the Open classroom.
The teacher who seeks to extend and redirect inquiry activity will

want to make an appropriate communication to the child (or children)

who calls upon him for comment, or who indicates

a

need for some
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evaluative response.

Feedback thus conceived can contribute to

the child’s self-diagnostic efforts,
or may serve to help the child

continue, or complete, the activity he is
engaged in at
moment.

a

given

As teacher behavior, substantive feedback
can constitute

questioning, criticizing, summarizing, etc.

The functions of feedback that facilitate developmental
learning
include helping the child recognize and deal with "mistakes."

It

is

a developmental premise that "The mistakes that the child perceives

are dependent upon his own cognitive level and not upon the level

projected by the teacher" (Voyat, 1973,

p.

165).

During the course

of his classroom learning, the child will naturally recognize and

act upon some of his explanations that are inadequate inthe face
of new data, or his solutions that don't check out, or his construc-

tions that don’t "work."

The teacher may intervene on occasions

when the child fails to notice or acknowledge logical discrepancies,
or examples of inadequate reasoning and judgment, but his tactic

should be, so far as possible, merely to call attention to such
instances, without forcing the issue.
It is a common tendency for teachers, upon discovering that a

child cannot adequately cope with a given task because he fails to
take into account a certain vital factor, to think that

i_hey

can

readily lead him to perceive and incorporate that factor into his

understanding of the problem.

In an experiment designed to discover

found
how a child makes use of substantive feedback, Voyat (1973)
that he can
that "even if one can provide the child with information

not going to surpass
use with a given context such as seriation, he is
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performance

,

rather, he /the teacher/ must
wait for the child's

operatory structure to develop to
observe incidence of other modalities
of learning.

.

.

.

Merely providing feedback

is

not sufficient to

change the ability of a child to
integrate information"

(p

.

166).

Under less informal, or incidental,
circumstances, the teacher

can provide feedback that may implement
more adequate understanding
by taking part in group discussion or
argument.

Newman and Oliver

(1971) argue that "Given the objective of open dialogue
aimed toward

developing complex individual positions, we should adopt
whatever
posture seems likely to achieve this objective.

In general this would

imply a combination of neutral summarizer and devil's advocate.
In special cases, on certain issues,

to meet one's moral responsi-

bilities as a citizen, it is necessary to take a firm stand and
even to try to persuade students that

a

view is most reasonable

(implying the commited advocate posture)"

(p

.

57).

In this chapter I have suggested that teacher intervention,
for purposes of diagnosis,

instruction, and constructive evaluation

needs to reflect an awareness of genetic epistemology and develop-

mental psychology.

The next, and last, chapter

will offer a summary

statement of the dissertation, along with some directions for further

research--and for the professional development of teachers.

142

chapter

VII

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The machine teacher, like
the empiric in every profession,
becomes a stupefying and corrupting
influence in his surround ings; he
himself becomes a mere
tradesman, and makes his school
a mere machine shop.
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 201)
.

.

.

it is by and through research
that the teacher's
profession ceases to be merely a trade
•

.

(Piaget,

1972, p.

130)

lf they do not intellectually
organize their own
work, while they may do much in making
the lives of the
children committed to them more joyous and
more vital,
they contribute only incidental scraps to
the science*
of education.
*

'

(Dewey,

1928, p.

120)

b y far the m °st progress has been made
in those
cities where the teachers themselves are the most
students.
•

•

*

(Rice,

1893, p.

18)

SUMMARY

The dissertation first identified a major problem for Open Educa
tion and its efforts to establish viable theory for curriculum and

instruction.

This is the tendency to advocate, and to articulate

guidelines for, educational change primarily in ideological terms.

While an educational reform movement may be carried along initially
by the efforts of persuasive critics writing in times of social fer-

ment, and by the examples of a few conspicuously successful experi-

ments in progressive schooling, it must ultimately define itself
through its manifest ability to sponsor total development in individu
al children, and in particular, the development of an active and

resourceful intelligence.
This charge necessitates an informed understanding of what
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intelligence is, and how it
develoos
vciops.

Th P basic assumptions
The
Open

educators hol d with respect
to learning and development
are avowedly
derived from the research of
Jean Piaget, and of cognitive-

developmental psychology.

No less a factor in the
evolution of

informal pedagogy has been the
influence of John Dewey.

By combin-

ing the insights of their two
essentially similar positions on knowledge,

intelligence, and development as the
aim of education, a

theoretical framework from which
prescriptions for practice could be
inferred was set forth.

The dissertation then attempted to
systematically sketch out

implications of
for learning,

a

developmental theory for creating an environment

for building curriculum, and for establishing
guide-

lines for instruction and teacher intervention.

It was argued that

the Open teacher's role as diagnostician needs to be
more knowledgeably

articulated, and that instruction and curriculum must be informed
by developmental notions of cognitive conflict and optimal match.

Subject matter needs to be increasingly thought of in terms of the
kinds of logical thinking it involves, or evokes, while teacher inter-

vention should emphasize questioning strategies to stimulate and
extend thinking, and the growth of understanding.
Directions for Further Research
And Development of Theory

These implications for improving Open classroom practice suggest some specific directions for further research and development.

Probably the greatest need
match.

is

in the area of diagnosing for optimal

Psychologists and educators must develop procedures for
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diagnosing thinking ability and
level of reasoning in

a

variety of

contexts, that are feasible for
use in the classroom without disrupting the learning activity of the
child.

The continued research of

Kohlberg and his colleagues in the area
of determining an "open
period" for development seems particularly
crucial here.

Likewise,

psychologists and curriculum developers need to
increase our understanding of the logical operations inherent
in subject matter, so as
to help the teacher map out

the logical interrelationships in diverse

skills and activities, and plan for instruction
accordingly, within
a given range of cognitive sophistication.

The work of developmental-

ists like Piaget and Kohlberg in establishing protocols for
inter-

viewing and observing, has, as

I

noted earlier, significant potential

for instructional strategies as well as for diagnosis.

need to maintain

a

Educators

regular dialogue with cognitive-developmental

researchers who are refining and testing out procedures for influencing stage advance.

Open educators need also, however, to be cautioned against over-

estimating the significance of any paradigm of development with
respect to dictating strategies for individualizing instruction.

As

Dewey (1928) noted, "certainly in such an undertaking as education,
we must employ the word 'science' modestly and humbly; there

is no

subject in which the claim to be strictly scientific is more likely
to suffer from pretence, and none in which it is more dangerous to

set up a rigid orthodoxy, a standardized set of beliefs to be accepted
by all"

(p.

116).

The implications of Piaget's theory for assessing
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intellectual competence, and for
designing and sequencing subject

matter in a curriculum, need to
be clarified considerably before
teachers can apply them effectively
and reliably.

Sullivan (1967)

has rightly called our attention to
the tendency for "uncritical

extrapolation

of Piaget's observations on development,
especially

as they are used to justify discovery
learning notions that preclude

direct instruction, or behavior modification
approaches.

Behavior modification and operant conditioning
techniques have
been widely employed in elementary education.

Piaget (1972) has

argued that these techniques do not produce learning outcomes
that
are transferable and reversible, and therefore they carry no develop-

mental significance (pp

.

75-80).

Questions like "How do these train-

ing techniques contribute to development?" and "How should teachers

employ them within an overall strategy of implementing individual
inquiry?" might suggest directions for some particularly useful
research.
I

have reiterated in this dissertation that Open Education has

been primarily

a

lower elementary grade concern.

While there have

been some seemingly related innovations for the more advanced grades
(e.g., "schools without walls," open-space schools), there are no

well-established theoretical directions for extending the ideas that
%

inform Open practice into the upper grades.

Work needs to be done,

therefore, that would explore the implications that developmental
theory holds for learning in these grades.

Specifically, such studies

would consider how an Open classroom approach might best accommodate
the learning styles of older children and adolescents, who are
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increasingly able to function intellectually at

abstract reasoning.

a

Questions like "How important

level of formal
is

concrete

experience to adolescent learning?'' might be addressed here.

Equally important would be a consideration of what Open Education might mean for more socially mature students (with their own

peculiar identity problems)

,

and how it could develop curriculum

that reflects appropriate opportunities for role-taking and purposeful social interaction.

Case studies of development and evaluations

of learning achievement need to be undertaken in those middle and

high schools where attempts at mounting an Open classroom approach
have been made.
In general, Open Education that holds development for its aim

requires more appropriate means for program evaluation than those
instruments which only measure skill-specific achievement.

The

results of a current study on evaluation methods for the Open classroom, conducted by the Educational Confederation of St. Louis, Mo.,

should make an important contribution to this problem.
a

This is still

wide-open area for research and development, since Open Education,

by its definition of multiple objectives for schooling, needs new

instruments for evaluating process and "product," as well as some

cumulative data to assess and redirect its own development.

On a broader front, cognitive-developmental theory needs to be
more effectively linked with ego development.

Research like that of

like
Loevinger and Wessler (1970) might delve further into questions

theory of
"How does cognitive stage theory parallel Erikson's stage

affect the
identity development?" or "How do identity 'problems'
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dynamics of cognitive equilibration?"

The work of psychologists

like Hauser (1971) on identity formation,
and on the phenomenon of
identity foreclosure"

(p

.

30), begs some correlation with research

in the development of moral reasoning, and the
factors that retard

cognitive stage advance.

cognitive development

is

It would also be useful to explore how

contingent upon the student's capacity to

accept, confront, and function in social realities, and to deal with

anxiety.

An anthropological perspective on the effects of socializa-

tion tendencies (e.g.. peer conformity, grouping) upon development
in the Open classroom would also be a valuable addition to the
1

research

Open educators speak of their commitment to meeting the emotional
needs and the intellectual interests of children.

Cognitive and

ego development psychologists have provided some considerable

insights into what the terms "emotional needs" and "intellectual

interests" might signify, and how they might be more strictly defined
for educational purposes.

Open educators need to accept this charge

to make their assumptions regarding needs and interests psychologically

informed, and logically correct.

Some interesting studies could be

undertaken to ascertain correlations between teacher beliefs and
teacher behavior in the Open classroom, as well as between teacher

expectations and student behavior.

Such studies might suggest ways

study on the
such contribution should be Jack Fagin's field
in an Open
interchange
social
effects the different opportunities for
dissertation
a
as
published
classroom have on learning behavior (to be
of Education).
at the University of Massachusetts, School
^-One
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to bring into more critical perspective the validity of
Open

Education's philosophical premises regarding children and learning.
Directions for Further Research
in Progressive Innovation

In Chapter II I -discussed at some length those factors in

progressive educational reform that serve to impede and militate
against successful change in the schools.

Among these factors, that

of alleged class bias on the part of reformers and advocates of

reform (as pointed out by Featherstone

/_1971a_/,

for example)

is

especially trenchant for Open Education, and needs to be examined
in some depth.

Part of the issue is the question of how appropriate

it is to prepare children to become creative,

autonomously-thinking

individuals in a society that functions according to bureaucratic,

hierarchical organization.

Are Open classrooms really feasible (both

psychologically and sociologically--in the sense that education
a key to

is

upward social mobility) for, say, a factory community?

Have there been attempts to "open up" classrooms in such communities,

and if so, what has happened?

What about rural communities?

Can

for
Open Education really prepare all American children adequately
a

variety of job lives?
in three
Open Education has so far most notably taken hold

distinctly different settings:
School in Bennington, Vt.

in private schools like the Prospect

and in some wealthy suburban public

where multi-age classschools; in a rural state like North Dakota,

room groupings were

a

urban public
logistic necessity; and in selected
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schools like those ln
Lillian Weber’s Open Corridor
Program, „ he;re
the typical school
population Is racially and
economically mixed.
,

Some extremely valuable
comparative studies could be
undertaken to
document how these various
operations demonstrate similar, or
different, problems In getting
started, maintaining themselves, and
growing and changing.

Another self-defeating characteristic
of progressive innovation
discussed in Chapter II was that of general
ineptitude in husbanding
change in the schools.

Barth's essay (1972) on an abortive attempt

to open up a school in New Haven, Conn.,

is a fine case study of this

problem, but more need to come forth to document
not only the failures
but the successes too.

Such studies could yield helpful insights

to questions like "How, and under what conditions, can an
Open

classroom approach be instituted on a scale that makes

it clearly

visible to the community; what political considerations need to be
made; what strategies might be employed to inform and persuade

appropriate pressure groups; what levels of public school personnel
need to be involved, and in what ways can their involvement be

optimally manifested?"

Another area for potential study
institutions--e

.

g.

,

is

the role of "outside"

universities, the federal and state governmental

agencies, and private foundations--in sponsoring the development
of Open Education in the schools.

In what ways have they been (and

can they be) most helpful in aiding local school districts, or

individual schools, in engineering significant change.

In what ways

do they sabotage such efforts by creating a "carpet bagger" image for
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Open Education!

What has

the reUtlonshlp bet

_ ^
n

e£forts

to establish teacher
centers in America, and
efforts to provide ongoing support to teachers
trying to informal^
classrooms and reorient

their room environments!

A further contribution to
an understanding

of how progressive educational
change is effected in this
country

would be

a

study of how innovation expressed
in terms of philosophi-

cal and ideological convictions
is coopted by the education
industry

how ideas get translated into
marketable curricula, and how this

phenomenon affects reform trends in general.
Implications for Teacher Training
and Professional Growth

Open teachers have been characterized by Walberg
and Thomas
(1971) as "seeking opportunity to promote /their own/
growth"
(p.

D 8).

This quality of professionalism

is a

crucial one for

American teachers, and needs to be instilled and cultivated
from
the very outset of pre-service teacher training.

The teacher himself

needs to develop the habits and skills of a researcher if he

effectively provide for the development of children.

is

to

He also needs

to become a sensitive and knowledgeable observer of children.

Interestingly, Dewey had several times suggested that teacher

training programs be founded on developing habits of scientific

observation of children and classroom life, while Piaget advocates
that prospective teachers be given instruction and continuous practice
in clinical observation and diagnostic interviewing procedures.

^See,

2

for example, Dewey (1904), and Piaget (1964b), p. 40.
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Furthermore, the teacher's

comment

to studying the ways of
chil-

dren should be complemented by a
self-monitoring process, wherein
he undertakes to maintain a
conscious awareness of "the self
as

instrument" in the educative process of
child acting on subject
matter.

Essentially, the task of the Open teacher
interested in

facilitating development is to provide for an
optimal match between
learner and subject matter in such ways as might
conduce to structural
change.

If the beginning teacher, or the experienced
teacher,

to

is

assume this responsibility, he must be helped to "perceive
both the

existence of a poor match and the organizational possibility for
better one" (Weber, 1972,

p.

a

This suggests that the learning

66).

psychology component of a teacher training program would optimally
be "built into"--or at least strongly coordinated with--the methods

component, so that apprentice teachers are continuously aware of the

potential for building curriculum along lines of developmental
schedules, and become increasingly competent in viewing curriculum
in terms of logical operations.

Some interesting comparison studies

might be made on the effects upon the attitudes and competencies of
teachers of pre- and in-service training that emphasizes these
p

riorities
We might also expect, from the teacher who holds that develop-

ment is continuous and gradual, and

is

predicated upon an active,

questioning, inquisitive approach to experience, that his own behavior

would illustrate a similar disposition.

Voyat (1973) has stated that

"the teacher should be convinced that his work holds out the possi-

bility of continuous self-reorganization, new construction, and

discover,
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and that hls discipUne
contains

m

infinite number o£

possibilities for theoretical
deepening and technical
improvement"
(P- 171).
This comment needs to be
understood

as a mandate for
teachers to become more
self-directive by assuming the
intellectual
autonomy necessary to adequately
meet the developmental needs
of
children in their classrooms.
The teacher, as Dewey always
argued,
requires a sound, working knowledge
of those psychological
principles
that justify the ethical beliefs
of progressive education.
With this

knowledge, the teacher need not be
"at the mercy of every sort
of
doctrine or device, but may have his
own standards by which to test
the many methods and expedients
constantly urged upon him

(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p.

202).

..."

Lillian Weber (1971) reinforces

this contention when she remarks that
"Without connection to a
coherent, nexus of constantly reexamined idea
and examples of applica-

tions that extend idea, the teacher has adapted
to the systematization
of the American school, and the teacher as an
individual feels

helpless to produce change"

(p.

235).

We should note that this point

applies equally to Open classroom teachers:
ing a vital,

the problem of articulat-

thorough-going Open pedagogy that can be widely adapted--

without becoming just another educational orthodoxy--is

a

problem of

individual educators evolving a common yet varied practice informed
by theory.

Speaking in 1928, after three decades of Progressive Education,

John Dewey observed that "we already have the elements of a distinctive

contribution to the body of educational theory:

respect for individual

capacities, interests and experience; enough external freedom and
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informality at least to enable
teachers to become acquainted
with
children as they really are;
respect for self-initiated
and self-

conducted learning; respect for
activity as the stimulus and
centre
of learning; and perhaps above
all belief in social contact,
communication, and cooperation upon a
normal human plane as an
all-enveloping

medium

(pp.

115-116).

These statements represented
Dewey'

s

most

charitable assessment of the progress
of Progressive pedagogy.

They

might also serve to denote the extent
to which pedagogical thinking
for Open Education has evolved.

In this dissertation

I

have argued

that the next step for proponents and
practitioners of Open Education
IS to

consolidate, and further elaborate these
"elements," so that

Open practice may be developed and extended on
the basis of sound,
coherent psychological and philosophical principles.

TEXTUAL NOTE
have used the word "he"
to indicate the
universal pronoun
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